Nuclear genie out of S Korean
bottle By Ehsan Ahrari
In this
age, when nuclear nonproliferation is receiving global
popularity, it might be hard to realize that developing
nuclear weapons still retains its status as the
proverbial prohibited apple among a number of countries.
Nations know they are not supposed to develop them, yet
they are so tempted to push the envelop to the edge by
attempting to develop weapons-grade uranium, just in
case. Such endeavors may be viewed as stopping short of
developing nuclear weapons, or keeping the indigenous
knowledge honed enough for future reference. The latest
surprise related to the South Korean nuclear program
falls in this category. This was also a violation of the
international agreement that Seoul signed not to enrich
uranium for nuclear power.
The recent disclosure
from South Korean that its nuclear scientists secretly
enriched uranium to nearly bomb-grade levels in
experiments was treated in Washington as a surprise. It
was a surprise in the sense that the United States did
not expect such behavior from its ally at a time when it
is trying to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear
weapons program. At the same time, given the technical
sophistication acquired by the South Korean scientists
through their training in the United States for peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, it should not be a surprise.
There were trained by the best in the business, and were
expected to test the outermost limits of their
capabilities. Having nuclear knowledge and not being
tempted to use it for developing nuclear weapons is like
living near brothels and remaining celibate. Sooner or
later, the temptation will triumph over all good
intentions.
What is also troubling is that Seoul
disclosed the nature of its nuclear activity on August
23, when confronted by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) under mounting suspicion. The official
position is that "it was a one-time experiment conducted
without government authorization and it was geared
toward the country's nuclear energy program".
Ironically, "without the authorization or knowledge of
the government" was also an explanation offered by
Pakistan in explaining the rogue activities of Dr A Q
Khan (who sold nuclear technology to other states and
almost sold it to Iraq), in the realm of global nuclear
proliferation. South Korea also stated that it enriched
only a tiny amount of uranium. Needless to say, the IAEA
would not accept Seoul's words, and wants a complete
explanation - and scrutiny of its nuclear activities.
The question should be asked: why South Korean
scientists ventured into the forbidden territory of
developing enriched uranium, which takes them so close
to developing nuclear weapons? Three reasons quickly
come to mind:
1) The neighborhood-related
variable: The East Asian neighborhood has four
actors - China, Japan, Taiwan, and North Korea - that
either have nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-related
know-how. China is one of the five officially recognized
"nuclear weapons states" (Britain, China, France Russia,
US - the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council). As such, Beijing's nuclear arsenal,
combined with its repertoire of ballistic missiles, is
undergoing sustained qualitative and quantitative
advancement. Even though the People's Republic of China
and South Korea are not adversaries, that reality should
not be a sufficient reason for South Korea not to
consider developing nuclear weapons. Russia and the
United States are no longer adversaries, yet neither has
shown any inclination even to drastically reduce their
nuclear inventories. The United States, the United
Kingdom, and France are allies, yet all have their own
nuclear forces. So, by extending the preceding argument,
the friendly ties between South Korea and the PRC has no
bearing on the temptation of the former to eventually
have its own nuclear arsenal.
Taiwan:
Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) and Japan already have
sufficient nuclear know-how to develop their own nuclear
weapons within six months to a few years. Even in the
1980s, two American nuclear nonproliferation
specialists, Leonard Spector and Joseph Yager, wrote
about the possibility that Taiwan sought a nuclear or
"near nuclear option". In 1998, two other specialists,
David Albright and Corey Gay, wrote that the ROC
explored nuclear capabilities in the aftermath of the
PRC's nuclear tests in the 1960s. Taiwan's rationale,
according to these authors, was based upon its
leadership's thinking that the US nuclear force could
not be relied on to deter military moves from the
mainland. America played a crucial role in pressing
Taiwan not to develop the nuclear option. In 1966, the
US again intervened to ensure that Taiwan's nuclear
reactors "included IAEA safeguards to prevent diversion
from materials into nuclear weapons".
Then, in
1972-73, Washington "discouraged the ROC from purchasing
from West Germany a reprocessing facility that could
have created the impression that Taiwan intended to
acquire nuclear capability". In 1997, a highly placed
Central Intelligence Agency spy in Taiwan's nuclear
development program played a key role in forestalling
another attempt by that country to develop nuclear
weapons. Despite these endeavors, it is generally
understood that Taiwan possesses nuclear weapon
know-how. Whether or when it pursues a weapons option
has a lot to do with the America's role in ensuring that
the PRC will not put into action its often iterated
position of using all means, including military action,
to reunite Taiwan with the motherland.
