| |
Game of nerves in Northeast
Asia
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - What would happen if tomorrow a few US
fighters bombed all known North Korean facilities
engaged in the production of nuclear weapons? Would
Pyongyang retaliate? Would it fire missiles at Japan or
bombard Seoul? Or would it just shout and cry and do
nothing?
Would Kim Jong-il's political career
survive the attack? Would all the generals survive as
well? How would the new peace-prone South Korean
government cope with a US attack that was not agreed
upon?
What would China do in this predicament
that would, in one stroke, drastically rearrange the
political geography of the region?
These are
perhaps the real big questions of the day, despite the
lingering concern for Iraq and new worries raised by
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Iraq, despite
some people's protests and US blunders, will be an
extensive project, and peace will be won only in the
long run. SARS is no plague and its implication for the
internal and international politics of China are
medium-term, after the disease is brought under control.
But concern surrounding North Korea is more
immediate, and Pyongyang's intentions are not yet clear.
Early this week some South Koreans argued that
Pyongyang was willing to drop its nuclear plans. "The
sources said North Korea proposed, on the first day of
the talks, a package of exchanges with the United
States, offering to dismantle its nuclear weapons
program in exchange for steps by the United States to
move toward normal relations with the North," the Joong
Ang Daily reported on Sunday.
Just a few hours
earlier, on Saturday, the North Koreans had been
stonewalling Seoul's demands to drop their nuclear
plans. "We made it clear that we can never accept North
Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. We emphasized
that the North should dismantle nuclear weapons, if it
had any, as well as its nuclear facilities," South
Korean government spokesman Shin Eun-sang said in
Pyongyang.
The conflicting statements came after
the breakdown of the talks among North Korea, the United
States and China that were held last week in Beijing.
On Friday a commentary in the People's Daily
stated: "It can be predicted that the tripartite talks,
in the first step they will try to get to know about
each other, the negotiation will not succeed at one go.
Even if it breaks down once it starts, the situation
will not become tense immediately, it is still too early
to talk about possible American use of force against
North Korea." Yet the paper, a mouthpiece of the Chinese
leadership, warned against any possible US preemptive
attack on the North Korea. It was a sign that Beijing
considered such an attack possible.
From the
Chinese perception, the North Koreans had come to
Beijing last week not to cut any deal but rather to
scout out US intentions. The head of their delegation
was too low, a mere vice director general, who could not
make any decision, he would only bring back news. The
breakdown was, as the Chinese put it, "wind which not
necessarily will bring rain".
The Chinese were
in fact trying to calm down the Americans, who are
growing very upset about North Korean brinkmanship. And
it is not only a matter of sensitivity. Many Americans
do believe that the lesson Pyongyang has drawn from the
Iraq war is that it must possess weapons of mass
destruction in order to make a US attack on North Korean
very costly (see for instance "China's mediation
backfires on North Korea" by Nayan Chanda, Yale Center
for the Study of Globalization, April 28).
They
don't believe that Pyongyang wants to trade its nuclear
weapons for anything, as the nuclear threat is the only
life insurance for the regime. China has been arguing
that the North Korean leaders have an interest in doing
business with the US, as this could provide the
necessary lifeline for the country. This is certainly
true provided there is mutual trust, which is not there.
In a nutshell: The US does not trust and won't do
business with a nuclear Pyongyang, and Pyongyang doesn't
trust and won't do business with the US without itself
possessing nukes. One can argue that trust can be built,
the North Koreans could be restrained, a bigger North
Korean fish could be brought to the table. But there are
further complications on the matter.
On April 12
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, hosting a
Trilateral Commission luncheon, argued that dialogue
with the North is the only option. South Koreans at the
meeting argued that in the past years in the South the
perception of the North has dramatically changed. The
younger generation feels that Pyongyang ought to be
pitied and thus helped, it can't be considered a threat.
Moreover, Japan feels that it can't rely only on the
United States for its security and it must build its own
security (see In Beijing, diplomatic opportunities
abound, April 19).
Then, if Japan will take
care of its own and the South thinks war against the
North is not an option, what is the use of the US forces
in South Korea and Japan? Is the United States redundant
in East Asia?
One can make up any kind of
justification, saying that for Japan two forces (its own
and the US one) are better than one (the simple US one).
For South Korea one can say that the US presence is
still a guarantee of stability. But the truth of the
matter is: if the United States can't solve the nuclear
issue in Pyongyang, Japan will grow uninterested in US
intervention and it will think that it has to take
things in its own hands.
Many things are
actually occurring behind the scenes. Japanese hawks are
holding more frequent talks with Chinese hawks on the
solution to the North Korean issue. And priorities are
different. China doesn't want the collapse of North
Korea, which would plunge 20 million poor North Koreans
on to the shoulders of China's already economically
battered northeast; thus a nuclear North Korea is better
than a collapsed North Korea. For Japan the issue is to
keep North Korea at bay, preventing the launch of any
threat, by word or by action. For South Korea the issue
is to assure the world that the peninsula is stable and
no war is going to erupt. The US is afraid of nuclear
proliferation, thinking that Pyongyang could sell
nuclear material or weapons as it now sells heroin and
amphetamines (see North Korea: Hand in the cookie jar,
April 29), and it is concerned that its regional
position could be at stake. North Korea wants to prop up
its regime and its military aristocracy, thus it needs
money to pay off the generals while showing off to the
world its starving population (which has to stay
famished for propaganda purposes). The bomb could well
be the guarantee that nobody will molest North Korea's
current order and the perks of blackmail on its own
people and on the region.
It is a very
complicated tangle, which however could turn up very
simple if one were first to bomb the North Korean
nuclear facilities, and then immediately offer Pyongyang
enough carrots to keep it calm, refraining from reaction
and from collapse. But nobody knows if after the bombing
there could prevail in Pyongyang a self-destructive
pride that would dive the country into war, or a
self-preservation instinct to keep things low-key. Not
many people would be willing to check it out, because
such a gamble could ignite South Korean protests. Thus
everybody pushes for North Korea to disarm, something
that is not taking place.
At this juncture
anybody could lose self-control and make a mistake,
which would mandate China's unhindered attention, but as
SARS is threatening the country's economy and stability,
nobody can care for anything else.
This stall
could well go on for months. In the meantime Japanese,
Chinese and South Koreans will increase their exchanges
and the United States will grow more nervous. Certainly
Washington has its hands full with Iraq, while
Afghanistan is far from stabilized and friction with
France is still hot. The US economy shows enough signs
of fatigue as things are without taking on another
difficult bundle such as North Korea. But the present US
administration has proved more than once it is willing
to act very conventionally, and this also could put a
new spin on everything.
(©2003 Asia Times Online
Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
