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North Korea's case for nuclear
weapons
By Erich Marquardt
On October 21, 1994, the United States and North
Korea signed the US-DPRK (Democratic People's Republic
of Korea) Agreed Framework, an understanding in which
Pyongyang accepted a proposal to scrap its development
of plutonium-based nuclear-energy facilities in exchange
for normalization of ties with Washington, in addition
to other benefits such as internationally funded twin
light-water reactors and shipments of heavy oil. As of
now, the Agreed Framework is in tatters; Pyongyang
blames the death of the agreement on Washington, and
Washington blames it on Pyongyang.
But which
party is more responsible for the unraveling may not be
as important as the following questions: Will North
Korea follow up on its nuclear rhetoric and become a
nuclear-armed state? And how will other regional powers,
such as the United States and Japan, react to a
nuclear-armed North Korean state?
At present, it
is not exactly clear whether North Korea is a
nuclear-armed state. Various North Korean officials have
ambiguously stated in the past that the country already
possesses such weapons; however, there has been no
concrete public pronouncement from Pyongyang that it
does indeed possess nuclear arms. Regardless, what is
clear is that Pyongyang has been developing the
components and resources capable of creating nuclear
arms. International observers argue that it will be only
a short time, possibly months, before North Korea
develops its first functional nuclear device.
Furthermore, Pyongyang already possesses the rockets
necessary to launch a nuclear weapon at neighboring
states, such as its historical nemesis, Japan; this
capability puts US troops at risk, as Washington
maintains large troop contingents in Japan and South
Korea.
Some analysts argue that the purpose of
Pyongyang's development of nuclear arms is merely to
blackmail the United States. These analysts argue that
once the US offers North Korea a sizable economic
package and a non-aggression pact, Pyongyang will
abandon its nuclear program; in fact, according to this
argument, it is not in Pyongyang's national interests to
develop such weapons, as it would only further alienate
neighboring countries as well as the United States.
While there is certainly much truth to this line of
reasoning, it cannot be overlooked that North Korea
would gain international leverage should it acquire
nuclear arms.
Since the election of US President
George W Bush, Pyongyang has become increasingly
concerned over the White House's foreign policy
objectives. The Bush administration labeled North Korea
as part of the "axis of evil" that might require "regime
change". Furthermore, Washington has threatened to
launch a barrage of missiles at North Korea should the
country come closer to developing and acquiring nuclear
weapons.
Washington's aggression has pushed
North Korean hawks toward a desire for a large nuclear
arsenal. Their purpose in creating such an arsenal would
be to prevent the United States from being able to
attack North Korea without fear of drastic consequences.
Indeed, the reason Washington has been able to threaten
North Korea is Pyongyang's lack of a nuclear arsenal.
Pyongyang certainly hasn't forgotten the chain
of events that occurred after China acquired and tested
its first nuclear bomb in 1964. In fact, in this one
respect, China was a state similar to present-day North
Korea. In the 1950s, China was threatened by a US
nuclear attack three times. During the Korean War, the
United States threatened to decimate China with a
nuclear assault. China was also threatened by the United
States two other times because of disputes over Chinese
islands being used by the Taiwanese military to launch
attacks against the mainland. Finally, in 1964, China
tested its first nuclear bomb, and the response it
received was very beneficial to Beijing's national
interests: Taiwan lost its drive to retake the mainland,
and US president Richard Nixon visited Beijing to
normalize relations between the two countries.
North Korea is certainly not China; yet if
Pyongyang were able to develop a large nuclear arsenal
with second-strike capability it would reduce the risk
of attack by the United States and other adversaries.
The potential for destruction against states attacking
North Korea would be too high and too costly. Becoming a
nuclear-armed state with second-strike capability could
be a lot more valuable than a non-aggression pact to the
survival of Kim Jong-il's regime.
However, that
is not to say that a nuclear-capable North Korea would
not have a negative impact for the region. If Pyongyang
were unable to create a significant stockpile of nuclear
weapons, with the capability of second-strike status,
the United States would still be able to strike North
Korea's nuclear sites preemptively and destroy its
nuclear capability.
This course of action would
be very risky for the United States, however, as it
would certainly alienate important powers such as China
that, while opposed to Pyongyang developing nuclear
weapons, would object fiercely to the possible precedent
created by such a military strike by the US against
another sovereign state in East Asia. Furthermore,
Washington would have to be certain that it was able to
eliminate Pyongyang’s nuclear capability completely;
otherwise the consequences of North Korean retaliation
could be devastating to US interests in the region.
Indeed, Dr Daniel Pinkston of the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California, states
that North Korea has the missile capability of striking
all of Japan, including US bases on Okinawa. While
Pinkston admits that North Korea's missiles are not very
accurate, he warns that accuracy "is not so critical if
they are armed with nuclear warheads".
In
addition to risking a preemptive attack from the United
States, Pyongyang's acquisition of nuclear weapons could
also spark a regional arms race in East Asia. It would
lend credence to the claims by hawks in Japan that Tokyo
needs to abandon its non-nuclear status and become a
nuclear-armed state. While able to rely on the US
nuclear umbrella, a nuclear-armed North Korea could
compel Japan to develop its own nuclear capability as
insurance against the peninsula state. This in turn
could cause China - no doubt already stressed by a
freshly nuclear-armed North Korea - to expand its own
nuclear arsenal in order to keep it superior to Japan's.
North Korea would have then in effect played two
regional powers against each other, giving it time to
develop its own country free from outside interference.
Therefore, if North Korea were to become a
confirmed nuclear-armed state, a whole series of power
and interest clashes could develop in East Asia. The
repercussions of Pyongyang's sudden possession of
nuclear weapons would have the potential of being severe
- from the threat of a preemptive attack by the United
States to the start of a nuclear-arms race in East Asia.
Perhaps the safest outcome - as far as sustaining
general stability in the region - would be if Pyongyang
would abandon its nuclear program and in return receive
substantial economic assistance and political
reassurances from Washington. However, as history has
demonstrated, it is not necessarily in Pyongyang's best
interests to do so.
Published with permission
of the Power and Interest News Report,
an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of
interest around the globe. All comments should be
directed to content@pinr.com
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