Six-party talks: When, oh when will they be?
By Jaewoo Choo

TAIPEI - It is now official that the second round of the six-party talks will not be held any sooner than January, according to a report released by the US State Department. That was not a major surprise, but what raised everyone's eyebrows was US President George W Bush's statement at a news conference on Tuesday that he was "pleased" with the progress being made on resolving the nuclear impasse with North Korea.

Perhaps Bush was just in a good mood after the capture of Saddam Hussein, which breathed new life into his re-election campaign while also putting his staunch ally Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom on firmer ground. But beyond that, what is there for the US president to be pleased about on the Korean Peninsula?

It is clear that Bush's recent shifts on the preconditions for the second round of talks have hit roadblocks not only in Pyongyang but also in Beijing. Does Bush think that by mid-January North Korea and China will have become more conciliatory? If so, on what basis? As things stand, then, it seems unlikely that the talks can take place as early as next month.

Perhaps Bush was pleased with the diplomatic efforts leading up to the talks, whenever they may actually occur, in particular the December 4-6 meeting of assistant secretary of state James Kelly with representatives from Seoul and Tokyo, namely South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuck and Mitoji Yabunaka, director general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Or maybe it was his December 8-10 meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that put him is such good spirits.

The trilateral meeting among the US, Japan and South Korea in Washington from December 4-6 had one clear purpose: to revise the preconditions for the second-round talks on North Korea. According to Chosum Ilbo, the most widely read newspaper in South Korea, the three were reported to have reached an agreement on a joint proposal to end the North's nuclear-weapons program in an "effective, verifiable and irreversible way".

In addition, the three countries by common consent decided that the measure should be carried out in "coordinated steps", not the "simultaneous measure" that the North has long demanded regarding assurance of its national security as the price for halting all its nuclear programs. According to Lee, the joint statement concluding the six-way talks would include clauses such as "the five countries will guarantee no nuclear threat or attack against North Korea" and "all six states shall not commit any demeanors that would worsen or heighten tensions during the six-way nuclear talks".

Chicken-or-egg debate, revisited
The United States' use of the term "coordinated steps" in place of simultaneous implementation, the paper reported, was perceived by some analysts as a reflection of the flexibility in the US stance in handling the nuclear standoff. But was it really flexibility or an indication that the US is not willing to deal with the North Korea issue at all at the moment, or indeed for some time to come? For the fact is that the trilateral meeting, far from smoothing the way to a quick resumption of the six-party talks, has placed the issue in another complex, contradictory predicament, in which the matter boils down to another round of black-vs-white, chicken-or-egg debate.

Beginning as early as December 3, successive remarks by the Bush administration suggested that a postponement of the second six-party talks was looming. Reuters News Service quoted an official in the administration as saying that the planning for the second round of talks was "not going well. It is not going to happen in December - but maybe January or February." The official attributed the cause for this to the difficulty in drawing up an agreement with other participating nations in advance of a statement to be issued at the conclusion of a second round.

Some aspects of the discussion on what the statement should say have been revealed. The US wanted the statement to include an agreement to shut down completely North Korea's nuclear program and to mandate inspections that would give the world reasonable confidence that Pyongyang had halted the program. The US also wanted to include such issues as long-range missiles and human rights. The proposal was reported to have been agreed by all participatory states of the six-party talks, except China. The Chinese ground for objection was not fully explained, but it is clearly understandable.

Such issues as long-range missiles and human rights have long been regarded by the Chinese leadership as non-negotiable, as they are related to national sovereignty in one way or the other. According to some Chinese analysts, including these issues in the agenda for the second round of talks or in the joint statement was pushing it over the line, going beyond the purpose of the talks. In addition, obviously, the proposal delivered to North Korea by China after the US-Korea-Japan trilateral meeting was objected to by Pyongyang on the grounds of its stubborn stance that the US must make concessions first.

Then, later in the month, there was an abrupt change in the US position regarding preconditions. This was disclosed on December 10 when Bush held a joint press conference with Premier Wen in Washington. While showing his firm stance that North Korea's nuclear-weapons program must be dismantled in an irreversible and verifiable manner, Bush bluntly expressed his willingness to make concessions in return, which would include the resumption of energy aid from the international community and the removal of North Korea from a US blacklist of countries supporting terrorism.

Bush's words might not have had any more significance than mere diplomatic rhetoric in the presence of one of his important dialogue partners. However, they were given more weight two days later when State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announced that the US had abandoned the precondition it had delivered to Pyongyang via China earlier.

Why, oh why were the talks put off?
Why then were the talks put off until next year? One thing for sure is that there is a lot of confusion in coordinating the handling of the second round of talks not only within the Bush administration but also among the participatory states, especially the US, China and North Korea. Another reason could be the lack of a coordinated strategy by the five participatory states on how to react to Pyongyang's next move. For example, what if North Korea complies with all preconditions? What are the five other states ready to offer in return? The price could be much steeper than they originally thought. Under the circumstances then, the five states, and the US in particular, will need much more time to draw up as many options as possible and to weigh the consequences of them all.

In institutionalized meetings such as those involving the United Nations, the European Union or the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum, there are many variables to work out beforehand, determining not only the agenda and goals for the meeting, but also a date when all the relevant parties can attend. The same is obviously true for the six-party talks, and here one can make an educated guess at what would be a feasible date, or at least which can be ruled out.

November could not work for several reasons, including the US Thanksgiving holiday, an occasion we now know was earmarked for a visit by Bush to his soldiers in Iraq. December is a worldwide holiday season, made all the more joyful this year for Bush and his administration by the capture of Saddam Hussein. So that brings us to the year 2004.

In January, China will enjoy a two-week break to celebrate the lunar new year. In the same month, Bush is to deliver the State of the Union address in which he must present a policy blueprint for his government and his nation. He will want to use that address to outline his stance on North Korea firmly, and the current unresolved status of that issue would suit that purpose better than the uncertainties of ongoing talks.

In February, North Korea will celebrate Kim Jong-il's birthday. To the outside world, that might sound like a minor event. But in North Korea, it is a long holiday; Kim himself celebrates for about a month, and the festivities for his people will last a week or two. As well, it is expected that Chinese President Hu Jintao will visit Washington in February for a summit that would give the two states a better idea of how to handle the North Korea problem.

In March, China will be preoccupied with its annual National People's Congress meeting, which usually begins around the fifth of the month and lasts until the 15th or so. More important, China and the US will also be very much tied up by the presidential election in Taiwan, which is scheduled for March 29. Unlike previous Taiwan elections, there are too many sensitive issues on the agenda this time for Beijing and Washington to sit idle and ignore the process. These issues include Taiwan's independence, a defense referendum and others.

Some would argue that all these conflicting events are irrelevant to the six-party talks because they involve the national leaders, who will not be sitting at the hexagonal table in any case. However, this overlooks the fact that while these will be working-level talks, their direction will be handed down from the top executive offices of each participating state. And the North Korean nuclear-development program is one issue that is too vital for the top leaders of the involved nations to leave in the hands of their officials.

Jaewoo Choo is assistant professor at the School of International Relations and Area Studies, Kyung Hee University, South Korea.

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