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Six-party talks, Round 2: In search of a
US policy
By Alan D Romberg
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
 See also:Guess who's in the
driver's seat? Not the US
On the
eve of the second round of six-party talks on North
Korea's nuclear weapons program, reports indicate the
the United States will "barely sweeten" the position it
took at the first round last August. and it will repeat
its mantra: "no rewards for bad behavior" - but it won't
do much more.
Senior foreign-policy advisers to
President George W Bush reportedly have decided to
reject Pyongyang's offer of a freeze on
plutonium-related facilities as "woefully inadequate".
They point to North Korea's refusal so far to
acknowledge, much less commit to eliminate, an
alternative highly enriched uranium (HEU) program to
produce fissile material.
If accurate, this
demonstrates once again that the Bush administration
lacks a serious policy for moving the North Korean
nuclear issue from its current sorry - and increasingly
dangerous - state toward resolution. The administration
seems unable to get past the rhetoric of "complete,
verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement" of North
Korea's nuclear-weapons program so as to develop a
workable strategy to achieve that important goal.
Rather, as one official recently put it, the objective
of the coming talks is simply to tread water, keeping
North Korea at the table. "The motto is ' Do no harm,'"
he said.
South Korea's ambassador to the United
States has taken a more sensible - and potentially
productive - approach. He has observed that "the second
round of talks can make progress even if North Korea
does not admit the existence of a highly enriched
uranium program, as long as the North does not bar
discussion of that issue". In other words, rather than
forcing confession or denial, the next round should
leave the door open to progress through negotiation -
while the Bush administration seems to view real
negotiation without a prior confession by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the role of
"diplomacy", therefore, as one official put it, merely
as "a placeholder to get us through the [November US
presidential] election".
The "father" of
Pakistan's nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, has
reportedly confessed to providing elements of a
uranium-enrichment program to North Korea. After
presenting this evidence to others in the negotiations,
it is perfectly reasonable for the United States to
confront North Korea with that same information - and
insist that inconsistencies between North Korea's
denials and Khan's information be cleared up.
US policy simplistic, lacks
understanding
But while it may be a good debating
point to argue that Pyongyang should simply follow
Libya's example (which - in Bush's own words - came only
after nine months of intense negotiation) and
unilaterally announce a policy reversal, reliance on
that line demonstrates once again the lack of any deep
understanding of North Korea or a seriousness of purpose
about actually resolving the problem.
US
officials will reportedly be explicit in their demands
of Pyongyang, but far less concrete about what North
Korea can expect in return. Why? In part because some
believe the DPRK is under unbearable economic stress
from sanctions and on the verge of collapse and will
have to capitulate. They also argue for US vagueness
because even if the uranium-enrichment program is
acknowledged, there is disagreement within the US
government about what to offer Pyongyang, in what order,
on what timetable.
Beyond insistence on "not
rewarding bad behavior", some officials argue, for
example, that it is not sensible to grant the DPRK's
request for security assurances - which takes but a
moment - in exchange merely for a commitment to
dismantle the nuclear program - by necessity a long-term
process. Others note, however, that Pyongyang can argue
that once it dismantles its program, it cannot quickly -
if ever - reconstitute it, whereas a security assurance
can be withdrawn in an instant, so offering such an
assurance would cost the US little and yet be a useful
inducement.
While Washington dithers, North
Korea is proceeding with its nuclear-weapons program at
a pace probably slower than Pyongyang claims but perhaps
faster than Washington perceives. Recent visitors to the
DPRK saw evidence that, at the least, spent fuel
previously in safe storage is no longer there - fuel
judged sufficient for five or six nuclear weapons.
Moreover, the status of the HEU program is totally
unknown.
The question is not whether the US is
right to seek the total abolition of North Korea's
nuclear program, including both its plutonium- and
uranium-based components. Obviously it is. The issue is
whether Washington has a coherent policy realistically
designed to achieve that goal. So far the evidence is
not encouraging.
Alan D Romberg is
senior associate and director of the East Asia Program
at the Henry L Stimson Center in Washington, DC. He can
be reached at aromberg@earthlink.net.
This article is used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS.
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