US mantra: N Korea nukes must go, but how?
By Ralph A Cossa

(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS) 

With a six-party working-group meeting about to take place in Beijing, in which North Korea has agreed to participate, Washington has said that its position toward the Hermit Kingdom remains unchanged: it seeks the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programs, or CVID for short. Yet, despite its repeated devotion to the acronym, Washington has not been entirely specific as to what CVID means, or to what it fully entails.

True, North Korea has agreed to participate in a six-party working-group meeting on May 12 to help lay the groundwork for the third session of the more senior-level six-party talks (among North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States), which are anticipated before the end of June. However, in regard to CVID, assistant secretary of state James Kelly, who heads the US delegation at the plenary sessions, recently told the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "that acronym (CVID) and the important goal it represents [have] been accepted by all but the North Koreans."

While it is also true that all parties (including North Korea) profess to seek a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula, and the others (less North Korea) at least pay lip serve to the CVID objective, it is not clear that all agree on the definition of its components.

Dissecting CVID
Washington has made it clear that "complete" means the dismantlement of both plutonium and uranium enrichment-based programs. But, despite the highly publicized confession by the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, that he had sold uranium-enrichment equipment to North Korea, Pyongyang continues to deny having a uranium-based weapons program, and several other members of the six-party process seem openly skeptical of Washington's accusations (or more willing to disregard the evidence, even if it might be true). Thus, it would appear that North Korea's (also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK's) acknowledgment of a uranium-enrichment program - and a willingness by the others to press Pyongyang on this point - must be the first order of business at the working-group meeting, if there is to be any hope for future progress.

"Verifiable" means just that. It has long been acknowledged that devising a verification regime intrusive enough to satisfy hardline skeptics will be no mean feat. This is why the "Libyan model" is potentially so important. As Kelly told Congress, "the DPRK needs to make a strategic choice for transformed relations with the United States and the world - as other countries have done, including quite recently - to abandon all of its nuclear programs." In case the reference was too subtle, Kelly later noted that he "discussed Libya's example with our North Korean counterparts, and we hope they understand its significance". In truth, verification can only work if the North cooperates in turning in its hidden hardware - not to mentioned reprocessed plutonium. Taking an Iraqi-style "catch me if you can" approach seems unworkable.

The definition of "irreversible" remains subject to the most interpretation. At a minimum, it would seem to require an end to all DPRK nuclear programs, including energy-associated efforts (both production and reprocessing), to guard against future backsliding. Pyongyang has, at times, intimated that its "peaceful nuclear energy program" might also be put on the bargaining table - if the price is right. Washington has argued that there is no "peaceful" program and has made no secret of its desire to avoid an Agreed Framework II. The first Agreed Framework was decided in 1994, when both the US and North Korea reaffirmed the importance of achieving peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, however, no serious movement came from the safeguards outlined in the framework, and much of it was later postponed. Thus, the US and the DPRK have decided to take the "freeze" approach for the resolution of the nuclear issue or a revival of any light water reactor (LWR) programs, although the US has yet to formally demand an end to all nuclear energy-related programs.

Washington sees "dismantlement" as an action, not as a future promise. Previously, it had dismissed North Korean "freeze" proposals, saying it would not reward North Korea for merely honoring past (broken) promises. However, a breakthrough now seems possible in this area, depending on how Pyongyang defines its current "reward for freeze" proposal. While US incentives will only come after dismantlement begins - which is itself a step beyond the [President George W] Bush administration's "no rewards until dismantlement is complete" approach - Washington has indicated that it would not object to a South Korean plan to offer energy assistance to North Korea in return for a "complete and verifiable" freeze, as long as the freeze were identified as "a first step toward dismantlement".

For any freeze proposal to work, however, it must encompass all of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programs, both plutonium and uranium-based. It must also be accompanied by a return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and monitoring devices to North Korea, removed in 2002. Therefore, success at the May 12 working-level talks, like success at the more senior-level six-party talks that will hopefully follow before the end of June, continues to rest on North Korea becoming more forthcoming on the full extent of its nuclear programs, and for China, South Korea and others to insist that any freeze be "complete and verifiable" before significant new rewards are provided to Pyongyang.

Ralph A Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS [pacforum@hawaii.rr.com], a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute, which made this article available.