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North Korea: Why US won't peel the
onion
By Jaewoo Choo
SEOUL - The recent
shuttle diplomacy by Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs Wang Yi, traveling to Washington and Pyongyang
in recent days, may be called a success, as it drew
promises from both North Korea and the United States to
resume talks on the North's nuclear problem, this time
in a six-party frame. Wang's shuttle diplomacy was
reminiscent of that of former South Korean foreign
minister Dr Han Sung Joo during the first nuclear crisis
in 1993-94, when he traveled to Moscow, Tokyo,
Washington, Beijing and Seoul.
It was certainly
great news that North Korea and the US had agreed to
accept what the majority of the states neighboring the
Korean Peninsula perceive as the most viable framework
in which a peaceful solution of the North's nuclear
problem should be pursued. Nonetheless, one has to
wonder what brought them finally to accept the idea of
the six-party talks after their long-standing argument
on the preconditions for any form of multilateral talks,
which at one point seemed to be going nowhere. While
North Korea stubbornly demanded that the United States
include a non-aggression agreement and a guarantee of
the security of its regime as prerequisites for the
talks, the US was not ready to make any concessions
until it halted all of its nuclear programs. Now the
word is that six-party talks are to be held in late
August in Beijing.
If the talks go ahead as
scheduled, then a very simple question can naturally be
asked: Can we allow our hopes to run high on the
prospects of a peaceful solution to the nuclear problem?
If a non-invasion agreement were to be achieved between
North Korea and the US as well as a guarantee of the
survival of the Pyongyang regime, then what are the
prospects for the current Korean War armistice that was
ratified by the United States, North Korea and China
being replaced by a "peace treaty"?
All the
aforementioned variables are key to the answer for a
formal peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula. However,
the peace-treaty question would have to be answered by
the United States. Whether it will agree to a guarantee
not to invade North Korea under any circumstances is a
problem that the US will have to ponder for some time.
Whether it is willing to continue to deal with Kim
Jong-il for the coming years will present a serious
challenge as long as the animosity toward Kim currently
held by the administration of President George W Bush
persists.
Even if Bush accepts North Korea's two
preconditions before the six-party talks, the road to a
peaceful solution of the nuclear problem will be a very
long and winding one. This is not so much because of
North Korea's demands as because of the constitutional
restraints that the US has imposed on itself when it
comes to dealing with Pyongyang. Installing an
artificial peace on the Korean Peninsula by way of the
United States' nominal acceptance of a "peace treaty" is
not going to lead to a permanent peace.
For
peace actually to exist on the peninsula, North Korea
would have to be able to survive on its own. While
neighboring states can continue to lend a hand, they
cannot afford to keep rendering free aid and assistance
to a state that is not capable of managing them. It will
have to learn how to survive on its own, not on the
terms of others that are supposed to guarantee its
regime's safety and survival. To this end, the United
States will have to give serious consideration to
whether it should lift its sanctions against North
Korea.
Removal of sanctions would be a long-term
struggle for both the US administration and Congress,
regardless of party and leadership. This is because of
all the labels the US has attached to North Korea. It is
an adversary state, an enemy that made the United States
bleed in the 1950s. It is a rogue state, a designation
it shares with six other states in the world because of
their diplomatic behavior. Because it is a communist,
Marxist-Leninist state, it is barred from conducting any
commercial or economic transaction with the US and from
receiving foreign assistance from international
financial institutions. For its active participation in
terrorism, it is liable to further sanction. And last
but not least, it is a member of the "axis of evil".
Under the circumstances, for the US to remove
all these labels it has put on North Korea and lift the
sanctions demanded by each label, it will be like
peeling an onion skin, an endless task.
Luckily
enough, being an "axis of evil" member does not bind
North Korea to any type of sanction by the US
constitution or law - this particular label is nothing
more than diplomatic rhetoric. By contrast, such labels
as a "rogue state" or "adversarial state" carry much
more important implications for the prospect of
relations between the United States and North Korea. The
relationship is constrained by all and any legal means
by the US.
Since the end of the Korean War in
1953, the US has adopted too many sanctions against
North Korea. In fact, the first sanction was adopted
before the war ended, in 1951. As a sanction against a
non-market state, the Trade Agreement Extension Act of
1951 was applied to North Korea. That act required the
suspension of Most Favored Nation trade status. Ever
since then, North Korea has been embargoed with many
more types of sanction.
First, since it posed a
threat to US national security, North Korea was subject
to the Trading with the Enemy Act and National
Emergencies Act. In the wake of the Korean War, the
United States invoked a total embargo on exports to
North Korea. Over the years, export controls were
restated as the Export Administration Regulations
(EARs). According to this restriction, North Korea was
classified as a member of Country Group Z, the most
restricted lot.
In 1989, the EARs were modified
to allow the export to North Korea of commercially
supplied goods intended to meet basic human needs.
Shipment of these goods required validation on a
case-by-case basis. In September 1999, president Bill
Clinton formally announced the removal of most export
restrictions applied to North Korea, at least in theory.
Second, North Korea has long been regarded as a
state sponsor or supporter of international terrorism,
pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979.
Third, for being a Marxist-Leninist state, it is subject
to the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, and is further
restricted under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. One
of the main features of these acts is that the United
States is required by law to oppose membership in the
international financial institutions or financial
support to terrorist states, including North Korea.
Fourth, pursuant to its label as a rogue state
for proliferating weapons of mass destruction, North
Korea has been made subject to the Arms Export Control
Act, the Export Administration Act of 1979, and the Iran
Proliferation Act of 2000. According to the Arms Export
Control Act, the United States bans "export, directly or
indirectly, of any munitions item, lease or loan,
credits, guarantees, or other financial assistance to a
terrorist country". It further "prohibits US individuals
from engaging in such trade or support of such a
country".
For all these legal constraints to be
removed and for peace to come into existence in the
bilateral relationship between the US and North Korea,
as seen above, the key is obviously in the United
States' hands. If we truly understand the long and
winding process for amending a law in US politics, not
too many of us can blame Pyongyang for relying on
unconventional bargaining tactics for its survival.
Whether North Korea knows the US political system well
enough to employ such preconditions for its
participation in the six-party talks is not clear.
However, if we were to look at the other side of
the coin, the US may be well aware of the true meanings
of the layers it has put on North Korea. It may have
already decided that it is better off with the status
quo than with a peaceful solution to the current crisis.
Perhaps Washington realizes that dragging out the crisis
will eventually exhaust its opponent to the point of
surrender. In the meantime, the US would be able to
shift the momentum toward its own side and turn the
course to its favor, thereby allowing itself to achieve
the domestic and international goals it sees as more
important than formal peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Under this scenario, all the hype about the
prospects of the six-party talks for bringing about a
peaceful solution to the nuclear problem would fizzle
away easily, and the "nuclear crisis" story would
continue like a broken record for years to come.
Jaewoo Choo, PhD, is a research fellow
with the Trade Research Institute, Seoul. The opinions
expressed in this article are his own.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
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