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TOWARD ONE KOREA
Part 2: A new
strategy
By David Scofield
Part 1: Seoul goes from ally to
arbiter
SEOUL - Indications that the
United States may seek to broaden a possible agreement
with North Korea beyond nuclear-weapons development and
potential fissile material proliferation, to address
conventional-force concerns, as well as North Korea's
medieval approach to human rights, portend an agreement
beyond what was brokered in 1994. But now, as then, the
United States needs to answer a fundamental question
before going forward: Is the present leadership in North
Korea capable of keeping an agreement?
No
possible agreement can stop North Korea covertly
developing nuclear weapons, or stop it selling fissile
and other untraceable weapons of mass destruction to the
highest bidder if it chooses to. The small quantities
and the concealable nature of the instruments and
elements involved make it impossible to vet effectively
all that leaves the country through air and sea
interdiction initiatives, and the nation's labyrinth of
underground facilities makes a complete understanding of
North Korea's nuclear program very unlikely.
Further, the success of the agreement cannot
rest on the ability of the United States to rally the
region to enforce compliance. Even 10 years ago when the
now defunct US-South Korea bi-national threat of
coercion existed, North Korea still managed covertly to
continue its nuclear program through a highly enriched
uranium initiative, in complete defiance of its written
promises. North Korea has reneged on promises to all the
region's actors and withdrew from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, eliciting nothing more than a scolding from some
of the region's capitals. The success of any agreement
rests on all parties involved believing that they will
be better served by following the terms - compliance
offering something that cheating does not - or
conversely, the costs of cheating being higher than the
potential reward. Unfortunately, neither is true in the
case of North Korea.
The present leadership
cannot adhere to its promises, and we should not expect
it to. It cannot accept change and retain control at the
same time, its power and position being predicated on
its ability to extort concessions and yield nothing;
cheating is a necessity, not a choice. We should accept
this reality and devote all available resources to the
principle of leadership change, finding new people to
negotiate with, people in whose best interests it is to
abide by the principles of a new regional agreement.
Supporters of appeasement usually counter that
there are no apparent successors waiting in the wings to
assume control of North Korea, which is true. If anyone
within the leadership apparatus were openly to indicate
interest in succeeding Kim, their next move would be a
one-way trip to one of his many gulags for a torturous
death. What is sure is that we will never know who might
be willing to step in as long as the US continues to
negotiate with the present group in Pyongyang.
Kim Jong-il leads a small, impoverished country,
yet he manages to dictate terms to the world's only
superpower. As long as he continues to command America's
attention, no one within the regime will doubt his
efficacy. Pressure will expose fractures that may not be
immediately obvious, while placating the existing
leadership, tolerating non or semi-compliance, is a path
that will make things more dangerous as North Korea's
consistent brinkmanship strategies will eventually, if
inadvertently, thrust the region into open conflict - to
say nothing of the possibility of undetected
proliferation, and the message it sends to every
dictator with an eye to acquiring nukes, and every
tyrant with a callous disregard for human life.
It is to be hoped that the next group of leaders
will see that they and their nation can be far more
prosperous, and "powerful" - a very important
consideration for Koreans on both sides of the 38th
Parallel - if they embrace the chance to steer a new
course. And it is likely they will, for unlike the
previous leadership, this new group will be far less
institutionally embedded. With the Kim cult gone, the
leadership will have only the tenets of juche
underpinning their governance, a code that can be
interpreted as offering justification for the Kim's
departure. The removal of the present leadership may not
usher in a group of forward-thinking altruists, but it
will demonstrate to all that that change is possible: if
the Kims can go, anyone can go, putting the new
government on notice that if positive change is not
forthcoming, its right to rule will quickly be
questioned.
Removing the few who currently rule
the North will also give the South the opportunity to
pursue rapprochement with North Korea in a more
balanced, reciprocal fashion. One hopes that it will
prompt national discussion on the future direction of
their relationship with the North as recent policy has
been rooted in the belief that Kim Jong-il is an
integral component of the North, his removal ushering
the nation's collapse. This connection has been the
impetus behind economic investment policies that,
ironically, may negate the possibility of unification in
the mid to long term as the incentive to invest in such
areas as the Kaesung Industrial Complex in the North
hinge on 50-year leases and some of the cheapest labor
in the world. These policies ensure peninsular division
and thwart unification.
Unlike in areas where
tribal loyalties and ethnic and religious fissures
threaten to fracture a nation in post-autocratic
transition, North Korea has no such issues. Indeed, the
US currently stands between North and South in what is
one of the most ethnically, linguistically and
culturally homogenous regions in the world. This is, at
its core, a civil division, and the US cannot advocate
peninsular security and autonomy in a post-Kim
environment while physically entangled in a web of
nationalism that spans both sides of the Demilitarized
Zone. The development of South-North relations and the
direction the two halves choose to take must be
indigenous.
The US is perceived by many in South
Korea as having undue influence over affairs both
regional and domestic. The validity of this belief is of
less relevance than the belief itself; as long as people
believe that this is true and various national
administrations continue to use the belief to deflect
criticism of their own policy weaknesses, it is "true"
and it will continue to inhibit the sort of national
institutional development a post-Kim North Korea will
require.
North Korea will be the recipient of
largesse from the region and the US. Reciprocal,
regional peace treaties, specific bi and multilateral
agreements and bargains must be an integral part of
post-Kim North Korea, but all must be underscored with
the legal understanding of an autonomous, independent
peninsula. This does not imply a reduced footprint or a
lowered profile, but a complete and total withdrawal of
the US military presence in South Korea.
Of
course, a US withdrawal does not end America's defense
obligation; in fact the obligations of the US and the
rest of the region's actors will actually increase, with
force-projection technology and a web of regional
treaties ensuring peace and stability.
The
Koreans, for the first time since the end of the Yi
Dynasty almost 100 years ago, may perceive their destiny
as self-determined, secure in the knowledge that the
region and the US are committed to their autonomy and
independence. This could mark the beginning of a Korean
Renaissance, and would spare the region and the world
conflict that seems inevitable with the present
leadership in the North.
David Scofield
is a lecturer at the Graduate Institute of Peace
Studies, Kyung Hee University, Seoul.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd.
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