Japan: It is a well-known fact that Japan
has the technological know-how to produce nuclear
weapons. The People's Daily reports that Japanese
Liberal Party chief Ichiro Ozawa made a claim on April 6
to a visiting Chinese delegation that, "In the event of
China's excessive expansion, Japan would make nuclear
weapons to 'curb' China; the plutonium of Japan's
nuclear power plant can fully turn out more than 4,000
nuclear warheads ... " Even prior to Ozawa's statement,
former prime minister Hata Tsutomu told reporters,
"Japan does have the ability to possess nuclear
weapons."
In July 1995, a Japanese magazine,
Hoseki Gem, reported a statement by an unnamed Japanese
politician, saying: "Japan can produce atom bomb within
183 days." People's Daily correctly assesses Japan's
nuclear know-how by pointing out that it possesses:
"World's first-rate nuclear energy technology";
"Multiplication reactor technology that has all
along been the key and [resolves] difficult points in
nuclear technology research";
"Extremely high-level nuclear warhead-carrying
technology"; and that Japan;
Is "actively exploring new technology for obtaining
nuclear raw materials";
"Stores astonishing nuclear raw materials," and that
by 2010, "Japan's gross plutonium reserves will reach
100 tons, thus making it the world's number 1 country
with the largest plutonium storage."
North
Korea: North Korea is a country that, by all
estimations, has either developed somewhere between 1-20
nuclear weapons, or, is on the verge of doing so. It has
already revoked its commitment to the Nonproliferation
Treaty and created a bad precedent for future wannabe
nuclear powers to attempt to emulate. However, even to
this day, North Korea's emergence as a nuclear power may
not have attained the status of irreversibility. That is
why the six-nation dialogue - comprising North and South
Korea, China, the United States, Japan, and Russia - is
still alive, and may lead to a negotiated solution of
this conflict.
2). The prestige factor:
Even though specialists on nuclear nonproliferation have
spent a lot of time discussing the security-related
aspirations of a country as the primary driving force in
developing nuclear weapons, the prestige factor has also
played a prominent role. Why else would the United
Kingdom and France continue to possess nuclear weapons?
Even during the heady days of the Cold War, their
nuclear arsenals were no match for the awesome nuclear
capabilities possessed by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR). Today, the "suspected total nuclear
weapons" of France and Great Britain are listed at 464
and 185 respectively, according to reliable sources. It
could be argued that the real deterring force vis a vis
the former USSR (suspected total nuclear weapons around
10,000) was the equally awesome arsenal of the United
States (suspected total nuclear weapons around 10,500).
Equally important, Washington was quite serious about
implementing the doctrine of "extended deterrence",
which included, inter alia, guaranteeing the security
and survival of France and the UK against a Soviet
nuclear attack. There is no doubt that, from the US
vantage point, having a nuclear-armed France and UK was
a good thing, since even their comparatively small
nuclear arsenal could not have been then ignored by
Moscow in its own strategy of nuclear retaliation.
Today, neither France nor the UK has shown any
inclination toward unraveling their nuclear weapons, for
that remains the only status symbol for them to maintain
a semblance of "great powers". South Korea seems to be
tempted by a similar feeling, recognizing fully that its
chances of becoming a nuclear power are well nigh
impossible. Still, the prestige variable could not have
been ignored by the top leadership in giving a wink and
a nod to its scientists to proceed with their technical
endeavors to process uranium. Seoul will not develop its
nuclear weapons; however, its nuclear scientists have
established the fact they can, if they must.
3) Giving a message to North Korea: There
is little doubt that North Korea has taken note of this
much publicized action of South Korean nuclear
scientists. In this sense, it is possible that Seoul
wanted to send a message to its northern neighbor that
it too can match Pyongyang's capabilities. However, it
is doubtful that such a message would have much of a
constraining effect on North Korea. Kim Jong-Il's
commitment to develop nuclear weapons is driven by his
resolve of not becoming the next victim of regime
change, if US President George W Bush is re-elected.
Washington is rightly concerned that North Korea "would
use the revelations to its advantage." It should be
noted, however, that unless the United States comes
through with sufficiently strong guarantees against
regime change in North Korea, along with a hefty
economic package, any potential development of nuclear
weapons by South Korea is not likely to play much of a
role in influencing Kim Jong-Il one way or another.
Ultimately, South Korea's romancing with the
nuclear option is a minor blip in terms of its potential
damage to the six-nation talks on North Korea's nuclear
weapons. What was important for South Korea was to
signal to its regional competitors - Japan and Taiwan,
to be sure - that it too belongs in the "big league" of
wannabe nuclear powers. As long as the United States'
commitment to South Korea's security remains firm, there
is no chance that Seoul would seriously consider the
option of acquiring nuclear weapons. At the same time,
Washington must also make sure that Japan does not
develop its own nuclear weapons. If that were to happen,
the US government would have a tough time persuading
South Korea why it should not also have its own nuclear
weapons, especially if North Korea remains armed with
such weapons.
Ehsan Ahrari is an
independent strategic analyst based in Alexandria,
Virginia.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
