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North Korea: Dealing with a
despot
By David Scofield
SEOUL - Brookings Institution senior fellow of
foreign-policy studies Michael O'Hanlon has articulated
a blueprint for disarmament, peace and reconciliation on
the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately, this grand design
hinges on desire for change in Pyongyang - and there is
little or no evidence that any such desire exists.
Speaking before a large audience at the Shilla
Hotel here on Thursday morning, O'Hanlon outlined his
"more for more" strategy, which is predicated on the
assumption that North Korea can be compelled to embrace
change if enough incentives are on the table. The theory
goes like this: Previous negotiated settlements have
failed because they were too narrow in scope, allowing
too many opportunities for non-compliance.
O'Hanlon's oft-quoted "Grand Bargain",
thoughtfully articulated in his latest book Crisis on
the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North
Korea, co-authored with Mike Mochizuki of George
Washington University, envisages putting it all on the
table: diplomatic recognition, economic incentives,
including restructuring money and energy guarantees, all
underscored by an agreement by the United States, and
the rest of the regions concerned actors, to take no
action to remove the leadership in North Korea. The
North Koreans for their part would go beyond the
verifiable, irreversible dismantling of all offensive
aspects of their nuclear program and would also be
expected to make large cuts in their conventional
military. The theory goes on to speculate that with this
many carrots on the table, North Korea would be unable
to say no and would acquiesce out of political-economic
necessity.
The idea is that this would compel
the North Koreans to do things they do not want to do,
and the implementation of such an all-for-all
arrangement would ultimately lead to a positive change
in the governance of North Korea as the blade of
incentives would cut both ways, ultimately undermining
the platform of fear and isolation that has been used by
Kim Jong-il so skillfully over the years to suppress the
people and maintain his tyrannical system of governance.
This is consistent with what Scott Snyder, Korea
representative of the Asia Foundation and author of
Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating
Behavior, calls changing the regime, as opposed to
regime change.
O'Hanlon's skillfully articulated
approach, an eventual change of the regime through
negotiated reciprocity - more for more - is hopeful. The
idea that the Grand Bargain would bring a tide of change
eventually proving irresistible to North Korean
leadership is inspiring. Unfortunately, it seems
unlikely to work, and while failure may solidify
regional support for more aggressive penalties in the
future (though certainly not assured), it is likely that
North Korea would be that much more dangerous by the
time failure were acknowledged.
While the
"steaks and sledgehammers" approach has not been tried,
the "carrot and stick" approach has, and it has
consistently failed as threats of punishment have
remained just that, threats. If such a grand deal were
to be brokered, there is little indication as to what
sticks, if any, could realistically be brought to bear
in the face of non-compliance, a situation that, if
history is any judge, seems more than likely. The
region's actors are resolute that a military option not
be considered. For North Korea, a state that was built
upon and defines itself through violent military
struggle and remains on a permanent war footing, this is
a key weakness. Short of assured destruction, all other
possible punishments ring hollow, as they rely in some
form or another on sanctions and penalties designed to
elicit national pain. The leadership has demonstrated
repeatedly that they are willing to subject the people
to more pain and hardship than the international
community can tolerate. Score another for Kim.
North Korea is remarkably consistent in its
approach to the world. It has been very successful in
using agreements to milk concessions and aid until the
agreement is eventually invalidated, perhaps not
surprising considering the central tenets of the
country's juche philosophy. The key notion of
self-reliance may seem a non sequitur in a country that
has for decades relied on Cold War hostilities to
extract needed resources and capital from its communist
brethren, but while self-reliance may be inferred by
many outside North Korea to mean self-sufficiency, North
Korea employs a different definition. In North Korea,
self-reliance is translated as self first, meaning that
all deals and agreements will be used to further the
agenda of the state, as we have seen countless times
before, the conditions or terms of any agreement not
withstanding.
This nation- (leadership-) first
approach to foreign affairs is not new. Indeed,
according to an insightful article by Jasper Becker in
the Christian Science Monitor last July, the former
Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries often
complained that North Korea, eager to secure much-needed
technology, weapons, oil and grain, reciprocated with
shoddy manufactured goods that were of no value. Still
today, China restricts the passage of its railcars into
North Korea, as it was found that while many would
enter, few were sent back - this to the North Koreans'
closest friend.
Concepts like those found in
O'Hanlon's Grand Bargain are based on the idea that
somehow North Korea wants to change, that all that is
needed are enough incentives to prod it into accepting
what it latently desires. But there is nothing in the
Pyongyang leadership's words or deeds that suggests this
is true. Indeed, it is only those outside the system who
maintain that Kim must covertly desire change.
The present leadership views itself as
synonymous to the nation. What is good for Kim is good
for the nation - period. Any change that is not fully
orchestrated by Kim and designed absolutely to ensure
his grip on power is not good for the nation and will
not be implemented. This has been demonstrated time and
again as the North Korean leader has acted in ways that
baffle observers who have yet to come to terms with the
simplicity and singularity of Kim's "me first"
leadership.
On another level, making deals that
ensure the survival, even in the short term, of a despot
who has overseen the execution, torture, rape and
politically induced starvation of millions of his own
people is morally repugnant and will severely undermine
the ability of the United States to advocate the concept
of universal human rights. That those who perpetrate
such crimes against humanity can or should be tolerated,
and that the perpetrators of such acts be cajoled,
placated, in essence rewarded, is an affront to all
humanity.
The belief that more bargains, even
"grand" ones, will lead to anything more than more
broken promises, greater regional instability and an
increased danger of proliferation of fissile and other
materials in the interim is fantasy. A belief in a
negotiated settlement with North Korea requires a
complete suspension of reality, and will likely leave
the United States and its regional allies in an even
tougher spot when it eventually fails - as Pyongyang
will, with history again as a guide, spend what
resources it can usurp from the agreement to fortify its
defensive and offensive capabilities further.
I
support Michael O'Hanlon in his quest for a peaceful
solution to the intractable Korean problem. I too hope
the change that is so urgently needed in North Korea can
be ushered in in ways that prevent mass bloodshed.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence to support the
assertion that positive change is possible under the
present system. On principle, the North Koreans will use
every opportunity to extract still greater concessions
and incentives from the region, but "reciprocity" is
just not in their vocabulary, and that preempts
negotiated change and the possibility of sustainable,
non-nuclear peace under the present leadership.
David Scofield is a lecturer at the
Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee
University, Seoul.
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