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Korea talks: Another act
about to unfold
By Ralph A Cossa
"Surrender means death!" This pretty much sums
up North Korea's opening position in the Six-Party Talks
in Beijing this Wednesday through Friday. The US
insistence that North Korea dismantle its nuclear
program "fully, verifiably, and irreversibly" in advance
of dialogue (or rewards) "is little short of demanding
that the DPRK surrender to it", proclaims the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, demanding "confirmation that
the US has dropped its hostile policy" as a precondition
to progress.
To demonstrate its "fundamental
switchover", Washington must conclude "a legally binding
non-aggression treaty and establish diplomatic
relations" and promise not to "obstruct [North Korea's]
economic cooperation" with other countries. The latter
is an obvious reference to Washington's new
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at
stopping the flow of weapons of mass destruction. (While
the PSI is not aimed specifically or exclusively at
Pyongyang, the shoe clearly fits.)
In effect,
North Korea wants Washington to stop hindering its
weapons trafficking (not to mention its highly lucrative
drug-smuggling operations). However, pending
counter-proliferation exercises by Washington's
assembled 11-nation "coalition of the willing" send a
strong signal that Washington is intent on strengthening
the PSI as part of its broader noose-tightening policy
toward Pyongyang.
Washington has also
steadfastly refused to offer a bilateral non-aggression
pact, even while hinting that some type of multilateral
security assurances might be provided, an idea Russia
and China have apparently also endorsed. Showing
flexibility to Pyongyang on this point in advance of the
meeting seems counterproductive, however; Pyongyang has
already declared that any collective security guarantee
would be "meaningless". Exchanging its nuclear deterrent
force for a multilateral security guarantee constitutes
"dishonest jugglery", it claims, even while refusing
officially to verify that it has such a force.
Given the unyielding positions of the two main
protagonists in this six-part drama, there seems little
hope for a positive outcome to the initial round of
talks. But this does not mean long-term prospects are
hopeless.
There are several points on which all
six already agree. First is that a war on the peninsula
serves no one's interests. While North Korea issues
threats of nuclear Armageddon almost daily, it realizes
that the outcome of any major confrontation (nuclear or
not) would be the destruction of the North Korean state.
Despite this obviously preferred goal, Washington does
not seek a military solution, given its preoccupation
elsewhere and the high costs in terms of human lives
lost (South Korean and American as well as North Korean)
should the military option be exercised. While few in
Tokyo, Beijing or Moscow would shed tears if Kim Jong-il
were to be eliminated tomorrow - the latter two see the
utility of a North Korean buffer state remaining but not
necessarily under Kim's rule - the uncertainty and costs
involved in bringing about regime change in North Korea,
at least at present, are higher than the presumed
benefits. So all agree that there should be no war (even
if Washington, wisely, keeps all options on the table).
In addition, while only the leadership in
Pyongyang sees the perpetuation of the Kim Jong-il
regime as a desired goal, all seem prepared to live with
an outcome that leaves the current North Korean regime
in place. One suspects that there is some doubt in North
Korea about this and clearly there are elements in
Washington that believe North Korea regime change is not
only desirable but essential, but this does not reflect
official US policy as articulated by President George W
Bush himself. A peaceful outcome is the top priority,
even if helps perpetuates the reprehensible regime in
the North (until such time as it crumbles of its own
weight).
There is a final point on which all six
should, and must, agree before a peaceful solution can
be assured: that the presence of nuclear weapons in
North Korea decreases the prospects for peace and
stability in East Asia and makes conflict on the
peninsula more rather than less likely. Five out of six
are already convinced: South Korea and Japan have joined
the US in stating unequivocally that North Korea's
nuclear-weapons program cannot be tolerated and will
result in further isolation and hardship in that
country, and both China and Russia have issued forceful
demands that North Korea give up its nuclear ambitions
and return to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
regime. Pyongyang remains to be convinced.
Obviously, Pyongyang has concluded that its
previous tactics - demanding bilateral talks with
Washington while increasingly coming out of the nuclear
closet - were becoming counterproductive. Hence its
agreement to enter into multilateral discussions. But it
is unclear whether it believes that its current
conventional military power - which puts the lives of
Seoul's 12 million-plus inhabitants (including tens of
thousands of Americans on any given day) at risk - is
sufficient to prevent the military option from being
exercised, absent an additional nuclear security
blanket. More important, talks about going down a "blind
alley" aside, Pyongyang sees little reason to believe
that Beijing or especially Seoul will really withhold
economic life support.
There is something
surreal about warning about "further isolation and
crisis", as South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun did
recently, while at the same time continuing
mine-clearing and construction activity aimed at opening
up road and rail links between North and South - not to
mention warmly welcoming North Korean athletes (and
cheerleaders) to the World University Games in Taegu
after issuing demanded apologies for South Korean
demonstrations of anger at North Korean policy.
As the six parties discuss the crisis in
Beijing, world attention will be on the remarks being
uttered by Washington and Pyongyang, even though neither
is expected to go much beyond reiterating its already
clearly stated positions during this opening round of
talks. Instead, we should be paying closest attention to
the comments coming from Seoul, Beijing and Moscow.
Unless and until Pyongyang believes that these
traditionally more sympathetic states are prepared to
play hardball in demanding an end to Pyongyang's nuclear
program - thus making a continuation of this program a
net minus rather than a perceived net plus - it is
unlikely to take the talks seriously.
Realistically, the best we can hope for from
this week's meeting would be a declaration (probably
unverified) by Pyongyang that it is freezing its current
programs, along with a multilateral pledge by all
parties that each will refrain from aggressive actions
against the other while talks proceed in good faith. The
best we are likely to get is an agreement to keep
talking.
Ralph A Cossa is president of
the Pacific Forum CSIS (e-mail pacforum@hawaii.rr.com),
a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute
affiliated with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, and senior editor
of Comparative Connections, a
quarterly electronic journal.
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