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SPEAKING FREELY
Korea: Tough problem, strong
solutions
By David Scofield
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their say.
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SEOUL - The
full inclusion of all the region's stakeholders in the
Beijing talks, their full participation in a negotiated
settlement, a subsequent role in agreement
implementation, and a share of the responsibility in the
event of failure - all this adds up to the possibility
of a regional solution to a regional crisis with global
implications. For the region is united in its rejection
of North Korean jingoism.
Or at least that's how
it could be. But the reality is a region far from
united, and it is difficult to be very optimistic about
the outcome of this week's six-party talks in Beijing,
as there are yawning chasms in national interests that
have yet to be reconciled. In fact, the participants are
not only in disagreement about all the options that
should be on the table, they have all, with the
exception of the United States, declared positions that
seem to preempt any discussion of a military option - a
point not lost on the Dear Leader of North Korea, Kim
Jong-il.
As long as these obvious differences in
approach persist, and options are excluded, North Korea
will continue its intransigence in the knowledge that,
with history as a guide, belligerence will be met with
more aid and support from South Korea, relative
ambivalence by China and Russia, and a focus on citizen
repatriation, not disarmament, by Japan.
China
holds tremendous influence over North Korea, and the
visit of Chinese officials to that country last weekend
could be a sign of China's willingness to exert
pre-talks leverage on North Korea. But this too is
probably overly optimistic, as Beijing has so far been
less than willing to lean on Pyongyang and instead seems
more interested in expanding its influence in North
Korea specifically and the region generally, than with
making strong demands of Pyongyang. Beijing's move
toward Pyongyang at such a critical juncture and Seoul's
repeated declarations that armed conflict with the North
is not an option, with or without Northern disarmament,
leaves the United States in a tough position and does
not bode well for success in the upcoming meeting.
US officials have maintained a firm line in the
weeks leading up to these talks, and rightly so. The
leadership of North Korea needs to hear, in no uncertain
terms, that threatening, belligerent behavior will not
be tolerated further. But as sound as the US position
is, it has also left it with little obvious wiggle room
if things fall apart.
What, for example, would
be the response to a North Korean declaration that it
will not abandon its nuclear weapons and other WMD
(weapons of mass destruction) programs, and will instead
commit even more of the country's scarce resources to
these programs to thwart continued US aggression - a
statement already floated through the state media? What
choice is left? Longtime US ally South Korea is more
concerned with appeasement than punishment, and China,
the major North Korean influencer, while having an
interest in preventing a US-led attack on North Korea,
believes that such an event is unlikely and would
probably not be too concerned if the tense status quo
were to continue. As well, the North Korea issue
continues to divide the populace in South Korea, putting
increasing pressure on US forces stationed there, a
situation that China also finds quite acceptable.
Both China and South Korea perceive talk of US
military action against North Korean as a negotiating
ploy, not a true option. It's also important to remember
that of all the parties attending the Beijing talks,
only Japan and the United States feel directly
threatened by North Korea. South Korea officially
prefers to see a kinder, gentler, misunderstood North
Korea - a situation best addressed with a hug, not a
gun. But, of course, without a viable military option
against North Korea, more bad behavior is likely and
future forced compliance impossible.
But there
may be another way forward if these talks stall, one
that would negate the necessity of a full frontal
assault on Pyongyang, and herald a new beginning for
both North Korea and its neighbors.
The present
leadership in North Korea has proved time and again, in
broken promises to all the countries represented in
Beijing, that it cannot be trusted to keep its word.
Even in the unlikely event that North Korea were to
accept its previously promised obligations, there is
little to suggest that new promises, without the real
threat of regional retribution, will amount to anything
more than so many failed agreements before. The leader
of North Korea has become synonymous with deceit, making
a negotiated settlement with him and his ruling clique
very difficult. In the interests of long-term stability
and regional peace, all options must be on the table,
and all possible scenarios should be considered.
The "encouraged leadership change" scenario has
been batted around before and is usually dismissed out
of hand, as most assume that viable opposition does not
exist - many pointing to reports of a failed coup in the
northern provinces in the late 1990s that was ruthlessly
put down by overwhelming numbers of troops loyal to the
Pyongyang regime. This event is often cited as the
reason regime change is not possible. But seen another
way, the attempts of years past support the hypothesis
that elements exist within the military ready for
change, but remain hidden, lacking external support and
planning.
The other traditional response is that
such a move would cause a complete collapse of North
Korea, resulting in a massive wave of refugees across
its northern border, a situation that Russia has
reportedly begun preparing for. But in many ways North
Korea has already collapsed. The famine in the mid- to
late 1990s that resulted in the deaths of more than 2
million people in North Korea - one in every 13 - did
not precipitate a mass exodus.
Koreans are no
strangers to hardship, and North Koreans can be expected
to resort to a defense mechanism that has worked for
millennia on the peninsula. Koreans have traditionally
maintained stronger ties to their region of birth and
upbringing than to the wider nation, and this is
probably especially true in a country where the vast
majority are not permitted to move and interact with one
another. If history is any guide, most North Koreans
will hunker down and stay put, using family, village,
regional connections and affiliations to survive.
Further, the ethnically homogenous nature of North Korea
negates the possibility of competing ethnic and
religious groups prolonging instability, as has been the
case in other regions.
The key to a successful
leadership evolution in North Korean is post-regime
military control. The military is the glue that holds
the nation together, and it's the only institution
capable of managing and maintaining the country in the
short term. Well-placed groups within the northern
military establishment must be identified and encouraged
in any way possible.
Of course, such proposals
will not gain momentum if credible sources of opposition
are not known, and there is probably only one country
that can secure the information necessary, and its
representatives have just returned from Pyongyang. China
must be strongly encouraged to aid and abet change in
North Korea. It must be made very clear to China that
the cost of maintaining and supporting the present North
Korean leadership will be very high politically and
economically. China has grown very dependent on foreign
investment and trade to keep its economy moving and to
ensure that internal socio-economic fissures do not
widen and deepen. The Chinese leadership must understand
that the present situation is not acceptable, and that
in the absence of positive steps forward, the situation
could worsen, adversely affecting all in the region,
including China.
Peace on the Korean Peninsula
and greater regional stability are possible in the short
term. But if self-serving agendas are allowed to take
precedence over sustainable stability, then the region
will continue to stagger along in a state of quasi-peace
with further polarization, instability and potentially
armed conflict in the near future. Strong solutions to
this protracted problem will not be easy, but the
dividends that eventual peace will pay will benefit
generations to come.
David Scofield is
a lecturer at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies,
Kyung Hee University, Seoul.
(Copyright 2003
David Scofield.)
Speaking Freely is an
Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say. Please click
here if you are
interested in contributing.
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