Seoul's new political landscape,
implications for US By David Scofield
The stunning electoral victory of the party
allied with impeached President Roh Moo-hyun - known for
advocating a pro-Korea policy somewhat independent of
United States - has generated discussion throughout
South Korean political circles about the future of the
Seoul-Washington alliance, the increasing economic and
diplomatic importance of China, and relations with North
Korea.
The Uri Party, also known as Our Open
Party (OOP), won a majority (152 seats in the 299-seat
National Assembly) in elections on April 15, upsetting
the old-guard parties that had spearheaded Roh's
impeachment on March 12 on grounds of campaign-funding
violations and incompetence. His case is now before the
Constitutional Court, which is expected to rule as early
as next week. His reinstatement is considered likely.
President Roh had been trying to develop a more
independent foreign policy that took US concerns into
consideration, especially concerning defense, but was
not dictated by Washington. Polls in South Korea also
show that most people consider Washington more of a
threat than Pyongyang. These developments have duly
alarmed South Korea's old guard and caused some disquiet
in Washington. The ascendancy and assembly majority of
the OOP mean those shifts and attitudes are likely to
continue.
A recent editorial by former vice
foreign minister Kim Hang-gyeong, now a professor of
international relations at Gyeongnam University,
outlines the new thinking, and economic constraints on
independence from Washington: "According to a survey
question handed out to Uri Party (OOP) general-election
victors asking them which country should receive the
most diplomatic and trade consideration from Korea in
the future, 63 percent answered 'China', while only 26
percent answered 'the United States'. This thinking on
the part of lawmakers who will exercise much influence
on our foreign policy must be read as meaning that in
the future, China will receive more importance than the
United States."
Funding independence a
too-costly proposition Kim also acknowledged that
while independence is desirable, the funds to pay for it
are not available. "Firstly, strategic independence is
premised on independent defense, but we are unable to
pay the economic and political costs to do this. In
particular, arming oneself with nuclear weapons - a key
point in independent defense - is something impossible
for us when we look at the situation around us."
So there will be no divorce from the Americans,
though many Koreans hope for distancing, and Washington
has agreed to shift its troops and dependents out of the
big Yongsan base in Seoul in a few years and relocate
them to other bases in the country. The US maintains
about 37,000 troops in South Korea, and a roughly equal
number of dependants, contractors and others connected
to the US military. It is not known whether some troops
will be transferred out of Korea entirely.
This
Thursday and Friday in Washington, meanwhile, South
Korea and the US have been holding their eighth round of
talks on the future of the alliance and on moving the
Yongsan garrison out of Seoul, where its presence is
deeply resented. The South Korean government has agreed
to pay the high cost of the move but has appeared to be
delaying for financial reasons. Another round of talks
could be held next month in Seoul.
Against the
backdrop of President Roh's independent-tilting foreign
policy platform, the oft-quoted raison d'etre for
the 50-year-old US alliance is that South Korea cannot
"afford" to defend itself from far larger and more
powerful regional powers. But in reality, the only
immediate threat to South Korea comes from the country
it has pledged to prop up - North Korea.
South
Korea enjoys inherent natural defenses from outside
attack. It's an extremely mountainous peninsula and,
arguably, the most ethnically homogenous nation on
Earth, ensuring no ethnic beachhead for an invading
power. The nation's "oneness" means it is next to
impossible for anyone but North Korea to plant seeds of
dissent within South Korea in a bid to weaken the
nation's cohesion and mettle.
South Korea, as
the world's 12th-largest economy, can easily afford to
develop its own indigenous, independent defense, free of
physical military alliances, in spite of popular
rhetoric among international-relations specialists in
Korea. The real impediment to Korea establishing an
independent form of defense is not economics - it
currently spends less than 3 percent of its gross
domestic product (GDP) on defense - but politics, as the
nation's elected officials balk at the political costs
of defending Korea on their own.
Rapprochement South Korea's
rapprochement strategy is based on the principle of good
cop, bad cop, with the United States Forces in Korea
(USFK) playing the perennial bad cop. The South Korean
government strongly encourages the notion, both within
Korea and beyond, that North Korea is not the threat it
once was. To this end, the central government has
softened official depictions of North Korea in the
nation's school curriculum; the "Dear Leader" Kim
Jong-il is no longer depicted as a horned devil, but now
enjoys the title of "leader" of North Korea.
On
university campuses, few professors are brave enough to
buck this trend toward tolerance and describe North
Korea as belligerent and bent on the forced
communization of its southern neighbor. And within all
government literature and policies, the description of
North Korea as South Korea's "main enemy" - as it has
been described in previous Defense Ministry white papers
- has been removed, expunged. Today the concept of
"partner", not "foe", is ever present, and this is
reflected in and reinforced by the national media.
The further allocation of national resources to
defense is at odds with with national rhetoric about the
benign brother to the north. How can the central
government justify moving money out of already
chronically underfunded departments such as welfare,
health care and education, when the people are told
decisively and often that the North is not so much a
threat as a poor, misunderstood sibling?
