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COMMENTARY
Pyongyang puts the
ball in Seoul's court
By Ralph
A Cossa
Is South Korea bluffing? This is
the first question that came to mind when I heard
that North Korea had taken another step out of the
nuclear closet by stating, unambiguously, that it
possessed nuclear weapons and was intent on
building more.
Yes, I meant South Korea. I
will leave it to others to speculate whether the
North is bluffing. It very well could be. After
all, there is no more reason to believe
Pyongyang's claim of possessing nuclear weapons
than there was to believe previous assertions that
it did not have them. But it seems foolish, and
foolhardy, to ignore the intended message. And the
message was clear: "We had already taken the
resolute action of pulling out of the NPT
[Non-Proliferation Treaty] and have manufactured
nukes for self-defense to cope with the Bush
administration's undisguised policy to isolate and
stifle the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of
Korea]." This sounds to me like a clear-cut
declaration by North Korea that it is a
nuclear-weapons state.
While North Korea
previously claimed that it had "weaponized" its
reprocessed plutonium, this latest Foreign
Ministry statement was much more explicit. It also
asserted that North Korea planned "to bolster its
nuclear weapons arsenal" as well. Pyongyang's
announcement that it was "suspending its
participation" in the talks (as opposed to
quitting them) because of Washington's continued
"hostile policy" also brings to an abrupt end the
optimistic speculation that the six-party dialogue
would soon resume.
Pyongyang's declaration
puts the ball squarely in Seoul's court. South
Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has consistently
argued that his country "would not tolerate"
nuclear weapons in the North. Pyongyang, Roh
asserted, could either go down the path of
political and economic cooperation with the South
and reap the considerable rewards inherent in this
choice, or it could choose to pursue nuclear
weapons and face political and economic isolation.
North Korea could not have it both ways ... or can
it? However else you choose to interpret the
North's latest statement, it clearly is calling
Seoul's hand on this issue.
If President
Roh is serious about not tolerating a nuclear
North Korea, at an absolute minimum he should
immediately announce that South Korea is
"suspending its participation" in all economic
cooperation and assistance programs with North
Korea until Pyongyang has provided a satisfactory
explanation regarding its declared nuclear
capabilities and intentions. Others (especially in
Washington and Tokyo) are likely to call for more
drastic measures, including immediate economic
sanctions, but this could be a step too far (at
least initially). It also puts others in the
driver's seat that Roh has long aspired to occupy.
The other six-party participants (China,
Japan, Russia and the United States) should
support this action and announce that they are
taking (or at least considering) similar steps.
But the measure will be most meaningful (and can
only truly be effective) if it is initiated by
Seoul, since it is South Korea that possesses the
greatest degree of (largely unused and untested)
leverage over North Korea. To give credit where
credit is due, this is largely a result of former
president Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy" of
economic engagement with the North. Since the
historic 2000 North-South summit, North Korea has
become increasingly dependent on Seoul
economically, while its (increasingly tentative)
international acceptability also has its roots in
Seoul's encouragement to others to engage the
North. One wonders if Roh is prepared to use this
leverage now that it really matters.
The
next step should be for Beijing, ideally at
Seoul's request, to call an emergency plenary
session of the six-party talks, inviting Pyongyang
to attend and provide further explanation of its
current stance, but making it clear that the
meeting will proceed regardless of whether North
Korea participates.
North Korea has in
effect played a "divide and conquer" game
throughout the nuclear standoff. If it receives
conflicting signals from Washington, Seoul,
Beijing, Tokyo and Moscow in the face of this
latest provocation, it will be encouraged to
continue this tactic. The time has come for the
other five finally to begin speaking with one
voice to Pyongyang, to hold it accountable for its
own words and actions.
If this problem
cannot be handled within the six-party context,
then the only alternatives are collective action
through the United Nations Security Council - the
desired alternative but one that Seoul, Beijing
and Moscow previously believed to be "premature" -
or unilateral actions that will likely only make
matters worse.
President Roh has long
insisted that Seoul play a lead role in dealing
with North Korea; it's time for him to step
forward. Will he call North Korea's hand, or
demonstrate that it was really Seoul that was
bluffing all along?
Ralph A
Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS,
a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute
affiliated with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington. He can be
reached at pacforum@hawaii.rr.com. |
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