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Few
impressed by Roh's diplomacy
By Jaewoo Choo
SEOUL - On Monday, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun returned home from his
second summit meeting, this time with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi. After a four-day ordeal that included dinner with Japanese Emperor
Akihito, meeting with the Japanese business group Keidanren, and a speech at
the Japanese Diet (parliament), Roh once again found himself facing severe
criticism from his own people over his handling of a foreign summit.
His trip this time is judged by Korean conservatives to have lacked goals and
purposes. Surprisingly, even liberals are not too happy with his actions and
words on the issues concerning the Japanese perception of the history of the
bilateral relationship, as the two leaders agreed to avoid the issue in their
talks and to concentrate on those of mutual concern in the context of Northeast
Asia.
What is Roh doing wrong to attract such harsh criticism every time he ventures
abroad? Why is it that all his diplomatic actions and words are viewed by his
peer Koreans as disgracing the nation? Is he losing his authority and
leadership over his conduct of the nation's foreign affairs? Is he really
incapable in conducting diplomacy, a concern that was raised during the
presidential elections last year (see
Into the maelstrom: President Roh, February 26)?
Despite the criticism, Roh claimed his visit to Japan over the weekend a
success, having achieved what he had in mind. There were two major
accomplishments, according to Roh. One was to clarify what Koizumi and US
President George W Bush meant by a possibility of "tougher measures" against
North Korea, so as to soothe the concern that statement provoked among the
South Korean people. The other achievement was to seek support from the
Japanese business and governmental leaders with respect to South Korea's
pursuit of status as a Northeast Asian hub for business, logistics and finance.
In the end, the meeting was certainly a success in one aspect, that is in
getting beyond South Korea's obsession with the past, which has always hindered
the development of its bilateral relationship with Japan. This time, both
leaders wanted to achieve something that their predecessors had not: to move
toward the future instead of dwelling on the past. While the way for a "future
orientation" had been paved in 1998 by their predecessors, Kim Dae-jung and
Keizo Obuchi, it was the present leaders' own characteristics and personality
that carried it off. Roh and Koizumi are respected by their own people for
their outward-looking and future-oriented philosophies. As well, Roh is the
first South Korean president to visit Japan who never experienced the 36-year
Japanese imperial rule of Korea that ended in 1945. As much by their desire as
by their personality, the two leaders were able to utilize the occasion to get
a better understanding of each other's position and perception on the current
problems concerning their nations' interests as pre-arranged by their aides.
So why is that the South Korean people are not satisfied with Roh's
accomplishments in Japan? Is he under a scrutiny for his game of changing his
words and attitude toward a nation just before he visits it, as he did with the
United States almost a month ago (see
Roh and Bush: Leopard changes its spots, May 20)? Not this time. Unlike
his first overseas trip almost a month ago, Roh's trip to Japan was troubling
from the beginning. First, he was very much criticized for originally
scheduling his meeting with the Emperor for June 6, which is National Memorial
Day in South Korea. Such scheduling, maybe by his aides and advisors under his
approval, was simply unacceptable to the memory of those who gave their lives
for Korea's independence from Japanese imperial rule. Against the widespread
criticism, Roh had no choice but to postpone his banquet with the Emperor to
the next day.
In addition, Roh's arrival in Tokyo ironically conflicted with the passing of
Japan's new National Security Law, the so-called "contingency bills", which
would, by any and all legal means, guarantee much greater freedom for the
Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) to engage in overseas military affairs in the
future. The effect of the law will have great implications to the international
order of East Asia as well as Southeast Asia, not to mention to the SDF's
activities in "defending" its own state against a dormant threat from North
Korea. Pyongyang's cautious move against possible SDF action has already
surfaced in the cancellation notification to the Japanese authorities last
Sunday of a passenger and cargo ship's visit to Niigata, a Japanese port to
which the ship, Man Gyong Bong Ho-92, has been a regular visitor for the past
few years. It had been alleged that the vessel was being used to deliver parts
and ingredients vital to North Korea's missile program, and had been targeted
for an inspection by the Japanese authorities during its next docking there.
In general, there was little understanding in South Korea of what the purpose
of Roh's visit to Japan was. Did he intend to seek cooperation on North Korea?
Or was he looking for further cooperation on other issues - a free-trade
agreement, visas, Korean-Japanese civil rights, opening of a cultural market
and shuttle flights between the old airports of the two nations, Kimpo and
Haneda? But the set of goals that Roh had in mind was in the end simply put
forward for later discussion without mentioning even a general guideline. The
two leaders merely agreed to promote talks with respect to these issues.
To Roh's dismay, Koizumi had different interests in mind for the talks. This
became obvious when he ordered his government and the Diet to start reviewing a
bill for his nation's action in Iraq on the very day he was to meet with Roh,
and when he referred to the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korean
agents as an act of terrorism. As if in an attempt to deliver his message more
forcefully, he made these remarks immediately upon his return from the Group of
Eight (G8) meeting last week. Koizumi's words may be attributed to his
understanding of the support his nation may get for its role in solving the
North Korean problems as indicated at his summit with Bush and subsequent
meetings with the leaders of the G8. He further consolidated this recognition
by expressing his differences with Roh on the handling of North Korea. While
both leaders, at least in principle, agreed to the simultaneous use of dialogue
and pressure, Roh placed a greater emphasis on the former and Koizumi on the
latter in a close cooperation among the United States, South Korea and Japan.
By publicly stating his position at the news conference after the Roh summit,
Koizumi made it quite obvious that there is a big gap in the pair's thinking of
handling the North.
In other words, Koizumi, as a leader of a world-class nation, wanted an
understanding, and possibly a consensus, from Roh for his future way of
handling North Korean problems. It would not be merely denuclearizing the
nation. It would extensively focus on a much broader variety of issues
concerning the North. All the allegations and charges against the North by
Japanese agencies as well as the international community would be subject for
inspection and investigation by Seoul or Tokyo.
Thus, in the foreseeable future, we are going to see Japan adopting a much more
aggressive and assertive stance in the process of handling North Korean issues.
Investigation on the abduction issue will be carried out in much more detail.
Inspection of North Korean ships will be backed up by the Self-Defense Naval
Force (SDNF) as well as law-enforcement agencies if they are suspected of
espionage. Drug trafficking will be another issue over which Japan will put
much more pressure on the North. While Japan and other nations are gearing
their efforts toward an omni-directional fight against North Korea, the South
is gradually fading from the global picture.
Again, in the machine of international politics in which South Korea is but a
small cog, it is failing to grasp the gist of the movements by the greater cogs
surrounding it (see
How to drag out the US-Korea talks, April 23). It is time for Roh
and his foreign-affairs advisors to view more objectively the intentions and
purposes of the recent developments around the Korean Peninsula. Otherwise,
South Korea will find itself "out of code" with others, a popular expression
that Roh often uses when describing opposition to his ideology, beliefs, values
and philosophy.
There are already signs of a split developing in South Korea's perceptions and
those of the rest, for instance regarding North Korean fishing vessels crossing
the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as an attempt to raise tension, while others
perceive the action as a mere attempt at survival - looking for food during the
crab season (see
Korea: Awkward anniversaries, June 4).
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