Independent defense If South Korea
were to develop defenses independent of the United
States, the increase in force structure would not only
be counter to the theme of rapprochement with Pyongyang,
but would, ironically, leave North Korea demanding the
opposite - a stronger South Korean military presence. A
reduction in South Korean military assets along the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) would unilaterally de-escalate
the 50-year status quo in the region, in effect
undermining the justification for Kim's dynastic rule.
The constant "threat" of invasion and the paranoia that
accompanies this brutally enforced national perception
of imminent siege are what define the North Korean
state. Removing this factor would undermine much of the
nation's military-first philosophy, to say nothing of
its effects on unification.
When the United
States announced that duties in the Joint Security Area
and along the DMZ would be handed over to the South
Korean military this October, the North Koreans retorted
- apparently oblivious to the irony - that the US
"attempts not to fulfill its duties" as prescribed in
the Armistice Agreement at the "end" of the Korean War.
Apparently the primary "duty" of the US, from
Pyongyang's point of view, has been to provide the
continued threat of invasion that the Dear Leader and
his clique so desperately need to justify their
draconian rule. Demilitarization and unification would
literally invite 50 years of lost economic, social and
political development to come crashing over the border,
demonstrating in no uncertain terms to the victimized
populace of North Korea just how badly they have been
duped.
In South Korea, all but the most
dedicated believers in "one country" have palpitations
at the thought of the economic costs of unifying with
North Korea. The discussion of unification invariably
centers on the German example of reunifying East and
West Germany at enormous cost and how that unification
model is still costing a far richer country than South
Korea enormous sums over a decade since the Berlin Wall
came down.
Unification, as many analysts have
come to discover, actually runs counter to political
agendas in both Koreas.
The 'cost' of
stability The presence of the USFK and the
maintenance of the US-South Korea alliance have had
further benefits too, as they ensure the perception of
stability in South Korea. This has helped maintain the
country's sovereign credit rating, and encouraged fixed
foreign investment that would normally be unthinkable in
a country still technically in a state of war. The risk
premium, whether reflected in expected investment
returns or in sovereign credit and debt ratings, is
artificially reduced through the physical presence of US
forces in South Korea. An independent defense system
would require the development of a professional army
capable of maintaining the perception of stability and
security presently enabled by the USFK. This would
require changes not only in national budget allocation,
but also in the mindset of the people.
The
Republic of Korea lacks not only the political fortitude to allocate
sufficient funds for genuine self-defense, but it also seems
to lack the human capital necessary to create
the sort of defense structure a country like South
Korea requires. A former Seoul official, speaking on condition of
anonymity, said that South Koreans view army service with
disdain, as evidenced by the number of prominent
families and politicians who use their influence and
money to exempt their sons from obligatory national
service. Unlike other countries, which make a great
display of their military heritage, there is little of
this in South Korea. A career in the military does not
carry with it, even among the officer class, any promise
of an elevated social position - crucial in
status-conscious Korea.
Exacerbating the social
perception of the military is its reputation for
corruption, its indifference to safety, and the
dangerous state of disrepair of its facilities and
equipment. This correspondent, who lives just up the
road from an infantry base near the DMZ, can personally
attest to the dismal state of military preparedness. The
transport trucks are old and dilapidated, frequently out
of service and left by the side of the road. The base
itself appears to have been constructed in the immediate
postwar period; the buildings are of cinder block with
corrugated-steel roofs. South Korea is investing great
sums in certain limited but high-profile military
platforms, including advanced US F-15 and F-16 fighter
aircraft, and has ambitious plans to construct by 2012 a
naval fleet of six 4,200-ton destroyers, three 7,000-ton
destroyers and state-of-the-art submarines, all with the
most advanced US Aegis combat systems and stealth
technology. The defense budget, however, does not appear
to cover the most basic needs of the rank-and-file
soldier's equipment or living quarters.
A nearby
forest, used for nighttime training, is littered with
heaps of used meal packets, emblazoned with the words
"Battle Meal" - equivalent to US MREs (Meals Ready to
Eat). The package expiry dates ranged from May-July 2003
- they were consumed last month, in April 2004.
South Korea can afford an independent defense posture.
It is a rich nation with billions of dollars at its
disposal. It has new and now largely empty World Cup soccer
stadiums, high-speed rail systems, and a seemingly
endless supply of credit for firms that muddle along in
the red for years. The primary impediments to peninsular
and regional peace are the nation's leadership and its
less-than-balanced politics of rapprochement with North
Korea, which focus primarily on mitigating the symptoms
of the Korean Cold War without formulating policies that
address the Pyongyang personalities who have a vested
interest in prolonging the conflict.
David
Scofield, former lecturer at the Graduate Institute
of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University, is currently
conducting post-graduate research at the School of East
Asian Studies, University of
Sheffield.
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