Korea through the Russian looking
glass By Stephen Blank
As
every observer of North Korea knows, all analyses of
anything pertaining to that country are shrouded in
ambiguity. Certainly this holds true for the Beijing-run
six-party negotiation process regarding North
Korea's nuclear program. Indeed, making sense of
what is transpiring at these talks is not unlike viewing
the Japanese movie, Rashomon, in which each
eyewitness recounts a different version of the truth as
they saw it, or wanted to see it. Still, to understand
what is going on in the North Korea talks, or at least
to make some sense of the dynamics, it is important to
understand the parties' positions and their motives. One
of the most intriguing is Russia.
The four
parties, in addition to North and South Korea, are
China, Japan, the United States and Russia, which
sprawls through the Far East and shares a very short,
38-mile boundary with North Korea, its former communist
ally. Once Moscow buttressed Pyongyang economically and
politically, but no more.
One of the most opaque
aspects of this process is Russia's position and
objectives on North Korea. Deputy Foreign Minister
Aleksandr Losyukov, Russia's delegate to the recent
talks in Beijing, voiced the common frustration that
North Korea did not verify whether or not it has a
uranium enrichment program underway and expressed the
equally common disappointment that not more was
achieved. Yet he simultaneously opined that progress was
made because the parties have indicated they will
continue to negotiate later in the spring and are
setting up working groups to tackle relevant issues.
Losyukov also warned that failure to verify what
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is
doing could lead the United States to undertake military
action, but at the same time he indicated uncertainty as
to whether North Korea indeed has a nuclear program.
Although the Russian government, from President Vladimir
Putin on down is on record as strongly opposing
nuclearization of the Korean peninsula, neither Losyukov
nor his government has indicated just what they think
should be done to prevent it. Losyukov said that his
government supports South Korea's proposal to give
energy assistance to the North should it dismantle the
nuclear program, yet Moscow remains unclear - or has not
stated - which step must come first, dismantling or
assistance - nor has it described how Russia visualizes
a verifiable regime of inspections to confirm that North
Korea has ended its program.
The fact that North
Korea has broken every previous agreement its signed
regarding its nuclear program does not seem to play a
role in Russian public diplomacy on how to ensure that
this does not happen again. Instead, Losyukov is trying
to push Washington to give Pyongyang energy and other
forms of aid without specifying just how the US and
Russia can be certain about the termination of the
North's nuclear program.
Understanding
Russia's conflicting stands At the same time,
though, Losyukov is not expressing any particular dismay
that North Korea clearly wants to retain a nuclear
program and obtain these forms of assistance. Therefore
the question is: how can one understand Russia's
position concerning North Korea and what lies behind it?
Russia's interests are rooted in its history,
geography and policy, and understanding the hierarchy of
objectives governing Russia's position on the Koreas may
help make sense of the apparent contradictions inherent
in its policy.
First of all, Moscow, like the
other four partners outside of the DPRK, and perhaps
Pyongyang too, is most worried about war and the need to
prevent the onset of conflict. That shared anxiety is
what creates a common negotiating space for the five
states seeking to roll back the North's nuclear program.
But beyond that important commonality, there are
divergences among the parties, creating situations in
which it becomes harder for all to agree and reach
consensus; instead, one or two states agree with each.
Historically Russia has fought four wars in the
20th century to prevent Northern Korea, with whom it
shares a territorial boundary near the Pacific Ocean,
from falling prey to hostile powers. Those wars were the
Russo-Japanese war from 1904-05; the undeclared war with
Japan in 1938-39 that took place mainly in Manchuria;
Russia's invasion of Manchuria and Korea, the
culminating offensive of World War II in Asia in
August,1945; and Russian pilots' participation in the
air war during the Korean War of 1950-53.
In all
cases, the point was, and is, not the unification of the
Korean peninsula as such. Rather it is the conditions
under which the peninsula might be united that concerned
- and still do concern Moscow.
Most important is
that Moscow, in approaching the two Koreas and the issue
of terminating the unfinished Korean war between them,
is the weakest of all the outside powers and one that is
acutely aware of how little it brings to the table.
Moreover, what haunts the minds of policymakers from
Putin down is that Russia, due to its current economic
and military weakness, could easily be marginalized and
excluded from any process bringing an end to hostilities
on the peninsula, reunification and denuclearization.
Russia seeks recognition as legitimate actor
A war on the peninsula not only would endanger
Russia's security, it also would make it abundantly
clear that it cannot contribute very much to the
resolution of the conflict and would be as much the
object of others' policies as it would itself be an
actor in Asia. Consequently, its overriding goal is
simply to be recognized as a legitimate player in all
the negotiations taking place in and around the Korean
peninsula and to prevent war through its participation.
If this means simply paying to play another round, so be
it. It also means not being too particular as to how
denuclearization is maintained if it is achieved at all.
For all of these reasons Moscow therefore
believes that it needs to be on equally good terms with
all parties. Every diplomatic initiative it has
proffered regarding North Korea, dating back to former
president Boris Yeltsin, revolves around getting
everyone to see Russia as part of the solution, as a
partner that can provide tangible political and material
resources to a peaceful resolution of the issues there
and whose participation is legitimate. While this
explains why it is ready to provide electricity and
energy to North Korea if asked, the fact is that for
decades Washington has sought to minimize the Russian
role in North Korea.
