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Mission Pyongyang: Good intention, bad
idea
By Ralph A Cossa
Some
unsolicited advice to professors, congressmen, former
ambassadors and other ex-diplomats and anyone seeking a
Nobel Peace Prize nomination: if you really want to help
resolve the nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula,
stay home!
Delegations by such people are always
well intentioned, but then again, they say "the road to
hell is paved with good intentions". What they generally
are not is very helpful in actually resolving the
crisis. True, former US president Jimmy Carter's mission
to Pyongyang in 1994 did help save the day, moving the
Bill Clinton administration and Kim Il-sung (father of
North Korea's current leader, Kim Jong-il) back from the
brink of sanctions and possibly war. But this is not
1994, and recent delegation heads, competent as they
might be, fall short of Carter's prestige, clout and
capabilities.
This week's delegation, headed by
Stanford Professor Emeritus John Lewis (a genuinely
sincere scholar for whom I have the highest regard) and
including former diplomat Jack Pritchard (who no doubt
means well but should know better) may - or may not -
visit the North Korean nuclear complex at Yongbyon,
where reprocessing of spent fuel rods has reportedly
taken place. Even with the former director of Los Alamos
Labs, Dr Sigfried Hecker, in the entourage, it is
questionable just what the group may be able to
ascertain or confirm, if they indeed make this side trip
(North Korea has yet to confirm that this excursion will
be allowed). But even if they return with an
intelligence coup, the potential diplomatic damage that
can be done will likely far outweigh any potential
benefits derived from the trip.
Like earlier
trips by US Congressman Curt Weldon (who apparently
wants to go again, despite President George W Bush's
obvious annoyance over his last trip) and former
ambassador to South Korea Don Gregg, the result is
likely to be counterproductive. At best, North Korea
uses such trips to play rival political factions in the
United States against one another while also trying to
drive a deeper wedge between Washington and its other
dialogue partners (Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing, and Moscow)
over how best to proceed in dealing with North Korea.
The current delegation may also create false illusions
in North Korea about alternative ways out of its current
dilemma other than returning to the six-party talks
(which it recently agreed to do "in principle" but not
at any set date). It will also interfere with the
efforts of, if not alienate, the people tasked with
actually solving this problem; ie, Bush administration
State Department diplomats.
Whether or not you
agree with the administration's approach toward North
Korea, it is plain to see that we are at a sensitive
juncture in trying to get Pyongyang back to the
negotiating table, while also maintaining one voice in
demanding that there must be a "full, verifiable,
irreversible" end to North Korea's nuclear-weapons
program. If all the Lewis delegation was going to do was
to reinforce this message - as a recent European
delegation did - at least it would do no harm. But if
the result is to make new suggestions - Weldon went as
far as presenting his own plan for solving the crisis -
this will at a minimum complicate, and could potentially
delay or undermine, the careful diplomatic effort that
has gotten us to where we are today.
As long as
North Korea sees the opportunity to drive new wedges or
create more mischief, it is unlikely to sit down and
negotiate away its nuclear-weapons program. Creating new
delays or diversions merely plays into the hands of
those in Washington - and their numbers are strong and
growing - who see no value in pursuing the diplomatic
option in the first place. Private diplomacy, especially
by those ill-suited to perform such a task, is no
substitute for the real thing.
If, in the end,
an independent delegation provides necessary, may I
suggest (stealing a thought from East-West Center
president Charles Morrison) that we select someone more
suited to the task and perhaps more likely to be
listened to in Pyongyang: Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.
Like North Korea leader Kim Jong-il, he was caught with
his hand in the nuclear cookie jar. But rather than turn
confrontational, he decided to come clean - having just
witnessed what happened to his neighbor Saddam Hussein
may have had something to do with this, Libyan denials
to the contrary - and a peaceful dismantlement of
Libya's nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction
programs is now under way. Perhaps Gaddafi could talk
some sense into Kim Jong-il; it's doubtful the current
US delegation will.
Ralph Cossa is
president of the Pacific Forum CSIS. He can
be reached at pacforum@hawaii.rr.com.
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