SPEAKING FREELY US should recognize
North Korea By Peter R Moody, Jr
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America's approach to nuclear proliferation
in North Korea is faulted for alienating its South
Korean ally. Countries do what they have to do, so perhaps
it's worth the cost, except the policy does not
seem particularly effective in furthering US goals
toward the North. Indications are that US President
George W Bush is not prepared to rethink Korea policy
during his second term. Yet were there the will, Bush's
re-election (and possibly some kind of political change
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the DPRK)
provides an opportunity for a radically different
approach.
The general non-proliferation regime,
such as it is, strives to deny states the means to
produce nuclear weapons. But states that want such
weapons seem to figure out ways to get them. It may be
more effective to treat the question from the demand
side - to address the political goals states hope to
serve through the acquisition of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction.
North Korea claims its governing motive is security
from a US attack. The very disproportion between the power
of the United States and the rest of the world gives
states an incentive to find ways to counter US
pressures. This would be true even if the United States were inclined
to mind its own business, but since the early
1990s, the US has shown an unusual propensity to throw its
weight around, a pattern only reinforced by the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The US has not attacked
any states that have nuclear weapons.
North Korea
is most directly concerned with the US military presence
in South Korea, officially know as the Republic of Korea
(ROK). If we look at the matter coldly, there is really
no reason for hostility between the United States and
the DPRK, except for the US commitment to defend
South Korea from a Northern attack. But in the judgment
of the ROK's government, this is no longer the problem
it used to be.
Of course, since the early 1990s
the United States has become more concerned about the
North Korean weapons program than about the ever less
necessary defense of the South. But without the US
commitment to the South, the North would have much less
of a rationale for building nuclear weapons. And in the
abstract, North Korean nuclear weapons are not a direct
threat to the United States, apart from their potential
use in a renewed Korean war.
Should the US perhaps cut the Gordian knot: offer North
Korea immediate, good-faith, unconditional
diplomatic recognition? This would be the most tangible
indication that the United States does not intend to attack
North Korea (at least as convincing and simpler than
a Ribbentrop-Molotov-style non-aggression pact North
Korea sometimes whines for): it would be a public US
acknowledgment of the DPRK's international legitimacy.
"Unconditional" means the United States should not
demand beforehand that the DPRK do anything about its
weapons program. It certainly means that recognition
should not be accompanied by offers of money in exchange
for concessions: questions of aid can be negotiated on
their own merits, not as extortion. Nor should
normalization be accompanied by any grandstanding -
visits by presidents or secretaries of state or such.
The tacit acceptance of a nuclear North Korea prevents
the weapons program being used as a bargaining chip.
Perhaps the United States could reasonably request that
the DPRK refrain from selling its weapons or technology
to hostile states or unsavory non-state entities.
This modest proposal violates current American
policy against bilateral negotiations with North Korea.
Although it is now hard to remember, the original
rationale for this was to assuage the ROK's not
unreasonable fears that direct negotiations between the
United States and North Korea would lead to
accommodations at the South's expense. But given the
current posture of the government in Seoul, this concern
also is anachronistic. And as the 1993-94 Pyongyang
nuclear crisis demonstrated, the DPRK can force
bilateral negotiations over South Korea's head when it
presses hard enough.
A side effect of the
proposed action would be a dilution of the South
Korean-American alliance, a toning down of American
political influence in northeast Asia. The United States
would abandon any ambition to exercise direct control
over much of what goes on in the region.
There
will be benefits to the region. America would no longer
be in a position to pledge its allies, Japan and South
Korea, to bankroll dubious Korean Peninsula Energy
Development (KEDO), or KEDO-type boondoggles without
consulting with them first. (KEDO was established to
provide safe nuclear power to North Korea, but it has
been suspended). But the immediate effects of an
American-North Korean demarche would probably be
consternation. Over the longer run, it could promote
multilateral interaction, perhaps fostering the
evolution of a Korean security regime guaranteed by the
countries participating in the current six-party talks
involving North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia
and the US.
American power generates distrust of
the United States. It also allows free rides on the
American bandwagon. On the Korean issue, states can
maneuver for their own advantage in ways that are not
always constructive, confident that the US will check
any North Korean audacity while reserving the luxury of
criticizing how America goes about it and reaping the
rewards of that criticism. A partial American suspension
of offensive military action would encourage a greater
sense of responsibility among the regional powers.
In the unlikely event that American recognition
results in North Korea's abandoning its nuclear program,
there is little left to say. And if there is a problem,
it is more the region's than America's. If current South
Korean policy is based on illusion, a less prominent
American role will encourage a less illusory approach.
China wins praise for helping mediate between the DPRK
and the United States, but in a way that leaves the
impression it thinks it is doing America a favor and
that its mediation should give it leverage against
America, say, on Taiwan. A more modest American role
would induce China to deal with North Korea on its own
merits (and if China really believes a nuclear North
Korea is, on balance, tolerable, then its mediation is
perhaps not worth much anyway).
A limited
American regional role does not mean no role; and a
lesser degree of engagement is not total disengagement.
The American role should be to support, within the
constraints of its own interests, regional efforts to
handle problems presented by the DPRK. It is not
America's place to run the show.
All of this is
offered without any excuses for the DPRK, or even too
many hopes for immediate effects. To deprive North Korea
of the pretext of threats to its security might provide
room for internal reforms, at least more so than the
present course. But this is nothing to count on. The
North Korean regime is truly foul. Its foulness, though,
lies in the way it treats its people, in its internal
political dynamic, and its indifference to international
standards of civilized behavior. It is best dealt with
by its neighbors who are directly affected by its
foulness, not by a pushy, self-righteous, questionably
competent outside superpower.
Peter R
Moody Jr is professor of political science at the
University of Notre Dame, and has written on Chinese
politics, the politics of the East Asian states, and the
international relations of East Asia.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their say.
Please click hereif you
are interested in contributing.
