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How to drag out the US-Korea
talks
By Jaewoo Choo
 SEOUL -
South Korean analysts and US experts on Korean Peninsula
affairs have agreed, according to reports in the Seoul
press on Tuesday, that there is zero possibility of a US
invasion of the North in the next year. Their
calculation is simply based on how long it is going to
take the US to get ready for another war in the
aftermath of Iraq.
This military strategic
calculation is in deep conflict with President George W
Bush's schedule for re-election. For what both the
Korean and American analysts omitted to state clearly
was how Bush is going to be able to manipulate the talks
with the North, scheduled to get under way in Beijing on
Wednesday, to go beyond 2004. This is where
understanding how the superpower plays it diplomatic
poker game is vital.
When growing up, we all had
the experience of opening up the back cover of a clock
out of curiosity to see how a clock runs. There we saw
two big cogs running against each other relatively at a
much slower pace than other small cogs that supported
them. Let's assume that these two big wheels were the US
and North Korea, as they are the main actors of the
upcoming talks. Always the supporting actors are
spinning too much faster to notice anything but minding
their own turnings. But the tooth of a big cog runs
against the other from its counterpart at a much slower
pace.
At the outset of the talks between the US
and North Korea, the very first teeth biting each other
will be the nuclear problem. However, as the talks
proceed, they may run into a need for a shift in
strategy. That is when the United States' second tooth
will turn against the North's. It could range from
human-rights issues to the freedom-of-religion issue,
from inspections for weapons of mass destruction to
reduction of conventional weapons, from espionage
activities for military technology to its sales, or
proliferation of its byproducts. Whatever the case, the
US has plenty of teeth in its cog.
We can draw
plenty of analogies from its conduct of relationship
with China. When it needs to buy some time, the US may
well come up with a human-rights card. It is
foreseeable, as in the case with China since the
Tiananmen massacre and the bloody suppression of the
democratic movement in 1989, that the US has already
prepared itself with such an issue to deliver to North
Korea. When the news broke that the trilateral talks
were to be held between Wednesday and Friday in Beijing,
the report of the passing of resolution on North Korean
human rights at the United Nations came out the same
day. Of 53 countries voting, 28 voted yes, including
Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland,
Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
In other words, those nations that presumably are the
main actors in an expanded multilateral talks format as
suggested by the US last January, that is 5+5 (see North Korea: What's on the table,
February 4), all voted for the resolution. On the other
hand, China and Russia, also part of the 5+5 scheme,
voted against it.
What is ironic about the two
events is that South Korea excluded itself. As for the
trilateral talks, it was disclosed that on April 4,
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun accepted a deal from
Bush on the trilateral formation of the talks. At the
voting of the UN resolution, South Korea decided not to
attend in consideration of its relationship with the
North. On the same day, however, it hosted a group of
lawmakers from five countries launching an international
parliamentary forum aimed at addressing issues
concerning North Korean asylum seekers. The 31-member
General Meeting of the International Parliamentarians
Coalition for North Korea Refugees and Human Rights
(IPCNKR) is composed of politicians from South Korea,
the United States, Japan, Britain and Mongolia. Thus, it
becomes quite obvious that the next item on the US
agenda is human rights. This could very much hinder the
talks progress when sufficiently used in the future
course of the talks, as North Korea, like China, would
be not willing to submit itself to such interference in
its sovereign affairs.
The US could further
employ another tactic in prolonging its talks with North
Korea as it did in January 1999 by presenting an
allegation on nuclear development. At that time, the
Bill Clinton administration came up with a report of a
possible nuclear-development program being built in a
small remote town named Geum Chang-ri. After a
persistent demand for inspection at the alleged site,
the US finally got its way, only to find nothing but
empty warehouses. A similar tactic could be employed
with various sites in North Korea as the entire nation
utilizes all its resources, including territory, to arm
itself.
Another tactic could be found in US
apprehension over the North's overseas activities. Such
means were carried out in the heat of moment in 1993
when the US Navy detained a Chinese ship, the Yinhe, off
the coast of North Africa for inspection because it was
suspected of shipping Scud missiles to some rogue states
in the Middle East. A similar detainment of North Korean
vessels or trains is possible. Last summer, off the
coast of Yemen, a North Korean vessel was raided by
Spanish naval forces alerted by the US that it was
shipping weapons of mass destruction to that country.
Luckily for North Korea, the Yemeni government admitted
its order of the shipment and the case faded away.
However, two days prior to the US-North Korean talks, a
North Korean ship with a Southeast Asian smuggler of
heroin on board was stopped for inspection and was
charged with drug-trafficking. Such hide-and-seek games
could be played to the US advantage at any time with all
the surveillance technology and equipment it has.
Another thing that could drag out the talks
would be a religious factor. The practice of Falungong,
a form of qigong, an ancient Chinese
deep-breathing exercise system sometimes combined with
meditation, certainly had a downside effect on the
bilateral relationship between the US and China. China
did not approve of its practice in its own territory as
it dubbed it a heretical religion in violation of the
Chinese constitution that prohibits illegal
congregation, in which the religion is often practiced.
For North Korea, however, it would not be much of a case
because the society is very much closed to religious
practice. Nonetheless, with South Korean missionaries'
persistent efforts at spreading the Christian message
combined with their continuous endeavor at organizing
North Koreans to escape from their inhumane living
condition for a better life, there is no guarantee
Christianity has not permeated into the country. If that
is the case, the consequences are self-evident: the
international community will not stand for religious
oppression.
Whatever teeth the US cog is going
to use against North Korea, South Korea cannot afford to
lose sight while spinning against the two. South Korea
must concentrate to its utmost so as not to repeat its
mistake of being left out but becoming fully responsible
of bearing all the costs of the outcome of the bilateral
talks. It must remind itself how the US initiated the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
program only to pass on the big chunk of financial
burden to the shoulders of the South Korean people.
South Korea also has to remember what kind of effect the
allegation in Geum Chang-ri had on the stability and
peace of the peninsula.
It also has to be able
to read the next card the US is going to hand down in
order to achieve true cooperation despite Seoul's
exclusion from the talks. Otherwise, Roh Moo-hyun's
government may have to rely on other means in pursuit of
its policy toward the North, something like his
predecessor Kim Dae-jung did when he held a summit
meeting with Kim Jong-il in June 2000 after the
breakdown of the four-party talks in August 1999.
Jaewoo Choo, PhD, is a research fellow
with the Trade Research Institute, Seoul. The opinions
expressed in this article are his own.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
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