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Best option is no action on North
Korean nukes
By Andrei Lankov
SEOUL - In May 2003, President Roh
Moo-hyun of South Korea and President George W
Bush of the United States of America explained to
the world how they saw the ongoing North Korean
nuclear crisis. They expressed "serious concern"
about North Korea's nuclear-weapons programs, and
then said in a joint statement that they "will not
tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea".
Well, as diplomatic rhetoric goes, this
sounds good. But what does it mean "will not
tolerate"? Does this mean that Commander-in-Chief
Roh is ready to give his 600,000-strong army an
order to start fighting a 1.1-million-strong North
Korean army? Does it mean that South Korean and
American commandos are planning daring raids
against North Korean nuclear faculties? Does this
mean, at least, a naval blockade of the North
Korean coast? Unlikely.
Now North Korea
has finally proclaimed itself a nuclear power. Is
it not time to make good on all these promises and
veiled threats? Do not hold your breath. This is
not going to happen. Tough diplomatic talk is not
going to be supported by tough actions, since no
actions can be undertaken.
It is clear
that all of its neighbors play down the
significance of Pyongyang's recent statement about
its nuclear weapons. Everybody recalls the North
Korean track record of mutually exclusive
statements, lies and distortions. This is true:
Pyongyang's statements are not to be taken
seriously. But the efforts to downplay are a wise
policy, too. Pyongyang dropped its bombshell last
Thursday, largely on assumption that this would
make its enemies and partners undertake some
actions that will eventually serve North Korean
interests. For decades, the tactics of North
Korean diplomacy were simple: first, create a
crisis; second, defuse it, extracting money or
other concessions in the process. Thus if the
world does not perceive what is meant to be a
crisis as a real crisis, this is a serious failure
of North Korean diplomacy. To rework a well-known
expression about war, "Imagine if they have a
crisis, but nobody comes." Hence ignoring
Thursday's statement is a wise policy - and this
is what the developed world is doing right now.
But the persistent efforts to play down
the significance of Pyongyang's declaration might
have another reason as well: even if North Korea
does have usable nuclear weapons (a big "if", of
course), the outside world cannot do much about
it, all earlier tough rhetoric notwithstanding.
Thus it makes sense to pretend that nothing has
happened, so the impotence of the great powers
will not be that visible. It's fine to say that
North Korea will "face serious consequences" if it
dares to go nuclear. But what are those "serious
consequences" exactly? If North Korea conducts a
nuclear test or demonstrates its nuclear potential
in some other persuasive way (statements do not
count), what will its neighbors do?
Air raids against nuclear installations,
something like the Israeli air raid on Iraq's
nuclear-research center in 1981? It's not going to
work. If nukes have been manufactured, they are
safely hidden in some of the underground
facilities for which North Korea is so famed. The
North Korean armed forces have huge numbers of
soldiers, and digging underground installations
has been their usual pastime for many decades. It
is virtually impossible to find a place where
nukes might be hidden at the moment, and
destruction of research facilities is unlikely to
have serious impact.
A large-scale invasion by ground forces? This
is definitely a non-starter, for a number of
reasons. North Korea has a rugged, mountainous
terrain and a large army. If Americans and their
allies choose to invade, eventual victory of a new
"coalition of the willing" is certain, but it is
also certain that the price of such victory will
be high, both in material losses and human lives.
There will be serious problems with such a
coalition, too, since South Koreans are very
unlikely to join such an undertaking. They prefer
to live with possibility of a North Korean nuclear
strike, rather than start a war just 30 kilometers
north of downtown Seoul, literally in the
capital's northern suburbs. But without South
Korean support, land operations are doomed.
Naval blockade might be a good way to let off
steam, to demonstrate to the voters in the US and
elsewhere that something is being done. But its
efficacy is very doubtful. North Korean maritime
activity is small, and the contribution of sea
transport to its trade is negligible. Most goods
are moved by land, through railway links with
China and Russia. Neither of these two countries
wants to see North Korea a nuclear power, but both
Moscow and Beijing are also unlikely to join the
blockade. However, without their active and
sincere cooperation, the blockade is doomed. North
Korea will hardly notice the frantic activity of
patrol boats, even if we can be certain of the
proclamations about "modern-day piracy" by
propaganda eccentrics. The only problem that can
be created by a naval blockade is interruption of
North Korea's exchanges with Japan, which are
quite important but still not vital for the
Pyongyang regime's survival.
