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SPEAKING
FREELY
US-North Korea: Foreign policy gone AWOL
By Michael A Hay
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say. Please
click here if you are interested in contributing.
I always knew the day I found myself in enthusiastic agreement with anything US
Senator Edward Kennedy had to say would be an indication something was amiss.
Seriously amiss - either with me or with the world. I believe it's the latter.
I'm talking about Korea. This contribution is not about the ongoing tragedy
that is the division for a full half-century of the Korean Peninsula, and the
splitting of millions of family members. It's not about Iraq. Still less is
this an exercise in Bush-bashing or America-bashing. What it means to Americans
to see combat fatigues and M-16s at civilian airports remains lost on most of
us Europeans across the Atlantic.
I do not for one second doubt President George W Bush's commitment to the
security of the United States, a goal I feel all the more keenly after the
murder of a good friend in New York on that morning of September 11, 2001. What
I question - and what a disturbing number of US commentators from across the
political spectrum are also questioning - is the lingering failure to address
the Korean Peninsula in a measured and thoughtful manner, or indeed, until very
recently, to address it at all.
If we Europeans still don't "get it" when it comes to the US, especially after
September 11, is it presumptuous to suggest that the communication divide
between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
is vastly wider? Some observations are perhaps worthwhile, because in the
current dialogue, several disturbing and potentially very dangerous aspects
have emerged.
First, there is no dialogue. Second, there is no policy. There wasn't "then",
and by all accounts there still isn't now, some three-quarters of the way
through Bush's current term of office. Or if there was one, it was a policy of
"benign neglect". That's not merely sad, it's dangerous.
Third, why have Republican Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Democratic Senator Joe Biden, ranking member on
the same committee, veteran Senator Robert Byrd, and numerous others right
across "the spectrum" voiced serious concern about Washington's approach to
dealing with North Korea?
We were all at a crossroads last year. The Bush administration was still
reviewing its policy toward North Korea. The DPRK - and many other countries -
had difficulty fathoming what was going on in Washington. Uncertainty
prevailed. Meanwhile North Korea was pushing hard on a wide range of reforms of
its macroeconomic and legal infrastructure - reforms that go far beyond those
reported in the international media - reaching out to numerous countries in a
flurry of activity that produced the establishment or resumption of diplomatic
relations with several dozen nations, including the United Kingdom, Germany,
Canada and others.
Then came the speech. "Axis of evil."
One thing is clear. Of all the potential flashpoints in the world, Korea is
singularly ill-suited to policy by sound-bite. Numerous Korea observers of all
hues consider that consolidated reference, lumping three countries together, to
have been a mistake, and a very big one. That statement stuck in the throat of
North Korea, and remained firmly lodged there - a fact obvious to anyone who
happened to be in Pyongyang in January, as the country announced, with deep
agitation, its withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That
specific reference to North Korea in the "axis of evil" remark - which we now
learn was thrown in at the last minute - did nothing to advance the security of
the United States, did nothing to promote the possibility of a rapprochement
between the US and North Korea, and did absolutely nothing to enhance the
safety of the 37,000 US soldiers stationed on the Korean Peninsula, and their
tens of thousands of dependants.
Stepping back a moment, does the name Cho Myong-rok ring a bell? In October
2000, Vice Marshal Cho Myong-rok, a special envoy from the North Korean leader,
Chairman Kim Jong-il, was being hosted for talks in Washington, including at
the White House, the highest-ranking North Korean official ever to set foot on
US soil. In a period that saw the unprecedented June 2000 summit between
leaders of North and South Korea, a summit that triggered the lifting by then
US president Bill Clinton, on June 19, 2000, of a large number of sanctions
that had been firmly in place for 50 years, and unleashed an unprecedented
series of governmental exchanges involving the United States and North Korea,
and the Southern and Northern governments. That's how far we had managed to go.
That was then, and this is now. And "now" isn't looking too good. So, what
next?
At least one person had a bright idea: Richard Armitage, who on February 4 this
year stated there was "no question" that the US would have to sit down with
North Korea. Armitage has acquitted himself with distinction in several
important respects. First, he not only currently happens to be US deputy
secretary of state and a former navy special operations officer but he actually
knows a thing or two about Korea. The widely reported slap-down by the
administration of Armitage's remarks, if they reflect marginalization of such a
figure, does not portend well for the immediate future.
The "we've been down that road before" argument, recently publicly articulated
by Dr Henry Kissinger, and which enjoys considerable support, is highly
understandable, but raises one simple question. What exactly is the alternative
that is being proposed? The answer, it seems, is a "multilateral approach".
This, put simply, means a refusal to talk until and unless other major
countries in the region come fully on board to present a united front. Again,
the case is very compelling, but only if you ignore one critical aspect that
does not apply to China, does not apply to South Korea, does not apply to
Russia and does not even apply to Japan, a nation with which North Korea has
had a consistently rocky relationship over the decades. Put simply, the North
Koreans do not believe that any of these four nations is "out to get them".
This is the critical "missing link" in most analyses - the genuine
bunker-mentality apprehension by North Korea that it is, and possibly was from
the outset, targeted, reinforcing long-standing perceptions already held prior
to the "axis of evil" speech.
