NE Asia alarmed by US's tougher NK
stance By Bruce Klingner
Continuing indications that the administration
of US President George W Bush will pursue a firm and
potentially more activist policy towards North Korea are
exacerbating regional concerns, straining already frayed
United States relations with South Korea, and spurring
Seoul to seek a more independent role in efforts to
resolve the North Korean nuclear impasse.
Bush's
assured statement following the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation summit that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il
"will hear a common voice" from the other five
participants at the next (as yet unscheduled) round of
six-way talks masked obvious unease by Korea's neighbors
with the US approach. Despite US assertions that
northeast Asian nations agreed on the need for North
Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programs, Bush's
counterparts concurrently emphasized the need for US
restraint and a measured diplomatic approach.
Secretary of State Colin Powell has called for
the resumption of negotiations in early 2005,
underscoring that Washington did not attach any
"preconditions" to its participation. The US reopened
"the New York channel" by sending Joseph DeTrani, the
special envoy for North Korean negotiations, to meet
with Pyongyang's United Nations diplomats and
subsequently dispatching him to the region for follow-on
discussions with China, South Korea, and Japan.
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and
national security advisor-designate Stephen Hadley
issued a mixed message to a visiting South Korean
bipartisan parliamentary delegation by assuring them
that the US neither planned to attack, nor sought regime
change in North Korea while, at the same time, warning
that the US might take the issue to the United Nations
Security Council. Hadley added that while President Bush
believed the six-way talks were the best means to
resolve the nuclear issue, "managed pressure" was
necessary to bring closure.
North Korea
willing to wait ... for now Pyongyang has refused
to reengage Washington until the Bush administration
provides tangible signs of having dropped its "hostile"
policy. A North Korean spokesman reiterated after the
New York meetings that it would await announcements over
the final disposition of Bush's second-term national
security team prior to agreeing to attend another round
of talks. Pyongyang is likely seeking indications of the
extent to which the US will press the regime, most
notably whether secretary of of state-designate
Condoleezza Rice elevates Undersecretary of State John
Bolton, seen as one of the administration's strongest
advocates of a hard line policy, to deputy secretary of
state.
Pyongyang will be encouraged by recent
South Korean and Chinese actions that serve to constrain
Washington's efforts to increase international pressure
on the recalcitrant regime. As a result, Kim Jong-il
will continue to eschew escalating tensions in the
near-term, preferring to allow his neighbors to
undermine US efforts. Pyongyang's patience is not
limitless, however, and if the leadership perceives a
further hardening of US policy or feels too long
ignored, it may choose to implement an escalatory
policy.
Regional concerns Asian
nations perceive that Bush is more likely to increase
pressure on North Korea by building an international
consensus for stronger action. The recently passed US
North Korean Human Rights Act provides another vehicle
with which to coerce Pyongyang and, in conjunction with
the Proliferation Security Initiative and UN nuclear
watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
efforts to have the UN Security Council address the
North's nuclear violations, comprise a three-pronged US
policy to garner greater recognition of the danger
Pyongyang poses. If these efforts are unsuccessful, they
would then form the legal basis to justify harsher
action, whether through sanctions or military action.
The latest diplomatic maneuvering between
Washington and Pyongyang takes place in the context of
recent comments from IAEA head Mohammed ElBaradei that
is he "certain" that North Korea has reprocessed its
spent nuclear fuel into an amount of weapons-grade
plutonium sufficient to produce four to six weapons.
Northeast Asian nations will be hesitant if not hostile
to US efforts to build an international coalition
against North Korea, seeing such efforts as a reprise of
Washington's efforts prior to its invasion of Iraq.
South Korea and its neighbors will shy from applying
such a policy to North Korea, given the perceived
deteriorating security situation in Iraq, increased
skepticism over US intelligence capabilities following
the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq,
and lingering resentment over Washington's unilateral
preemptive policy.
Faced with the prospect of
continued impasse as Pyongyang increases its arsenal,
grudging formal acceptance of a nuclear-armed North
Korea, or escalating tensions, South Korea and China
will likely seek to change the existing paradigm through
their own unilateral efforts.