Well, what is left in the arsenal of
enforcement actions? Economic sanctions? The
cheapest and easiest options, they will probably
be imposed if and when the world is unable to deny
the nuclear potential of North Korea. But their
efficacy also is doubtful. Normally, sanctions
work in an indirect way. By putting some country
under sanction, the international community
exercises influence on its population. The
strategy of economic sanctions is based on the
assumption that dissatisfied people would demand a
change in the policy or would simply overthrow a
non-complying government. In spite of tremendous
changes during the past decade, North Korea is not
liberal enough for its people to have any
influence in matters of the governance. In all
probability, sanctions will help to kill another
few hundred thousand hungry North Koreans without
any effect - apart from providing ammunition for
nationalist and anti-Western propaganda, of
course.
Thus if North Korea indeed decides
to go nuclear, the world is not in position to do
anything. Such an unfortunate turn of events
should be accepted, and we must try to learn how
to live with a nuclear-armed North Korea.
This might not prove to be too difficult.
Of course, the North Korean leaders will embark on
a new round of their customary blackmail, this
time supported by bomb-rattling. But if the world
finally learns to take North Korea for what it is
- a small, impoverished, highly repressive
hereditary dictatorship - there is not much need
to pay the requested ransoms. A benevolent
neglect, combined with some humanitarian aid, will
be the best policy.
De-dramatizing North
Korean nuclear ambitions is also important because
two other countries of the region, Japan and
Taiwan, can go nuclear in a matter of months. In
Japan, the North Korean nuclear program will help
local rightists who are arguing in favor of a
nuclear Japan. With a saber-rattling, or
bomb-rattling, nuclear North Korea virtually next
door, such policy would appear more sensible and
attractive.
And Japan's nukes are likely
to push Taiwan and South Korea in the same
direction. The South Korean public has persuaded
itself that the North is not that bad, and many
people naively believe that North Koreans would
never use their nukes against "fellow Koreans" (of
course, it's is not very probable that Pyongyang
will use nuclear weapons at all, but if it does,
South Korea will be its major - or only - target).
On the contrary, a nuclear Japan will be seen by
Koreans as a direct challenge, and South Korea
will at least consider acquiring nuclear weapons.
Thus cool and measured reaction to North Korean
statements is important to prevent nuclearization
of East Asia.
Such nuclearization is
perhaps a bigger threat than the North Korean
nuclear arsenal itself. If not provoked (or rather
if not directly attacked), North Koreans will not
use their nukes, even if they have actually
acquired them. North Korean leaders know only too
well that their country and its army are not in
good shape, and that they would eventually lose a
general war. Nukes are negotiating chips to be
sacrificed, and also a deterrent against large
neighbors. But no amount of weapon-grade plutonium
will be able to stop the ongoing disintegration of
the social and political system of North Korea,
and this slow-motion decay is certain to solve the
nuclear problem sooner or later by bringing about
the collapse of regime. Its formidable nuclear
arsenal did not save the Soviet Union from
internal collapse, so why should North Korea be an
exception?
Thus it will make sense to
leave North Korea to its own fate, biding the time
and waiting until its regime either devours itself
from within and collapses, or until some sensible
reforms are undertaken (the latter option,
contrary to the view now prevailing in South
Korea, does not appear very likely). Actually, the
world has no other option.
Dr Andrei
Lankov is a lecturer in the faculty of Asian
Studies, China and Korea Center, Australian
National University. He graduated from Leningrad
State University with a PhD in Far Eastern history
and China, with emphasis on Korea, and his thesis
focused on factionalism in the Yi Dynasty. He has
published books and articles on Korea and North
Asia. He is currently on leave, teaching at
Kookmin University, Seoul.
(Copyright
2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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