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Guess who's in the driver's seat? Not the
US
By Larry Niksch
(Used by
permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
 See
also: Round
2: In search of a US policy
As
the second round of the six-party North Korea talks opens
on Wednesday in Beijing, guess who's in the driver's seat?
It's not Washington - not by a long shot.
A look back to February 2003 can
leave one astounded over the diplomatic fortunes of the
two chief antagonists. A year ago, North Korea appeared
headed toward the status of an isolated 
international pariah through its brazen actions
and threats, self-destructive to the impoverished nation
and genuinely menacing and destabilizing to its
neighbors and the region.
The United States had
seemed to be ascendant. It issued communiques with other
concerned neighbors and nations criticizing North
Korea's actions. It succeeded in securing six-party
talks. At the first six-party meeting in Beijing last
August, a US official declared: "We're letting them dig
their own grave." The administration of US President
George W Bush said North Korea was self-destructing and
was alienating the other participants. US officials
spoke confidently of securing China's support. Today, US
administration officials remain emboldened, citing
Libya's decision to give up weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) as the example for North Korea to follow.
However, a broader look does not appear to
support the Bush administration's optimistic analysis.
North Korean diplomacy has placed key items of
Pyongyang's agenda at the top of the negotiating agenda:
North Korea's proposal for a formal non-aggression
security guarantee from the US, and Pyongyang's proposed
freeze of its plutonium program. China, South Korea and
Russia speak positively of these proposals and declare
that the United States must address North Korea's
concerns. Japan alone seconds the US position that North
Korea must commit first to a "complete, irreversible,
verifiable" dismantling of its nuclear programs and take
concrete measures toward that end.
Expressions
of skepticism about US claims of a secret North Korean
highly enriched uranium (HEU) program now come from
Chinese, Russian and South Korean officials. North Korea
is receiving cash (US$50 million in October) and
increased fuel and food from China, economic aid from
South Korea, and further economic aid from Russia. Even
the Bush administration has offered North Korea
"security assurances", which would be more concessionary
than the nuclear-security guarantee offered in the 1994
Agreed Framework.
North Korea's successes are
the result of a negotiating strategy that plays on the
psychological fears of the other parties coupled with a
concerted propaganda strategy to advance Pyongyang's
agenda.
Pyongyang's skillful negotiating
strategy
After each of the Beijing meetings,
North Korea criticized the sessions and the US position,
warning that it saw no usefulness in the meetings and
probably would not participate again. Then after
repeated warnings, North Korea made "new" proposals.
After the April meeting, North Korea hammered away on
its proposal for a formal US-North Korean non-aggression
pact. After the August meeting, North Korea proposed a
"freeze" of its plutonium nuclear program, while
asserting that a non-aggression guarantee was necessary
to prevent the Bush administration from staging an
"Iraq-like" unilateral attack.
Pyongyang
contended that a freeze was a logical "first stage",
employing enticing slogans such as "simultaneous
actions", "action vs action", "simultaneous package
deal", "bold concession" and "non-interference in our
economic development". While promoting these proposals,
North Korea steadily escalated the denials of any
uranium-enrichment program.
Other governments,
apprehensive over North Korea's threat to abandon the
talks, sought to react positively in order to persuade
Pyongyang to agree to future meetings. President Bush
acceded to China's overtures to offer multilateral
security assurances. China began to press for a freeze
as an integral part of any agreement. Public and elite
opinions in China and South Korea reacted favorably to
North Korea's proposals, clearly influenced by
Pyongyang's propaganda. These positive reactions
inevitably have led others to question US positions,
including the claim of a secret North Korean
uranium-enrichment program.
North Korea has been
able to exploit weaknesses in US strategy. The Bush
administration's unwillingness to offer detailed,
comprehensive settlement proposals has given Pyongyang
an open playing field to advance its proposals into a
dominant position in the talks. Other governments have
nothing to respond to - other than Pyongyang's
proposals. North Korea is not pressured to make a
fundamental policy choice.
The US
administration's reliance on China as a partner also has
contributed to North Korea's successes. China has worked
hard to organize the talks and has urged the United
States to issue comprehensive settlement proposals.
However, China has tilted toward North Korea on
substantive issues. The question of what China wants as
an outcome remains unanswered. Is it a complete
termination of North Korea's nuclear program or an
agreement with more limited obligations? Without a
credible answer to this question, the US reliance on
China has proved to be an unstable foundation.
Lack of US response strengthens North
Korea
The absence of a US response to North
Korea's propaganda strategy also has contributed
significantly to Pyongyang's strengthened position. The
Bush administration rejected North Korea's
non-aggression pact and nuclear-freeze proposals but did
not challenge their substance so as to bring into the
open their negative features and hidden agenda. The
administration's response to the non-aggression-pact
proposal was to contend that the Senate would not ratify
it. Its response to North Korea's denials of an HEU
program was that North Korea admitted to it in October
2002.
This creates at best the perception of a
"he said she said" dispute. The administration hopes
that the alleged confession of Pakistan's Abdul Qadeer
Khan will contain the growing skepticism. However, North
Korea already charges that Khan's confession was
coerced, and the administration offers no evidence of
its own of North Korea's alleged HEU program.
North Korea's strengthened position in the
six-party talks puts two related outcomes within reach
of Pyongyang - continued talks with pressure on the US
to accept a nuclear freeze or the eventual collapse of
the talks altogether.
One outcome would be an
agenda in future meetings that emphasizes pressure from
the other governments on the United States to accept an
agreement for a limited nuclear freeze - that would be
designated as a "first phase" but in reality would stand
alone, with other phases to be determined through an
undefined diplomatic process. The Bush administration
likely would reject such pressure, but the result
probably would be an erosion and eventual end of the
six-party talks. Public opinion likely would blame the
US for the collapse or would perceive "moral
equivalency" between the US and North Korea.
This second outcome - collapse of the talks -
would free North Korea from the threat of international
sanctions, assure continued economic support from China
and South Korea, and give North Korea more options in
advancing its nuclear and missile programs - including
an open demonstration of nuclear capabilities with
reduced risk of punitive measures from neighboring
states. If growing North Korean confidence transformed
itself into overconfidence, North Korea might be tempted
to proliferate WMD in high-risk ways.
The big
question in the Wednesday meeting is whether the Bush
administration can regain a dominant position for the US
over the negotiating agenda or whether North Korea will
make further progress toward these outcomes.
Larry Niksch (lniksch@crs.loc.gov)
is a specialist in Asian Affairs at the US Congressional
Research Service. The opinions expressed are his own.
This article is used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS.)
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