Seoul - taking
the lead South Korea has been in an increasingly
awkward position as the Bush administration seeks to
ratchet-up pressure. President Roh Moo-hyun has tried to
balance Seoul's efforts to build trust with North Korea
with efforts not to alienate conservative elements of
the South's populace - as well as Washington. Endorsing
the US policy would undermine Seoul's engagement policy
by chilling dialogue with Pyongyang while offering
little if any benefit to Seoul. The inherent
contradictions of seeking to be on both sides of the
fence have exacerbated existing tensions with Washington
while not generating concessions from Pyongyang.
President Roh Moo-hyun's speech to a Los
Angeles-based think tank served as a diplomatic shot
across the bow by rebuking the Bush administration over
its approach to the north and urging the US to engage
diplomatically with North Korea as the best means to
resolving the nuclear impasse. Roh sought to distance
himself from Washington's policy by announcing "the use
of force as a negotiation strategy should be restricted
[and] a blockade against North Korea would be
undesirable too, as it would only drag out uncertainties
and risks." Pointedly emphasizing that "I can't ask
Koreans to risk a war again," Roh stated that "a
hard-line policy means too much for the Korean
Peninsula."
Roh's statement that Pyongyang's
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and missiles was to
"deter threats from the outside" was harshly criticized
by South Korean conservatives who accused the president
of serving as an apologist for the North and risking
further alienation of the United States. Defense
Minister Yoon Kwang-ung's subsequent suggestion that
references to North Korea as Seoul's "primary enemy"
would be erased in the next defense ministry white paper
to be published in January was widely perceived as
another indicator of South Korea seeking to distance
itself from the US approach to Pyongyang.
Roh's European tour The South Korean
president used meetings with European counterparts to
garner support for a peaceful resolution to the nuclear
issue and espouse the need to provide security
assurances and economic aid to Pyongyang so that it
would continue its nascent efforts at economic reform.
He sought to stake out a "leading role" for South Korea
and emphasized that his government "will do its best ...
to reflect the thoughts and circumstances of the Korean
people ... even if [we] have to turn red in the face
with somebody [the clear inference being the US], we
have no choice but to do so."
The South Korean
populace has become increasingly distrustful of the US,
as reflected in several surveys that identify Washington
as a greater threat than Pyongyang to peace and
stability on the Korean Peninsula. Especially striking
was a November poll which revealed 20% of those surveyed
advocated that South Korea should join with North Korea
in the event of a US-North Korean armed conflict, while
49% chose the US and 30% were unsure.
Roh's
free-wheeling diplomacy may resurrect domestic debate
over the direction of South Korea's foreign policy and
the degree of collaboration with Washington, reminiscent
of discussion following then-foreign minister Yoon
Young-kwan's unexpected dismissal in January. Although
Yoon's departure was couched as being the result of
"insubordination toward the president". a Blue House
official said the foreign minister had been "unable to
grow beyond the dependent foreign policy of the past"
and had not adequately followed the "new independent
foreign policy" of President Roh.
China wary
of UN action Chinese Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing's announcement that Beijing would not support
Washington in bringing Iran's nuclear issue before the
UN Security Council may reflect a calculated Chinese
decision to impede US attempts to increase international
pressure on Tehran - and by inference, North Korea. Li
told reporters that Security Council involvement "would
only make the issue more complicated and difficult to
work out", explaining that China feels the issue can be
handled within the framework of the IAEA. China's signal
against US-led action against Iran reflects Beijing's
growing strategic relationship with Iran, based largely
on new agreements to satisfy the Middle Kingdom's
growing oil appetite and continue the country's critical
economic growth. The Chinese leadership has repeatedly
stated that maintaining peace and stability on the
Korean Peninsula was a strategic national interest,
making it unlikely that Beijing would support UN action
against Pyongyang.
Ramifications for US
policy As a result of parallel South Korean and
Chinese efforts, the international community will act as
a sea anchor to the Bush administration's pursuit of a
hard line policy against North Korea. Increasingly
isolated, the US will be faced with the choice of
attempting to gain greater acceptance of its strategy or
proceeding unilaterally. Washington will, of course,
initially attempt the former but, as post-election
administration statements indicate, is willing to pursue
the latter.
Bruce Klingner is director
of analysis for Intellibridge Corp in Washington, DC.
His areas of expertise are strategic national security,
political and military affairs in China, Northeast Asia,
Korea and Japan. He can be reached at bklingner@intellibridge.com.
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