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Time for Seoul, US to close the
gap
By Ralph A Cossa
Debates
are raging among the security-policy communities in the
United States and South Korea over North Korean motives
and intentions and how best to deal with Pyongyang.
There seems to be only one point upon which all agree:
no solution to the current standoff is practical
(perhaps even possible) unless Washington and Seoul are
in lock-step with one another in dealing with an
increasingly belligerent and provocative North Korea.
While the two sides may not be as far apart as
many believe, significant policy and perception gaps
clearly exist between the two allies that the North is
busily exploiting. In order to close these gaps, it is
important first to understand the fundamental
differences between the two sides.
During recent
discussions with high-level South Korean officials, one
told me that the main difference was that "we both have
a carrot-and-stick approach but Seoul chooses to
emphasize the carrots while Washington seems to favor
the sticks". Many South Koreans find resonance in this
description, but I believe it widely misses the mark.
While the US has an image of speaking loudly while
waving a big stick, this hardly applies in the case of
North Korea. Even the State Department's leading hawk,
Undersecretary John Bolton, has argued for a peaceful,
diplomatic, albeit multilateral solution.
One
can also argue that the US has for many years followed a
"carrot or stick" approach: behave and you get carrots;
misbehave and the sticks come out. There was an aspect
of this in former South Korean president Kim Dae-jung's
Sunshine Policy as well: aggressive North Korean
behavior would not be tolerated, but political and
economic cooperation would be rewarded.
The
classic "carrot and stick" approach calls for the farmer
to hold a carrot on a stick in front of a stubborn
donkey, but just out of its reach, to get it to move in
the right direction. Sunshine Policy critics observed
that Seoul's stick was too short: the donkey was able to
get the carrots without moving at all. What was needed
was not necessarily a new policy - everyone supports
engagement over war - but a longer stick. It remains to
be seen how long a stick South Korea's new President Roh
Moo-hyun will employ in pursuing his new "Policy of
Peace and Prosperity".
In his inauguration
address, Roh said he would "give priority to building
trust and upholding reciprocity". It was the absence of
reciprocity - the failure of the donkey to move - that
caused concern (in South Korea as well as the US) about
the Sunshine Policy's implementation. An insistence on
reciprocity (and Roh's companion pledge to "enhance
transparency" in dealing with the North) will help close
the policy and perception gap between Washington and
Seoul while also helping secure the domestic bipartisan
support needed for any South Korean policy to succeed.
Ironically, while the US retains its "heavy on
the sticks" image, the only country either to threaten
or actually use force against North Korea in recent
years is South Korea itself. On at least three occasions
- during the June crab-fishing season in 1999, 2001, and
2002 - shots were fired by South Korean Navy patrol
boats at intruding North Korean ships. In two instances,
North Korean sailors were killed; in the latest
instance, several South Korean sailors also died when
their patrol ship was sunk. (Those who believe that the
timing of that incident, within hours of the soccer
World Cup semi-final, was coincidental, should take note
of the North's missile test within hours of President
Roh's inauguration; another coincidence? ... or a sign
of sheer disrespect?)
Seoul's firm response to
the North's aggressive behavior - which in each case was
strongly backed by the South Korean public and by
Washington - did not result in North Korean attacks but,
at least in the last case, in an apology. It is
important to remember these precedents if the North
again acts aggressively toward an unarmed US
reconnaissance aircraft (as it did recently) and the US
this time responds with force.
This also compels
me to ask an impolite question: Do South Koreans believe
that fishing in disputed waters is a more serious act of
aggression than the development of nuclear weapons?
To be fair, Roh has also taken a strong stand
against the North's nuclear-weapons program. He is on
record stating that he "would not tolerate" a
nuclear-weapons-equipped North Korea. (The
English-language text of his inauguration remarks said
that the North's nuclear development "can never be
condoned", causing some to worry if this was a weakening
of his position, but the Korean text reinforces his
earlier "will not tolerate" stance.) In his inauguration
address, Roh said "Pyongyang must abandon nuclear
development. If it renounces its nuclear-development
program, the international community will offer many
things it wants." This is precisely the same as
Washington's stated position.
The main
difference between the two sides is Roh's statement that
a preemptive attack on North Korea to prevent its
development of nuclear weapons is "a serious issue, and
at this moment I am against even consideration of such
an option" and US President George W Bush's assertion
that "all options" remain open even though he's
"optimistic that we'll come up with a diplomatic
solution".
Let's accentuate the positive: both
Bush and Roh prefer and are actively seeking a
diplomatic solution; neither sees the use of force as a
viable option at this time. Both sides also agree that
South Korea should have a major voice in any solution
(since it is the people of South Korea who are literally
under the gun during this standoff) and that the crisis
impacts not only Washington and Seoul but the Korean
Peninsula's neighbors and the global non-proliferation
regime. They even agree that dialogue is the preferred
solution and that a central aspect of this dialogue is
direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang.
Why then can't we narrow the gap through a joint
statement, perhaps issued by Secretary of State Colin
Powell and South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon
Young-kwan, reaffirming that Washington and Seoul remain
committed to a diplomatic solution, one that encompasses
direct dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang in a
broader setting that ensures that Seoul's voice is also
heard and that the concerns of Korea's neighbors and the
international community are also taken into account? And
why shouldn't this communique also note that both sides
are committed to a peaceful solution at this time while
acknowledging that continued aggressive behavior on the
part of Pyongyang could force both allies to jointly
reassess this commitment?
Ralph A
Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS a
Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated
with the Center for Strategic and International Studies
in Washington, and senior editor of Comparative Connections, a
quarterly electronic journal.
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