Governments, just like individuals, act on their perception of reality, not
necessarily reality itself. No amount of denials and disclaimers as to US
intentions will change that, if there is such a (mis)perception on the other
side - least of all if they are not talking to each other. To rework a famous
line from the highly respected Dr William Perry, former US defense secretary
and special envoy to Pyongyang, we need to treat the North Koreans as they
perceive our intentions, not as we perceive our intentions. Indeed, the
contribution of Perry and his largely unsung colleagues to US policy on North
Korea will arguably come to be seen as one of the true highlights of an
otherwise beleaguered Clinton administration.
And just where could such misperception come from? North Korea's logic is
neither complicated nor illogical. The equation reads as follows: ("axis of
evil") + (attack on Iraq) = "we're next". "Wrong," you may say, but it's that
simple.
Any such apprehension by North Korea will in turn motivate its response. Which
will in turn produce a response by Washington ... and so it goes on. There's an
expression for this: "ratcheting up". This is not merely a risk. It's already
happened, it's happening right now, and it appears set to continue if a few
things don't change soon. What's more, this ratcheting gives the above equation
the hallmarks of a self-fulfilling prophecy in the making.
Curiously, we are told that the US will "eventually" talk (though not
"negotiate") with North Korea - but not now. What exactly is it we're waiting
for, as tensions rise daily, where "no [weapons] issue is of greater urgency"
to the United States than this one, as stated by US Secretary of State Colin
Powell on June 18?
And on talks, let's be clear. If multilateral talks do take place, then so much
the better. Those advocating direct, bilateral talks for the most part are not
blindly condemning the current US administration's strident call for
multilateralism. But the prospects do not look good. So, faced with an impasse
where neither side appears willing to budge on that issue, and with tensions
rising daily, these Republican and Democratic US senators and others are merely
thinking "out of the box", going for "Plan B". Is it disingenuous to suggest
that this was what Lugar had in mind when he stated, on March 6, "... it is
vital that the United States not dismiss bilateral diplomatic opportunities ...
we must be creative ..."? Indeed, ironically, bilateral talks arguably serve as
the precursor to that which many do seek, a multilateral forum.
As for the numerous political and commercial analyses around, many are flawed
by some dangerous assumptions. First, those who doubt a "national suicidal
urge" miss the point. They entirely ignore the risk of a miscalculation, by one
side or another - or both. Second, the wild card, a "freak accident" (remember
the Chinese Hainan Island incident in April 2001?). Third, they assume - quite
wrongly - possession by all players of what economists might term "perfect
market information", and that therefore both sides are reading each other
correctly. They are not. Indeed, there are times, such as this, when talking in
the daylight is preferable to groping in the dark.
"Time is on our side," one frequently hears. Wrong. Whatever one's view of the
motivation of North Korea in this sorry mess, one thing is clear. The DPRK has
for years been desperately working out ways to combat its dreadful energy
crisis, and so long as it prevails, like it or not, North Korea is not going to
be ignored - least of all when it believes "it's next". It's that simple.
Benign neglect? What we face now is what you get when you ignore Korea, hoping
it will "just go away". That's the problem. It won't.
Back to Senator Lugar, who on March 6 stated: "All of us remain concerned about
the potential for miscalculation that could lead to a deadly incident or
broader conflict ... While some American analysts oppose any dialogue with
North Korea, especially in the wake of extraordinarily provocative events, I do
not believe we have the luxury to be this absolute. The risks are too immediate
and the stakes are too high." Look at where we are now compared with then.
That's ratcheting. Even with gritted teeth, bilateral dialogue - now - is at
this stage preferable to an immovable refusal to talk, posited on dangerous
assumptions made by decision-makers in Washington who display limited knowledge
of the peninsula and apparently even less regard for their few colleagues in
Washington and elsewhere who know this troublesome spot.
So what was it that Senator Kennedy said? Speaking on January 21 before the
National Press Club in Washington, DC, he had this to offer: "The sudden
emergence and escalation of the crisis with North Korea is the result of a US
foreign policy that was AWOL [absent without leave] on that issue for the first
21 months of the Bush administration. Then the administration lurched into an
unsustainable overreaction when it initially refused even to talk unless the
North Koreans backed down. Even as our ally South Korea sought to engage the
North, the US rebuffed any dialogue at all, leading to an embarrassing
deterioration in our relations with South Korea." Quite.
As things stand, the Korean Peninsula is a virtual deja-vu catastrophe waiting
to happen. The disturbing thing is that so far the actors on all sides appear
to be sticking rigidly to their scripts, without bothering to flick through to
the last pages to see where we are all going, if things don't change. It's time
for someone to ad-lib. May it happen, and happen soon.
Michael Hay, PhD (hay@koreastrategic.com),
is founder of Koreastrategic Inc, a business consultancy specializing in
advising foreign corporations monitoring or doing business with North Korea. He
travels regularly to the country.
(Copyright 2003 Michael A Hay.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say. Please
click here if you are interested in contributing.
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