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Korea: The time for ambiguity is
over
By Ralph A Cossa
What
exactly did North Korea claim or admit to and in what
context? And how has this affected the Bush
administration's approach toward dealing with Pyongyang?
The answer is, I'm not sure ... and neither are most of
the reporters and "experts" who have been commenting on
the April 23-25 Beijing "talk about talks" and its
aftermath, based on unidentified "informed sources" or
"unnamed officials".
This much is clear. North
Korea has been inching ever closer to admitting that it
has, at a minimum, a nuclear-weapons program, if not the
weapons themselves. Reports of whispers in the ear of
assistant secretary of state James Kelly in Beijing
aside, Pyongyang has yet to make such a claim officially
and unambiguously, however, while denying some (but not
all) of the allegations.
There are, of course,
some good reasons North Korea may want the world, and
more specifically the administration of US President
George W Bush, to think that it is a nuclear-weapons
state. First appears to be the belief - perhaps mistaken
- that the possession of nuclear weapons may be an
insurance policy against North Korean leader Kim
Jong-il's regime meeting the same fate as Saddam
Hussein's. This, plus the fact that threats appear to be
Pyongyang's leading export, and the only thing that, in
the past, have brought handouts or garnered North Korea
serious attention on the international stage.
But there are also some downsides. In his
inauguration address, South Korean President Roh
Moo-hyun stated that North Korea could either enjoy the
benefits of South Korean and international trade and
assistance or it could go down the nuclear path; it was
a clear either-or choice. Russia has also stated that it
would be forced to reconsider its opposition to
sanctions or other harsh measures if North Korea were to
come out of the nuclear closet and China has forcefully
warned that such a step would not be in North Korea's
interests. So Pyongyang's challenge is to be specific
enough to convince the Bush administration that it has
nuclear weapons while being vague enough to not push its
neighbors into seeking retribution. Hence its apparent
decision to have its representative in Beijing make
private assertions to Kelly out of earshot of others.
This is a dangerous game, for more than one
reason. The great irony is that North Korea already has
a sufficient security blanket to keep it from being an
obvious target of the Bush administration, namely its
ability to wreak havoc in the South with its massive
conventional military forces. That, plus the commitment
of the Roh government to a policy of engagement, since
any serious US military action against Pyongyang would
almost certainly require Seoul's consent, if not
approval. But this restraint could come to an end if
North Korea pushes too far in its nuclear adventurism.
And the threat of North Korea mass-producing nuclear
weapons, or even highly enriched uranium or plutonium
(contained in the spent fuel rods Pyongyang claims it is
either already or on the verge of reprocessing) could be
the straw that breaks this camel's back.
The
consequences of responding with sanctions and censure,
if not with military force, at some point become less
serious than the consequences of doing nothing and thus
allowing Pyongyang to produce and possibly export such
weapons or weapons-grade materials. Press reporting to
the contrary, the Bush administration has made it clear
that its overall policy toward North Korea's nuclear
program is unchanged: it seeks a complete, verifiable
end to Pyongyang's nuclear-weapons program and is also
intent on preventing the North from exporting any
nuclear weapons, materials, or hardware. It also
continues to seek a diplomatic, multilateral solution
while keeping all options on the table.
What
happens next remains unclear. Pyongyang apparently did
offer to swap some if not all of its nuclear programs
for "considerable" aid, putting forth a "bold offer"
that appears unacceptable to Washington (as any opening
bargaining position should be expected to be).
Additional "talks about talks" following the Beijing
format appear likely, although serious negotiations will
likely not take place until Washington has secured a
seat at the table for Seoul and Tokyo, or at a minimum
obtained their public support once again to proceed.
This is why Bush's upcoming meetings with Roh and
Japanese Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi are
so important.
Bush's first meeting with Roh,
this week in Washington, is particularly significant,
given the perception that the two sides remain far apart
in their preferred approach toward Pyongyang. The two
allies will try to narrow this gap by reaffirming the
centrality and continued relevance of the US-South Korea
alliance and the need for North Korea immediately and
verifiably to put an end to its suspected
nuclear-weapons programs. Both will express their mutual
commitment toward pursuing a diplomatic solution,
although some acknowledgment by Roh that other options
exist as a last resort could be helpful. Roh also needs
to clarify how active a role Seoul expects or demands in
subsequent "multilateral" negotiations.
For his
part, Bush needs to be more specific on just what North
Korea claimed or offered and how flexible the US intends
to be in its response. While the Bush administration's
attempts at quiet diplomacy are to be applauded, a more
concerted effort at rumor control is clearly needed. A
firmly stated, more clearly defined blueprint of the
preferred road ahead could also help motivate disparate
administration elements to speak with more clarity and
consistency; something all observers on both sides of
the Pacific would find refreshing.
Ralph A
Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS
(e-mail pacforum@hawaii.rr.com),
a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute
affiliated with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, and senior editor
of Comparative Connections, a
quarterly electronic journal.
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