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Korea: Ominous
removal of America's 'tripwire'
By
Ted Galen Carpenter
(Republished with the
permission of the Cato Institute)
During his
recent visit to South Korea, US Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced Washington's intention
to "reposition" some of its military forces stationed in
South Korea. Currently, most US troops are deployed in
the northern part of the country, between the capital,
Seoul, and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates
South Korea from communist North Korea. The redeployment
would entail moving those forces farther
south.
Wolfowitz offered only a vague
justification for such a move, contending that
repositioning forces would make them more effective in
meeting the threat posed by North Korea. That is a
curious argument. Since the end of the Korean War in
1953, the principal rationale for stationing the troops
near the DMZ has been that they would serve as a
tripwire in case of a North Korean attack, guaranteeing
US involvement in any conflict. North Korea, knowing
that it would then face war not only with South Korea
but also with the United States, would be deterred from
taking such a reckless gamble.
Why is the
administration of US President George W Bush proposing
to abandon the long-standing tripwire function of US
forces in South Korea? There is one unsettling
possibility: The administration is considering a
preemptive military attack on North Korea's nuclear
installations and wants to move US troops out of harm's
way. Even the most hawkish US experts on Korea concede
that if the United States did launch such an attack, the
North would likely respond with an intense artillery and
missile barrage of the Seoul metropolitan area and,
possibly, with a ground attack through the DMZ. US
troops stationed between Seoul and the DMZ could easily
end up being dead tripwire forces.
True, Bush
administration officials have stated that they want to
solve through diplomacy the crisis created by North
Korea's resumption of its nuclear-weapons program. But
those same officials have stressed that all options,
including the use of military force, remain on the
table. When South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun went to
the United States in May, he sought an assurance that
the controversial doctrine of preemptive war embedded in
the administration's national-security strategy would
not apply to North Korea. US officials rebuffed his
request.
Indeed, the national-security strategy
document approved in September 2002 clearly would seem
to apply to the North Korean situation. "We must be
prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist
clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons
of mass destruction against the United States and our
allies and friends," the document affirmed. The
administration's policy on combating weapons of mass
destruction, adopted in December 2002, stated the point
even more succinctly, emphasizing that the United States
would not "permit the world's more dangerous regimes" to
pose a threat "with the world's most destructive
weapons". Nuclear weapons in the hands of secretive,
Stalinist North Korea fill that category.
Even
if one takes the Bush administration at its word that it
wants to settle the crisis through diplomacy, it begs a
crucial question: What does the United States do if
diplomacy (or diplomacy combined with economic pressure)
fails to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear
program? Is the administration prepared to live with a
North Korea armed with nuclear weapons? The statement
issued by Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi after their recent summit suggests otherwise.
The two leaders stated bluntly that they "would not
tolerate" a nuclear-armed North Korea.
If
diplomacy fails, it is not clear how that result can be
prevented except through military force. The Bush
administration may not be committed to such a course
yet, but in deciding to move US forces away from the
DMZ, it is creating a precondition for pursuing that
option. South Koreans, who know how horribly their
country would suffer if the United States launched
preemptive strikes on the North, now have reason to be
very, very nervous.
Ted Galen
Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign
policy studies at the Cato Institute and is the author
or editor of 15 books on international affairs
including Peace & Freedom: Foreign Policy for a
Constitutional Republic. This article is republished
with the permission of the Cato Institute
.
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