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Pyongyang's nuke talk tests
Beijing's diplomacy
By
Jing-dong Yuan
Pyongyang's announcement
that it has "manufactured nukes for self-defense"
and is "compelled to suspend" its participation in
the six-party talks "for an indefinite period"
puts Beijing - host of the talks and North Korea's
old ally - in a bind.
China responded to
this unexpected turn of events by both reiterating
its long-held position calling for a denuclearized
Korean Peninsula and expressing hope that
six-party talks would continue. Chinese Foreign
Minister Li Zhaoxing called his US and Russian
counterparts and reaffirmed Beijing's resolve to
see the talks resumed. A Chinese envoy was to
travel to Pyongyang in an effort to convince
Beijing's troublesome neighbor that it is in North
Korea's best interest to return to the negotiating
table.
Pyongyang's announcement that it
now has nuclear weapons is also a slap in
Beijing's face. While most US and Western official
statements and analyses have long held that North
Korea possesses the fissile materials for about
six to eight nuclear weapons, China has yet to
accept this assessment officially and indeed has
taken exception to such assertions by the United
States and others, in particular after the
intelligence debacle over Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction. (The US cited Iraq's alleged WMD
capabilities as a major reason for invasion.)
Chinese analysts also point out that North
Korea is trying to strengthen its bargaining
position, or at least to head off pressure from
the US and perhaps Japan for it to come clean on
the transfer of nuclear materials to Libya and
other issues, as well as its own nuclear program.
Can China deliver? This depends on
Beijing's long-term strategy regarding the Korean
Peninsula and its more immediate concerns and
available options. Beijing increasingly has worked
behind the scenes and engaged in more high-profile
public diplomacy over the past two years, first as
the convenor of a trilateral meeting and then as
the host of the six-party talks. However, because
of significant differences between Pyongyang and
Washington, the process has yet to produce the
desired results - the end of North Korea's
nuclear-weapons program in return for energy, food
and economic assistance.
Beijing is
believed to have significant influence over
Pyongyang. It is now North Korea's largest trading
partner, with total volume of US$1.38 billion in
2004. This is a 35.4% increase over the previous
year. At the same time, North Korea's bilateral
trade with both South Korea and Japan has declined
over the same period. China also provides North
Korea with significant amounts of energy and food
supplies. The questions, however, are whether
these economic levers can translate to real
political influence and whether Beijing is willing
to exercise that influence.
China's
long-term interests remain a denuclearized and
stable Korean Peninsula. In this respect, Beijing
has always cautioned against policies and
reactions that could further escalate the delicate
situation on the peninsula. But its patience with
North Korea is wearing thin. Pyongyang, among
other things, does not seem to take China's
security interests into account in its
brinksmanship. And one of China's major security
issues is preventing Japan from exploiting the
North Korean nuclear and missile developments as a
pretext for its own military expansion.
But perhaps the most worrisome aspect of
the ongoing crisis is its impact on regional
security, especially on the potential reactions
from Japan, whose recent military activities are
of deep concern for China. Also worrisome is
Washington's end-game for the peninsula, with the
apparent ultimate goal of a regime implosion if
not a regime change, the US pledge not to attack
North Korea notwithstanding. However, Beijing's
options are limited and any course of action could
have potential negative trade-offs.
China
could express its impatience by applying economic
pressure, as it did two years ago by cutting off
oil supplies. It could also indicate its
neutrality on any US proposal to take the North
Korean nuclear issue to the United Nations
Security Council for possible economic sanctions.
China is one of the five permanent council
members, all wielding veto power. China has
opposed all efforts to censure North Korea in the
Security Council since Pyongyang expelled
inspectors of the UN International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in 2003.
The problem is that
these actions by China probably would not bring
about the results intended and could possibly
further escalate tension. Indeed, should these
actions be undertaken, China is likely to endure
grave consequences, including but not limited to
massive inflows of North Korean refuges,
disruption of its economic ties with the region's
key partners, and an unsettled post-conflict
environment not entirely to Beijing's liking.
Working closely with the US and the
region's other powers to resolve the North Korean
nuclear issue serves China's fundamental national
interests of continued economic development in a
stable security environment. In that regard,
Beijing might also wish to see Washington show
some flexibility and more willingness to find ways
to resolve the nuclear impasse.
It is very
likely that Beijing will advise caution and
cool-headedness by all parties while looking for
ways to nudge the North Koreans gently away from a
sure path of confrontation. Official statements
from the Chinese government as well as comments
from analysts have all played down the
significance of the North Korean announcement. It
can be expected that Beijing will continue to
engage in both public diplomacy and
behind-the-scenes activities to work things out.
But China needs help from the United
States as much as it is looking for receptiveness
from Pyongyang. For the time being at least, the
best that Beijing is looking for is avoidance of
harsh words and angry reactions from the US and
Japan. And for the time being, responses from the
US and its allies are either moderate or muted. US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice cautioned
while in Brussels that North Korea's action -
suspending participation in the talks and
declaring it has nuclear arms - would only leave
it further isolated. Tokyo likewise has played
down the significance of Pyongyang's statement and
is monitoring developments closely.
Turning things around for yet another time
may prove one of the toughest tests for Beijing's
diplomatic skills in the coming weeks and months.
The stakes are very high for its reputation as an
emerging great power and a stabilizing force in
regional security.
Dr Jing-dong
Yuan is director of research of the East Asia
Nonproliferation Program at the Center for
Nonproliferation, Monterey (California) Institute
of International Studies, where he is also an
associate professor of international policy
studies.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times
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