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Seoul marches into the
unknown
By Jaewoo Choo
SEOUL
- South Koreans marched in the streets after this
weekend's long-anticipated decision by their government
to send troops to Iraq. It has been likely for a long
time, though, that the move by President Roh Moo-hyun
was inevitable.
As it was in April, the nation
is split between those who think backing the US-led
occupation of Iraq is a righteous thing to do for the
sake of the US-Korea alliance that is currently
celebrating its 50th anniversary, and those who oppose
it on the grounds that it is the wrong war to join. In
April the former, the nationalists, if we may dub them
so, managed to sway the vote of the National Assembly,
through which a group of a few hundred construction and
medical servicemen was sent to help rebuild worn-torn
Iraq.
Since the recent passing of a resolution
on Iraq at the United Nations Security Council will
enhance the legitimacy for military or non-military
activities to be conducted in Iraq, it also gives Roh
more leverage over his people on the issue of sending
troops to Iraq. The troop dispatch is feasible not
because 70 percent of the populace favors the cause with
the passing of the Security Council resolution, but
because South Korea has no other choice but to subdue
itself to US pressure.
One recent anecdote from
the latest visit to the US by South Korean Foreign
Affairs and Trade Minister Yoon Young-kwan tells us the
inside story. The New York Times on October 14 described
Yoon's meeting with his US counterpart, Secretary of
State Colin Powell, as a "heated" one. Yoon relayed his
president's conditional message in which he related
Korea's dispatch of troops to the US's promise to "give
North Korea some ground to stand on", implying a softer
stance in handling the North. According to the report,
the message upset Powell so much that he "curtly told"
Yoon that this was not the way ally nations treat each
other. A couple of days later, US National Security
Adviser Condoleezza Rice quoted Ra Jong-il, director of
South Korea's National Security Council, with whom Rice
met in Washington last week, as saying that Seoul fully
supports US efforts in Iraq.
The second call to
send troops was relayed from Washington to Seoul in
early September. At the time, it seemed a decision had
to be made at once. However, it was postponed by a few
urgent domestic matters, such as bribery scandals
involving a number of Roh's aids and his demand for the
general populace's vote of confidence.
The extra
time provided by Roh's preoccupation with domestic
issues generated much more heated debate on whether
Korea should send troops to Iraq. This time the US has
asked it to send 3,000-5,000 combat soldiers at Korea's
own expense in the name of the alliance. It has asked
that the Korean troops engage in such duties as patrol
and combat activities. In the course of such duties,
casualties and even deaths are unavoidable. This concern
has particularly triggered Korean sentiment.
A
poll released on Friday showed that 52 percent of South
Koreans opposed the dispatch of their young men and
women to Iraq, and 48 percent favor the move. It also
showed that with understanding of differences between
multinational troops and UN peacekeeping forces, 61
percent opposed the idea of participating in the
multinational military efforts, with 32 percent in favor
of it. However, it found a strong consensus on
dispatching non-combatant troops: almost 70 percent were
up for that.
At the governmental level, the
split between Roh's administration and government is
rather balanced. As most, if not all, of his
administration staff is composed of those conscientious
of human rights and democracy, its position is either
against complying with the US request or has
reservations. By contrast, his government and those
departments related to the nation's security interests
in particular, such as the Ministry of Foreign and
Commerce Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, and the
Ministry of Defense, have all expressed strong support.
It is thus obvious there is strong division around the
president. So the president decided to listen to what
the public had to say.
As was the case in April,
the nationalist group has been persistent in its support
for the US demand, for the following reasons. First, it
is now time for us to pay back our debt to the US for
its half-century-long commitment to our nation's safety
and security. Without it, South Korea could not have
achieved what it has in economic terms. Second, it is
for our national interests. They claim that South Korea
could benefit very much by taking the US side, albeit
they are not too clear on what the benefits would be. It
is speculated that Korea will be allowed to participate
in Iraq's postwar reconstruction projects, which is
pretty much monopolized by the US. Third, South Korea
has to uphold the spirit of its alliance treaty with the
US. Last, its refusal would be very costly, since there
is a growing skepticism in Washington about its
relations with Seoul.
The predominant argument
by the opposing group is based on the legitimacy of the
Iraq war. Because it was an illegitimate war to begin
with, they say, it is neither rational nor justifiable
for South Korea to participate in any kind of activities
that is especially designed by the US, the instigator of
the war. Second, sending combatant troops is
economically too expensive. On an annual basis it is
estimated that the economic cost for a contingent of
3,000 troops would be about US$200 million. Third, with
deepening anti-American sentiment in the Islamic states
and in Iraq in particular, South Korea's participation
on the US side would taint its national image, thereby
ruining the reputation it has thus far established as
nation friendly to the Arab world. South Korea has since
the 1970s been one of the major actors in Arab
construction and plantation work sites. Fourth, there
are no conceivable economic gains or other possible
benefits that South Korea may be able to retrieve from
sending its troops. Even if it gains something, it would
still not overcome the deficit arising from the expenses
that it has to pay for its troops.
In the end,
there needs to be an explanation as to why South Korea
has to undergo all these debates if it was always going
to send troops anyway. South Korea had no other choice
but to do so because of its fear of uncertainty,
especially that caused by not complying with a US
demand. Now that the decision has been made, however,
the fear of uncertainty will inevitably loom even larger
on South Korea. No one can describe the benefits this
move will gain in exact terms. No one is certain of
South Korea's position or role in the US reconstruction
blueprint for Iraq. No one can guarantee that South
Korea's decision to risk shedding blood along with US
soldiers will favorably affect the United States' plans
to redeploy its troops in the Korean Peninsula. No one,
not even the president of South Korea, can assure anyone
of the safe return of those dispatched.
Jaewoo Choo is a former research
fellow at the Trade Research Institute, Korea
International Trade Association, and currently assistant
professor at the School of International Relations and
Area Studies, Kyung Hee University, South Korea.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
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