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America's options on the Korea nuke
crisis
By Ehsan Ahrari
One of the most certain aspects of
North Korea's nuclearization is how little the United
States really knows about the specific nature of its
program. No one really knows the quantity of the highly
enriched uranium that it possesses. There is no certain
knowledge regarding the professional capabilities of
North Korea's nuclear scientists, or the state of its
nuclear reactors. The element of ambiguity is so
pervasive that one wonders how Washington will develop
its policy options in dealing with Pyongyang in future
negotiations. Obviously, the preceding statement is
based on the assumption that "regime change" is not an
option.
The most significant question about the North
Korea is how advanced its nuclear technology really is
at this stage. However, on this issue, the intelligence
is sketchy, and there is a plethora of speculations. For
instance, according to Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI),
"North Korea has enough plutonium to produce at least
two nuclear weapons." The National Intelligence
Council's (NIC) report of December 2001 stated that
Pyongyang "has developed one to two nuclear weapons". In
January 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency reported
to the US Congress that North Korea had "enough
plutonium for at most up to two nuclear weapons."
But North Korea has never tested a nuclear
explosive. Where did it acquire its nuclear
capabilities? US journalist Seymour Hersh claimed in
January that Pakistan had been "sharing sophisticated
technology, warhead design information, and
weapons-testing data" with Pyongyang since 1997.
Islamabad denied this, but US officials later affirmed
the veracity of this information. The most important
favor that Pakistan might have done, if one goes by
Hersh's report, is to help North Korea "conduct a series
of 'cold' tests, simulated explosions, using natural
uranium, which are necessary to determine whether a
nuclear device will detonate properly".
A
recently issued report of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, "Verifying North Korea's
Disarmament", notes: "North Korea's plutonium program is
the most advanced component of its nuclear complex." If
that program is fully operational - even though
published intelligence reports indicate that it is
having trouble restarting its plutonium-based facilities
- it is expected to make impressive increases in the
size of its nuclear arsenal. NTI provided the following
numbers: By this February, based on the quantity of
plutonium from 1989, North Korea was expected to have
one to two nuclear weapons; by May, six to seven
weapons; by next May, eight to nine; by 2006, 29-30; and
by 2007 73-90. These numbers are based on a
uranium-enrichment program of 50- and 200-megawatt
reactors that are under construction, and 8,000 spent
fuel rods that Pyongyang currently has.
The
whole issue of nuclear weapons is intrinsically linked
to a country's capabilities of integrating
nuclear-weapon technology with missile technology. North
Korea has been doing respectably well with its
nuclear-capable Nodong missile. Once it resolves the
technological glitches of its Taepodong I, its missile
arsenal will be a source of concern to Japan and South
Korea. But the United States will worry when North Korea
develops Taepodong II, which is an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM).
Another important
issue for North Korea is the miniaturization of nuclear
weapons. Miniaturization requires mastery of
technological sophistication. A general understanding is
that Pyongyang does not yet seem to possess that
capability. Jonathan Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace said "the US government has
known as far back as [the] mid-1990s that [North Korea]
could reduce a nuclear weapon enough to fit on a Scud".
But whatever technology North Korea lacks, China
possesses. Beijing long ago developed second-strike
capabilities by developing multiple re-entry vehicles
(MRVs) and multiple independently targeted re-entry
vehicles (MIRVs), along with nuclear warhead
miniaturization. The question is whether China is
willing to transfer such capabilities - if it hasn't
already done so. In the past, China's leaders have
described their relationship with North Korea as "closer
than gum and teeth". It is not known whether they still
couch their ties with Pyongyang in those terms. If they
do, then it is just a matter of time before North Korea
will acquire the capabilities it requires. In the past,
China has shown no compunction about transferring its
long-range-missile technology to North Korea. For
instance, the 1993 launch of Nodong required no
telemetry, which is a characteristic of some Chinese
missiles. In addition, the "missile mock-up" of the
Taepodong 2 resembled China's CSS-2 intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM).
The most obvious
choice for the United States is to insist that China
refrain from transferring the MRV/MIRV and
miniaturization technology to North Korea. But
considering the past record of the Chinese leadership on
this issue, no one assigns high probability that
Washington will succeed in persuading China to that end.
The most effective option might be direct and
multilateral negotiations aimed at unraveling
Pyongyang's nuclear program. For that, North Korea will
require guarantees against a future US military
invasion. Even if Washington were to do so, Kim Jong-il
might also remember that the United States walked away
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty of 1972,
arguing that the changed international strategic
environment has made that treaty irrelevant. Thus, Kim
would think twice before accepting America's strongest
possible guarantees against military attack, and would,
in the final analysis, envisage nuclear weaponization as
the most credible way of deterring a future US invasion.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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