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Korea

Catching Kim with his pants down
By Li Yongyan

If Saddam Hussein really had a cache of biological and chemical weapons, would he have unleashed them on the marching allied forces? Most people would agree that he would, judging by his massacre of the Kurdish people in northern Iraq. But would he have detonated an atomic bomb if he had one?

The world never found out, fortunately. But the question, hypothetical as it may be, has serious, realistic implications on the peace and security of some 1.6 billion people in the Far East, because like Saddam, North Korea's Kim Jong-il is also a dictator and therefore a danger to the region. But unlike Saddam, he is enthusiastically pursuing a nuclear program and wants the whole world to know it, posing a clear and potential danger to the well-being of the people on the Korean Peninsula and far beyond.

As North Korea, the United States and four other nations prepare for a new round of multilateral negotiations on the nuclear crises, their pursuit of a reliable and viable solution should begin with an understanding of how the issue has come about. The first question is: Why is Kim going about acquiring nuclear capabilities? The consensus has him using the nuclear issue as leverage for international blackmail. If we take a look at history, it will be apparent that Kim Junior is actually seeking peace and recognition.
Communists are not known for their imagination, with good reason: they suppress freedom of thought. So what do they do when they wish to achieve something desirable? Mao Zedong summed up his own experience: "The power of examples is indefinite." Indefinite indeed.

When the Chinese communists swept into power in 1949, Kim Il-sung was full of admiration and inspiration. Within a year, he launched a "unification" war on the Republic of Korea across the United Nations-established border.

In early 1960s, when a rift with Moscow left Beijing isolated and unloved, Mao's resolve was hardened by shame: "Go ahead and let them blockade us, for 10 years, for 20 years. By that time we will have everything." In the words of one general, "We will have to make one atomic bomb even if it means pawning our pants." So one bomb was exploded in 1964. The shockwave was sweet: the Nationalists in Taiwan gave up for good their hopes of a comeback to the mainland, and seven years later, a US president asked to be invited to Beijing for normalization talks.

That must have impressed Kim Junior so much that he now wants to have a "peace bomb" of his own. In fact, he has already made it clear that he wants to sign a non-aggression treaty with the United States, his arch-enemy. Unfortunately for him, he does not have much credibility. So China's example is once again being followed: the only way to be taken seriously is to obtain some serious chips. And what gets more attention than a Nuclear Club membership card?

Now that we have helped Kim articulate his true intentions that he can't broadcast himself, what are the options in securing peace in the Peninsula? Again, three powerful examples, in order of desirability but in reverse order of effectiveness, are given here:

The Chinese way. Send an emissary of peace to Pyongyang for talks on the establishment of diplomatic relations. If a preceding Republican president of the United States, Richard Nixon, got accolades for his vision and courage in breaking the ice with a nuclear-capable China in the early 1970s, then there is no reason the present Republican administration of George W Bush should be crucified for pulling off a similar diplomatic coup. There would be a minimal political price, as no allies would be betrayed. South Korea would be vastly relieved by America's overtures. This is no more of a capitulation than Nixon's historic visit to Beijing was, keeping in mind that an isolated and cornered dictator becomes the most unpredictable and dangerous.

The India/Pakistan way. If and when Kim continues to receive the current level of attention, or lack of it, he thinks he deserves, he will in all likelihood pawn his or - to be more exact - his people's trousers for his nuclear ambitions. If South Korea, Japan or even China and Russia feel threatened, so be it. Technically, North Korea as a sovereign state has every right to build any weapons of mass destruction, just as the United States and China do. China and Russia are supposed to be powerful enough to protect themselves. But South Korea and Japan can hardly persuade Washington to launch a massive air attack on the North by invoking the joint defense treaty. It is a defense agreement that says "fire only when fired upon". No clause provides for a preemptive strike against a perceived threat, nuclear or conventional. Since deterrent prevention is the best defense, what would happen then would be an arms race very much like the one on the Indian subcontinent: everyone rushes to manufacture an atomic bomb or two. With the kind of economic prowess that Tokyo and Seoul possess, a nuclear-armed East Asia would be just a few months away. Incidentally, it would be interesting to see what new charges the world community would bring against the US. "Irresponsibly letting the situation get out of control" would fit snugly, while "flagrantly violating the sovereignty of another state" was ditched conveniently. But one way or the other, this approach would be effective in bringing about closer cooperation from China, especially when Japan, in a justifiable move, has begun to amend its constitution with the tacit approval of the US. That alone should be sufficient stimulus for the region to apply voluntary, concerted pressure on North Korea.

The Iraq way. If the above two scenarios are seen as inadequate, there is always the hardball way. A surgical-type decapitation strike, while cost-effective, requires not only electronic but also human intelligence, which is next to impossible under the circumstances. So an air campaign followed by overwhelming ground and amphibious forces might prove a most persuasive method. After Iraq, what is one more regime change under America's M-1 tanks? And it just does not matter if there is any evidence of Kim's weapons export or missile-technology transfers. This should preferably take place before Kim lays his hands on an atomic bomb. For a man without pants will be desperate enough to do anything.

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Aug 6, 2003



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