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Six-party talks: Conditions for
success
By Ralph A Cossa
SEOUL - President George W Bush's recent offer
to provide Pyongyang with written assurances that the
United States does not intend to attack North Korea, and
Pyongyang's willingness "to consider" this offer,
provide the basis, however tentative and contentious,
for a negotiated solution to the current nuclear
standoff on the Korean Peninsula. But even if North
Korea really does return to the bargaining table - and
this is by no means assured - a long and difficult road
lies ahead in the search for common ground between the
two primary antagonists in this six-party drama. The key
to a successful outcome remains the willingness of the
other four actors - China, Japan, Russia and especially
South Korea - to stand firmly behind Washington's
central demand: that Pyongyang "fully, verifiably, and
irreversibly" abandon its nuclear-weapons programs.
While Bush's comments (during the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation Leaders' Meeting in Bangkok last
month) demonstrated some US flexibility as to how that
goal is ultimately achieved - as opposed to the previous
"all quids before any quos" US approach - the result
(rightfully) remains non-negotiable. Most important,
references to a "phased approach" notwithstanding,
Washington's offer of multilateral security assurances
remains "conditioned on verifiable progress" toward the
dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program.
North Korea's agreement "in principle" to return
to the six-party talks is also conditioned, upon the US
"putting into practice the proposal for a package
solution based on the principle of simultaneous
actions". North Korea previously described these
simultaneous actions as follows: Pyongyang would
"declare its will to scrap its nuclear program" in
return for Washington signing a (bilateral)
non-aggression pact and establishing diplomatic
relations with North Korea. At that point, the two sides
could then discuss verification measures (and an
economic-assistance package).
It's no wonder
Washington has said "that 'simultaneity' is not a word
that we would use", while being careful not to reject
the concept out of hand: "We'll be talking from our
proposals; if they want to come and talk from theirs,
that's fine," commented State Department spokesman
Richard Boucher.
Over-optimistic interpretations
emanating from Seoul and Beijing notwithstanding, it is
important to note that North Korea has not dropped its
demand for a "legally binding" bilateral US-DPRK
(Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Non-Aggression
Pact. Nor has it agreed, in principle or otherwise, to
accept multilateral security assurances as a substitute.
Even its willingness to consider the Bush proposal was
cast strictly in bilateral terms: "We are ready to
consider Bush's remarks on the 'written assurances of
non-aggression' if they are based on the intention to
co-exist with the DPRK," the official Korean Central
News Agency quoted a Foreign Ministry spokesman as
saying, continuing that "this stance is prompted by the
expectation that the DPRK and the US can build
confidence and lay a foundation of co-existence in the
course of solving issues one after another on the
principle of simultaneous actions".
Acceptance
of multilateral security assurances will be an important
test of Pyongyang's sincerity and intentions. If its
current position is driven by genuine security concerns
(as Beijing, Seoul and others contend), a multilateral
security guarantee seemingly would provide greater
assurance to North Korea than one underwritten by
Washington's promises alone. But this would require
Pyongyang, finally, to recognize Seoul as a legitimate
interlocutor when it comes to issues of peace and
security on the Peninsula, something it has steadfastly
refused to do - the earlier four-party talks broke down
in 1999 in large part over Pyongyang's refusal to agree
to Seoul being a signatory on any Korean Peninsula peace
accord. The North has, of course, been more than willing
to take the South's money (in the form of economic
assistance and downright bribes). But, when it comes to
Korean Peninsula security issues, it demands to deal
bilaterally (and exclusively) with Washington. This must
change.
As an aside, it never ceases to amaze me
how the South Korean people, who are quick to take
affront at every real or imagined slight coming from an
American (or Japanese), are so willing continually to
turn the other cheek in the face of North Korean insults
and affronts, and have criticized rather than praised or
thanked Washington for insisting on a South
Korea-inclusive multilateral approach.
Bush's
willingness to consider multilateral assurances - to
find "other ways we can look at, to say exactly what
I've said publicly, on paper, with our partners'
consent" - is a first step in the right direction. It is
now up to Washington to make Pyongyang an offer it can't
refuse; one that is crafted jointly with Seoul and Tokyo
and vetted and improved in advance by Beijing and
Moscow, prior to being tabled at the next round of
six-party talks.
The five like-minded parties
should offer the DPRK verbal assurance that there will
be no attempts to invade North Korea or to seek or
support efforts aimed at "regime change" provided
Pyongyang simultaneously declares a halt to its
nuclear-weapons programs (including further reprocessing
of its spent fuel) and agrees to pursue six-party
negotiations in good faith. Written assurances would be
provided once International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspectors are allowed to return to North Korea to begin
the verification process, with the assurance being
contingent upon continued DPRK cooperation and
compliance, including the placing of spent fuel
canisters (and any extracted plutonium) back under IAEA
safeguards.
Any significant economic assistance
package, to include a resumption of suspended heavy fuel
oil deliveries, would be predicated on the introduction
of a more intrusive verification regime, with clear
penalties spelled out for future non-compliance. Serious
negotiations should also begin on a four- or six-party
peace treaty to replace the 50-year-old armistice.
But first, Pyongyang has to show up at the next
meeting and accept, in principle and in practice,
multilateral security assurances rather than a bilateral
pact with Washington that cuts Seoul out of the security
picture.
Ralph A Cossa is president of
the Pacific Forum CSIS (e-mail pacforum@hawaii.rr.com
), a Honolulu-based non-profit
research institute affiliated with the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and
senior editor of Comparative
Connections, a quarterly electronic
journal.
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