The
United States is once again reminded that North Korea is
playing hardball when it comes to continuing its nuclear
weapons program. As recently as July 25, Pyongyang seems
to have rejected the "butter for guns" proposal made by
the administration of US President George W Bush. The
operative phrase here is "seems to have rejected",
largely because US officials remain uncertain that the
communist Korea is definitely making that statement and
categorically saying "no".
(The Bush
administration has urged North Korea to take Libya's
approach - declare and dismantle its weapons program and
invite in weapons inspectors in return for diplomatic
recognition and economic aid.)
The Bush
administration entered office scornful of the Agreed
Framework that the Clinton administration had negotiated
with North Korea. The then new administration was to
offer no olive branch of continuing the negotiating
process with Kim Jong-il's regime where Clinton
officials had left off. The US was to get tough with
North Korea. When Secretary of State Collin Powell
publicly stated the strategy of recommencing the
negotiating process on the basis of continuity with the
previous administration, Bush personally vetoed him. The
two countries were left with no active contacts on
nuclear issues, as other related events took their
course.
Then, during the period of shrill
rhetoric following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, Bush prominently listed North Korea as part of
an "axis of evil", along with Iran and Iraq, and stated
unequivocally that the US would seek to deprive them of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). One must also recall
Bush's national security strategy that was issued in
September 2002, when the dual doctrines of proactive
counter proliferation and regime change were formalized.
All "axis of evil" countries were following that
rhetoric with rapt attention.
Then in March
2003, that rhetoric became operational in the toppling
of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. The US invasion of Iraq
was originally carried out on the pretext of depriving
that country of the opportunity to develop WMD. If North
Korea had any doubts about the seriousness of America's
resolve to invade a country of the "axis of evil", the
March 2003 action against Iraq removed it once and for
all. Since regime survival is the primary motivation of
all governments, Kim Jong-il views his own nuclear
weapons program as the ultimate guarantee against
meeting the same fate as Saddam. The Iraqi nuclear
weapons program, as the world came to know definitively
after the invasion, could not be resuscitated once it
was uprooted under the auspices of the United Nations in
the early- to-mid-1990s.
One must also recall
the US's earnestness regarding the proliferation
security initiative (PSI). Established in May 2003, this
regime includes the creation of international agreements
and partnerships that would allow the US and its allies
to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and
seize illegal weapons or missile technologies.
Initially, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom joined this arrangement, which, according to the
Bush administration statement of September 4, 2003,
underscores "the need for proactive measures to combat
the threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction". Even though it is consistent with UN's
1992 statement, which declares that the proliferation
all WMD constitutes a threat to international and
security, the PSI remains outside the purview of the
world body. At the same time, it is also in harmony with
the recent statements of the Group of Eight
industrialized nations and the European Union that call
for the creation of coherent and concerted efforts to
prevent proliferation of WMD.
It should also be
pointed out that the PSI also has its critics. Such
countries as China, Canada, Brazil, Russia, South Korea,
India and Pakistan have expressed their concern in the
past that the US seeks to use PSI as an instrument of
strengthening its supremacy in the production of
cutting-edge nuclear, ballistic, biological and chemical
technology and to control global transportation routes.
Bush targets Korea Bush, in a speech
made at the Air Force Academy in June, named North Korea
as one of the specific targets of the PSI.
"Because this global threat requires a global
response, we are working to strengthen international
institutions charged with opposing proliferation," Bush
said. "We are working with regional powers and
international partners to confront the threats of North
Korea and Iran. We have joined with 14 other nations in
the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict - on
sea, on land, or in the air - shipments of weapons of
mass destruction, components to build those weapons, and
the means to deliver them. Our country must never allow
mass murderers to gain hold of weapons of mass
destruction. We will lead the world and keep unrelenting
pressure on the enemy."
Under these
circumstances, North Korea finds little reasons to
abandon its nuclear program. The six-nation dialogue
under the proactive participation of the People's
Republic of China, North Korea's chief interlocutor, has
not emerged as a productive forum providing confidence
for Pyongyang to offer meaningful concessions. One
frequently mentioned explanation is that North Korea is
awaiting the outcome of the American presidential
elections. That is not an untenable course of action
under the general expectations that, if elected, John
Kerry would be decidedly more interested in negotiating
the denuclearization of North Korea than Bush.
Moving away from personalities and personal
preferences of Bush or Kerry, the stakes are indeed high
for North Korea. As ruthless a regime as Kim Jong-il
presides over, neither he nor his neighbors are
interested in the highly impetuous notion of regime
change through military invasion. So, North Korea will
wait and see whether Kerry will continue his present
rhetoric of negotiating with friends and foes to resolve
regional and global conflicts, or whether he will change
that rhetoric once in office. After all, Bush also paid
lip service to the notion of humility in international
relations while running for office.
Even with
Kerry's assurances, North Korea is not likely to
completely abandon its nuclear weapons option. There is
a frequent mentioning of North Korea following the
example of Libya and doing away with its nuclear weapons
option. North Korea and Libya belong to two entirely
different categories of nation states. The nuclear
weapons program in North Korea is way ahead of Libya's
own nuclear program when Muammar Gaddafi decided to
unravel it. Besides, Libya has no powerful friend or
interlocutor arguing its case with great powers or with
the lone superpower. Libya is a desert state and an open
target for a potential American pre-emptive attack. That
was one of the chief motivating factors that drove
Gaddafi to do away with his nuclear program. North
Korea, on the contrary, is capable of causing much
devastation to South Korea or even Japan. North Korea
also has in its vicinity a sizeable number of American
troops, more than 30,000, whose security is also a
driving force for a pre-emption-oriented Bush
administration.
On top of it all, the United
States has learned a bitter lesson in Iraq: It may be
easy to conquer a nation militarily; however, ruling it
in peace is an undoable task, even for the lone
superpower. But North Korea is not interested in such
historical lessons. It must survive and that survival,
in the final analysis, will only be guaranteed by
acquiring nuclear weapons.
Ehsan
Ahrari is an independent strategic analyst in
Alexandria, Virginia.
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