June seen as North Korean meltdown point
By Bruce Klingner

The United States and North Korea appear to be on a collision course and June could well be the month of impact. North Korea says it plans to remove and reprocess plutonium rods to produce weapons-grade material in three months unless the US shows flexibility. The US says it is fed up and wants nuclear disarmament of the North.

North Korea's renewed nuclear threats and US comments that it would take the nuclear dispute to the United Nations Security Council will energize regional efforts for a last-ditch effort to save the moribund six-way talks. Chinese and South Korean diplomatic entreaties, however, are increasingly unlikely to achieve a fourth round of the multilateral negotiations, placing the participating nations on a path to confrontation.

Pyongyang's shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and threats to augment its nuclear arsenal will affirm regional perceptions that the US policy has failed. China and South Korea will conclude that the lack of response by the United States to the North's nuclear-weapons pronouncement in February likely led Pyongyang to calculate that it must take the additional escalatory step of shutting down the reactor in an attempt to force Washington back to the negotiating table. In this sense, the military benefits that North Korea gains from additional reprocessed plutonium is less strategically significant than the inflammatory effect it has on its neighbors to renew calls for increased US flexibility to preclude a dangerous downward spiral.

Beijing and Seoul will be privately dismissive of Washington's nebulous comments of potential North Korean nuclear-test preparations. They are skeptical of Washington's intelligence assertions, and US credibility was undermined further by media reports that the United States had deliberately misled Asian nations about North Korean export of uranium hexafluoride to Libya. The administration of US President George W Bush was accused of selectively using intelligence to highlight North Korea's involvement while downplaying the role of Pakistan and arms merchant Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Low potential for nuclear test
The likelihood of a North Korean nuclear test remains low, though slightly higher than six months ago. North Korea's decisions to announce its possession of nuclear weapons formally and cease operations at Yongbyon reflect a willingness to resume brinksmanship tactics and risk confrontation with the US. Although Kim Jong-il has carefully calibrated his escalatory policy to avoid reprisals, growing frustration with continued US inaction could lead to him to take increasingly provocative steps, such as military actions along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) or, less likely, a nuclear test. North Korean officials have stated they were willing to give a "physical" demonstration of its nuclear capabilities.

That said, Kim must realize the dangerous and irreversible consequences of conducting a test. Doing so would remove the last shred of strategic ambiguity that has allowed Beijing and Seoul to avoid acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear state. A test would enable the US to pressure the six-way talks participants into pursuing stronger measures, much as the international community responded to the India-Pakistan tests of 1998. South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon displayed uncharacteristic resolve by characterizing a Northern test as a "reckless step" that would lead the South to take "other, stronger diplomatic steps [and] move on to a path where [North Korea's] future is not guaranteed".

US unmoved by Pyongyang's threats
The Bush administration perceives North Korea's renewed nuclear blackmail as vindicating its view that Pyongyang has no intention to negotiate away its nuclear-weapons programs. Washington is therefore unlikely to alter its position that Pyongyang must first implement incremental steps to resume compliance with international nuclear obligations and return to multilateral negotiations prior to receiving diplomatic and economic incentives. Washington raised the bar for North Korean acceptable behavior with assistant secretary of state Christopher Hill's comment that "it is not enough to get [North Korea] going, we need to achieve progress" in the talks.

Washington will conclude it has little incentive to acquiesce to Pyongyang's growing demands and, as a result, is increasingly likely to eschew the six-way talks process and shift toward ratcheting up pressure on North Korea, including UN Security Council resolutions. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other officials continue to espouse US preference for negotiations, but are increasingly impatient with the lack of results.

The Bush administration has been criticized for "delegating" the nuclear crisis to China and has repeatedly pressed Beijing to adopt a firmer stance toward North Korea. As such, Washington's comments over the potential for "other measures" to resolve the nuclear impasse may be directed as much at Beijing as at Pyongyang.

Beijing remains on the fence
China will continue efforts to coerce North Korea but will remain reticent to greatly increasing its pressure on Pyongyang due to concerns over causing instability, an influx of refugees into its northeastern provinces and the collapse of leader Kim Jong-il's regime. China may alternatively choose to offer economic incentives, but this tactic has become less effective in moderating North Korean behavior in recent years and Beijing is loath to reward Kim for behavior that impacts China's security interests. Pyongyang's nuclear announcement runs directly counter to Beijing's articulation of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula as a core national interest.

A meeting between Kim Jong-il and the Chinese leadership could signal a policy shift, as occurred prior to Kim's landmark decision for an inter-Korean summit in 2000. However, a rumored trip to North Korea in May by Chinese President Hu Jintao was postponed indefinitely because of Pyongyang's refusal to agree to returning to the six-way talks.

Even if a trip were to occur, it is doubtful, however, that China could strike a balance sufficient to induce both North Korea and the US to return to talks. Even agreement by all parties to attend a fourth round of talks is unlikely to resolve the nuclear dispute; resumed six-way talks would likely be as ineffectual as the predecessor four-party talks.

June as trigger point
Several factors are converging to make June a potential deadline for escalatory action. Senior North Korean officials stated that US refusal to accede to Pyongyang's demands would result in the fuel rods being removed during the next three months for reprocessing into weapons-grade material. The US has made increasingly direct statements that the June anniversary of the last round of six-way talks may mark the end of Washington's patience with North Korean intransigence. Japanese officials have also unofficially raised June as a potential deadline for action.

Impediments to US strategy
Attempts by Washington to take the North Korean nuclear issue before the Security Council will face a number of significant challenges. The US would need to gain acceptance by fellow permanent members China and Russia, neither of which is amenable to council consideration, warnings and eventual sanctions. China would prefer to avoid a formal showdown in the UN and Beijing would likely take steps to derail a US initiative prior to it reaching the Security Council. The International Atomic Energy Agency referred North Korea to the Security Council in February 2003, but that effort foundered largely because of Chinese opposition.

South Korea pursuing separate policy
US efforts to attain collective agreement for imposing greater economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea would also be hampered by the growing policy dichotomy with Seoul. President Roh Moo-hyun has advocated an increasingly independent foreign policy that is less aligned with Bush administration priorities. Roh's "refusal" to allow Korea-based US troops to engage in a regional security role, his proposed "balancer role" for South Korea in Northeast Asia, and suspension of joint contingency planning with the US on North Korean regime-collapse scenarios reflect additional impediments in the already strained relations with the United States.

Barring a North Korean nuclear test, Seoul will continue its engagement policy toward Pyongyang as it attempts to moderate Northern behavior and transform the regime. Southern officials have affirmed continuation of the inter-Korean Kaesong industrial project despite US objections and stated that Seoul would oppose US efforts to involve the UN in the nuclear impasse. Although the bilateral military alliance and underlying strategic relationship remain strong, the schism between Roh's and Bush's policies toward North Korea will hamper Washington's ability to garner widespread support for stronger measures.

Increased regional skittishness
Secretary Rice implied that Washington is not reliant on UN resolutions to increase pressure on Pyongyang and could invoke the existing Proliferation Security Initiative to seize suspected North Korean shipments of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) components. Asian governments and international investors will be increasingly wary of developments that could increase tension in the region and degrade stability and economic confidence. The precariousness of the situation was reflected in Wall Street stock prices falling on April 22 on rumors of a nuclear test.

Bruce Klingner is the Korea analyst for Eurasia Group, an independent research and consulting firm that provides global political risk analysis. His areas of expertise are strategic national security, political and military affairs in Korea, China and Japan. He can be reached at klingner@eurasiagroup.net.

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