Until US President George W
Bush gratuitously offered Russia an uncompensated role
here in the North Korea talks, Moscow had nothing to
offer and few parties wanted it involved. It was only
once Putin successfully persuaded North Korea that it
could be a useful interlocutor that Pyongyang said it
wanted Russia involved. Undoubtedly it did so to offset
China whose power is too great and whose border too long
for its comfort. But Washington, which was not under any
compulsion to draw Moscow into the process, did so, and
required no compensation for doing it, thus giving Putin
an easy victory at no discernible cost.
Thus,
Russia has been freed from the responsibility of
actually having to offer comprehensive proposals and to
a considerable degree can be a free rider at these
talks. Which means Moscow has so far succeeded in
getting a seat at the table even though it apparently
has no independent ideas of its own on how to proceed
and precious few resources to give away in order to
craft a solution.
Fears of
marginalization Despite it's seat at the table,
Russia continues to fear its potential
marginalization in Asia generally, and Korea in
particular, fears which are traced to two
primary concerns:
First, that the US penchant for unilateral action
may bring about a war - hence Losyukov's warnings about
the dangers of unilateral US military action. A war
would bring about a situation inherently dangerous and
unpredictable, especially if the DPRK has nuclear
weapons.
And second, that rising Chinese economic power will
marginalize Moscow's ability to play a major role in
Korea.
Russia is anxious over China's rising
power because Moscow has major economic interests tied
to its geopolitical objectives of maintaining North and
South Korea in balance, integrating the North with the
rest of the world, and using the two Koreas to help
Russia's own stricken Eastern and Asian provinces
recover economically. Thus it is seeking debt repayment
from the North, even if its has to sell arms to
Pyongyang. Moscow also encourages the North to reform,
seeks either to pay off or have its debts forgiven by
South Korea, and take advantage of its proximity to the
Korean peninsula to construct its so-called Iron Silk
Road, a railroad linking the two Koreas to the
Trans-Siberian railroad and thus to Moscow and Europe.
The Iron Silk Road is of major geostrategic and
economic significance to Russia. It would rival the
European Union's Silk Road project from Europe to the
Pacific Ocean, through the Caucasus and Central Asia -
bypassing Russia in its course. And the Russian project,
if undertaken, would also rival China's efforts to build
a pan-Asian railway and advance its transport
infrastructure.
Furthermore, a war on the Korean
peninsula and/or any monopolization of aid to North
Korea by Washington or Beijing would exclude Moscow from
economic and political consideration, leaving its
rundown and underdeveloped eastern provinces acutely
vulnerable, mainly to Chinese economic pressure. Either
or both of these contingencies - conflict or exclusion
of Moscow from aiding North Korea - also makes it
impossible to realize Russia's economic and political
objectives regarding its Asiatic trade or the
development of North Korea.
Thus, beyond being
accepted as a legitimate part of any Korean "peace
process", it is also essential for Moscow to be deeply
involved, to whatever extent possible, in the economic
dimensions of a solution to the Korean dilemma.
Moreover, it does not want to have to choose among
Beijing, Seoul and Washington, realizing that doing so
makes it vulnerable to pressure from China or the
US.
Seeking a role in the big issues of Asian
security Last, the legitimization of Russia's
participation in the six-power North Korea process opens
possibilities for its equally legitimate participation
in broader multilateral discussions, either in number or
in scope, concerning the great questions of Asian
security, a position that Moscow covets but which has
hitherto proved elusive.
Arguably these concerns
and the need to balance them to stave off
nuclearization, war, or the collapse of North Korea -
which also would enhance Beijing's and Washington's
clout, not Moscow's - govern Putin's and Losyukov's
efforts. These concerns and fears inform Moscow's
simultaneous warnings to Pyongyang to denuclearize and
to Washington to refrain from provocative acts, and its
support for aid to the North based on its comparative
advantage in energy and electricity in the region.
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Moscow
wants the talks to go on, whatever difficulties they
encounter, and regards their mere continuation as
progress. Likewise, it is clear why Russia wants North
Korea to denuclearize and is not so insistent on the
specifics of a verification regime and compensation to
the DPRK in the field of energy - as long as it is
included in both aspects of that part of the solution.
Similarly these goals also explain why Russia
tries to maintain close ties to both North and South
Korea, not to mention Beijing and Washington. Finally,
this hierarchy or framework of concerns driving Russian
policy also explains its very high and sustained
interest in inducing the North to undertake economic
reconstruction to which Moscow can contribute - but from
which it also can benefit.
This assessment of
Russia's position at the North Korea talks cannot answer
all the questions regarding those negotiations, or even
concerning Russia's position as the talks go on. But
seeking greater clarity and trying to dispel the fog of
ambiguity that envelops North Korea is valuable for its
own sake and can help the other parties understand
Moscow's goals. Now that it is an accepted interlocutor
in this process - even though it gave nothing to gain
this seat at the table - a clearer insight into Moscow's
objectives and positions is a necessary, if
insufficient, step in making progress and reaching a
mutually acceptable solution to the threat of a nuclear
North Korea.
Stephen Blank is an
analyst of international security affairs residing in
Harrisburg, PA.
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