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Moves afoot: US strategy in
Korea
By
Jaewoo Choo
SEOUL - The anti-American sentiment
that has been growing in South Korea since June may seem
to have had an impact on the US decision to take early
action to redeploy its troops in Korea. However, if we
look at other recent developments in US global and
regional strategy, it is clear that the United States is
not a nation whose behavior is easily swayed by forces
other than its own will and interests. The Korea case is
no exception, as can be seen when examining the
redeployment in detail.
Osan and Pyungtaek have
been designated as the Korean cities that will host all
the US troops that have been stationed north of the Han
River, which runs through the heart of Seoul. With an
auxiliary air base in the adjacent city of Kunsan, Osan
is already one of the biggest US air bases in East Asia,
if not the Asia-Pacific region. Pyungtaek is the
fourth-largest port in Korea, and the closest one to
China. However, its potential to become a major port for
shipment to China has not been fulfilled yet as its
development was suspended for some years because of the
financial constraints arising from the 1997 Asian
financial crisis. The United States plans to develop and
transform the port into a naval base, the first one in
Korea.
Under the circumstances, it is
foreseeable that future US strategy for its military
forces on the Korean Peninsula will concentrate on
enhancing air and naval capacity as well as their
forward deployment ability. What this strategy implies
is that the US intention is clearly to field its
missile-defense program against the possible threat of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and alleged nuclear
warheads in North Korea.
One apparent flaw in
this maneuver is that the potential US missile-defense
locations in South Korea contradict the official line on
Northern WMD. If the North's weapons are aimed at Japan
and the United States, as has long been claimed, the US
should have chosen Korea's east coast areas for the
restructuring of its military forces. Instead, the newly
selected and announced areas are all on the west coast.
This reveals the true story of US long- and mid-term
security strategy concerning missile defense in East
Asia.
In addition, this strategy is probably why
the United States has been pushy with South Korea since
2000 on getting it to join the missile-defense program.
If we were to recollect then president Kim Dae-jung's
visit to the US in March 2000 just after President
George W Bush entered the White House, one of the agenda
times for the summit was whether South Korea would join
the US effort in fielding missile defenses in East Asia.
Kim made a very explicit reservation on the issue, which
was quite upsetting to Bush.
Kim later opened
his public address with a formal apology for his hasty
remarks on missile defense and during the rest of his
visit to the US pledged to reconsider his nation's
commitment to the program. Ever since that time, South
Korea has been under great pressure from Washington
regarding its commitment to the US missile-defense
program. When the US revealed its troops-relocation
plan, however, it was apparent that the US intended to
continue with its effort to field its missile-defense
program in and around the Korean Peninsula, regardless
of what the South Korean government and its people
wanted.
Therefore, contrary to the claims of
many observers inside and outside South Korea, anti-US
sentiment, while it may have been part of the equation,
was not the main factor in Washington's decision to take
an early initiative in restructuring its troops in
Korea. US strategy is rarely swayed by demands from a
small number of radicals, or even by national consensus
as seen in South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines in
the 1980s. As well, the current anti-US protests will
eventually lose momentum after the month of August. The
effect of any movements by radical Korean students will
be temporary.
The month of August has a special
meaning to Koreans. It was on August 15, 1945, that they
were liberated from Japanese colonial rule. The
historical meaning of the month of August energizes
those who are politically conscious. It is thus during
the month of August that student activism picks up a
notch, despite the fact that they should be on summer
break.
Issues for these demonstrations have
varied time to time. In the 1980s, it was democracy. In
the 1990s, it was political reform. Now, the main agenda
is to attain proper recognition for the Federation of
Korean University Student Councils, or Hanchongnyeon.
Aside from timely political issues, there have always
been other problems attached to the students' demands.
One salient agenda item is the unification of the two
Koreas.
The other persistent issue is a drive
for the South Korean government to become more
independent and autonomous from foreign influence, a
sentiment that is easily transformed into an
anti-foreigner agenda. For this reason, the student
movement in Seoul has recently made headlines with such
things as trespassing on the US military exercise
compound and demanding the withdrawal of US troops from
the Korean Peninsula. The anti-US movement is also still
being fueled by anger over the deaths of the two
junior-high-school girls accidentally run over by US
tanks more than a year ago.
That incident
stirred up anti-American sentiment after a long period
of relative calm even among student radicals. The recent
resurgence of anti-Americanism eventually led these
students to intensify their demand for the US military
to withdraw from Korea, as they saw the US way of
handling the North Korean nuclear problem as upsetting
the peace and stability on the peninsula.
US
military officers in both Seoul and Washington began to
see these developments as a threat to their troops'
security and interests, in addition to the nuclear
crisis. Washington used the situation as an opportunity
to draw up a relocation plan for its troops farther
south.
The plan originally called for a gradual
shift of the troops to begin in two or three years, and
to be completed three to five years thereafter, meaning
that the redeployment mission would be completed by
2011. But the rising anti-Americanism and stubborn
posture taken by the North with its possible nuclear
weapons seemed to have compelled the United States to
consider an earlier date for its redeployment plan.
Details for the redeployment were revealed at
the conclusion of the third round of working-level
meetings between US and South Korean military officers
in June. As it turned out, the US will move its
"tripwire" to the south of Seoul, leaving the defense of
the 38th Parallel and Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to South
Korean forces.
What this implies is that South
Korean military commanders will be solely responsible
for all action necessary in defending their country, a
long-sought wish by the South Koreans, as most, if not
all, military actions had previously been subject to the
permission from the US command and the United Nations
Joint Security Office.
The only problem that may
hinder the redeployment process is its cost. Estimations
of the total expense stand as of now in the range of
US$5 billion to $17 billion. Considering that the annual
budget of the South Korean military forces falls between
$12 billion and $13 billion, the relocation of the US
military forces will be a very expensive mission.
Therefore, South Korea has been under
significant pressure from the US to increase its
military budget to the pre-1997 standard, up from the
current rate of 2.7-3.2 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP). But any increase in the military budget
will be difficult to sell to the populace at a time when
the nation's economy is experiencing hardship not seen
since the Asian financial crisis of 1997.
Despite the high cost, however, relocation of US
troops in Korea seems inevitable. But why now? After all
these years, why is it that the United States now wants
to move its troops farther south and away from the DMZ?
Does this have implications regarding the real threat of
North Korea's WMD? Or does it have any meaning regarding
future US tactics in management of the North's nuclear
problems, including a preemptive strike?
The
answers to these questions are far from clear but, as
noted above, the locations chosen for the new US bases
reflect Washington's ambitions regarding missile
defenses in and around the Korean Peninsula.
Missile defense can be fielded in the air as
well as in the sea. For airborne missile defense, the US
plans to enhance the Osan air base's manpower and
capacity at a cost of $15 billion in the coming years.
To field missile defense in the waters off the Korean
Peninsula, the US needs a naval base in Korea, and has
chosen Pyungtaek port to assume the responsibility of
hosting US naval facilities and weaponry.
All of
this is very worrying for Beijing. Considering the
geographical locations of Osan and Pyungtaek, the
relocation of US military forces in Korea has caused
concern in China. Furthermore, fielding missile defenses
in Japan is now within visible reach after Tokyo decided
to allocate 140 billion yen ($1.17 billion) for such a
program for fiscal 2004 with a view to deployment by
2006. Taiwan is also studying the feasibility of its
participation in the program. If Taiwan and South Korea
were to join, it would mean that the core of the Chinese
military establishment would be under US surveillance.
Jaewoo Choo, PhD, is a research fellow
with the Trade Research Institute, Seoul. The opinions
expressed in this article are his own.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
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