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Finger on the
button
By Bruce Klingner
Although the likelihood of a North Korean
nuclear-weapons test is somewhat higher than it
was six months ago, several factors suggest that
Pyongyang remains unlikely to conduct a test in
the near term. Reports that US intelligence has
observed "rapid, extensive preparations" and a
statement by a North Korean official that "a
plutonium-based test is unavoidable" exacerbated
fears that North Korea would continue its
escalatory policy. But even as Pyongyang continues
to pursue brinksmanship tactics, a nuclear test
carries significant costs for North Korea.
A nuclear test would be the next logical
stage in the development of North Korea's
nuclear-weapons program since Pyongyang has
already conducted nearly 100 high-explosive tests
related to nuclear warhead development, according
to media reports of US intelligence assessments.
Moreover, a nuclear test would further North
Korean national objectives and be consistent with
Pyongyang's recent return to brinkmanship tactics.
"Dear Leader" Kim Jong-il may calculate
that a nuclear test would increase Pyongyang's
bargaining leverage and force Washington back to
the six-party talks, which have been suspended for
more than a year. By formally achieving status as
a nuclear state, Kim might conclude that
Washington would have to accept Pyongyang as an
equal negotiating partner, a long-held North
Korean foreign policy objective. A demonstration
of its nuclear capabilities could also be seen by
Pyongyang as a means of ensuring regime survival
by deterring a US military attack. Moreover, a
successful test would provide the Kim regime a
domestic propaganda windfall, similar to that
reaped from the 1998 Taepo Dong 1 missile launch.
However, other factors make it unlikely
that Pyongyang will engage in a nuclear test
during the next several months. Subsequent media
reports of the supposed test preparations indicate
decreasing consensus on the issue within the
intelligence community. Most notably, The New York
Times, the initial source of the most definitive
reporting on the observed activity, has downplayed
its original assertions.
US intelligence
has previously misinterpreted North Korean
underground activity. The most notable example was
in 1998-99, when the US and North Korea engaged in
tense negotiations over a site at Kumchang-ni,
which the US suspected as a nuclear reactor and
reprocessing facility; subsequent US inspections
confirmed the site was not nuclear-related.
More recently, in September and January of
last year, the Times reported warnings from US
intelligence sources of nuclear test preparations,
but no test ensued. The difficulty in determining
nuclear test-related activity is also shown by the
1997 US demarche to Russia in which Washington
accused Moscow of violating the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty based on satellite observable activities
that were "a dead ringer" for preparations for a
nuclear test. The US later admitted the assessment
was incorrect.
On May 26, Pyongyang denied
that it was conducting nuclear test preparations,
dismissing the US statements as "fabricated
rumors". The observed activity may be unrelated to
North Korea's nuclear-weapons program or part of a
calibrated North Korean strategy to raise regional
concerns over its intentions while still allowing
Pyongyang to retain strategic ambiguity over its
capabilities. North Korea has previously placed
long-range missiles in observable locations,
raising international alarm over an impending
launch, and subsequently removed them.
Kim
likely understands the irreversible consequences
of conducting a test. A test would remove the
strategic ambiguity that allows Beijing and Seoul
to avoid acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear
state. A test would also provide the George W Bush
administration the necessary justification to
bring the nuclear issue before the UN Security
Council. Although Beijing has publicly rejected US
"strong-arm tactics" toward North Korea, Chinese
officials have privately indicated growing
frustration and anger with North Korea and a
willingness to step aside following a nuclear test
if the US took the issue to the Security Council.
A test would likely derail any potential
diplomatic resolution to the nuclear impasse,
encouraging a range of more aggressive US
strategies. Although Pyongyang has exhibited
little interest in continuing negotiations, its
most recent official statements and informal
entreaties suggest it has not yet fully rejected
the six-way talks.
Several recent events
also make a near-term nuclear test less likely.
The resumption of inter-Korean talks provided
Pyongyang with 200,000 tons of critically needed
fertilizer, with promises of an additional 300,000
tons for attending a follow-on meeting later in
June. Although neither the inter-Korean talks nor
a New York meeting between US and North Korean
officials were successful in breaking the nuclear
impasse, they provide North Korea a buffer against
any Chinese or South Korean diplomatic pressure
absent provocative actions by Pyongyang. Kim is
also unlikely to initiate a nuclear test this
month ahead of the June 15 visit by South Korean
Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young and the
North-South Korean ministerial meeting scheduled
for June 21-24 in Seoul.
Bruce
Klingner is the Korea analyst for Eurasia
Group, an independent research and consulting firm
that provides global political risk analysis. His
areas of expertise are strategic national
security, political and military affairs in Korea,
China and Japan. He can be reached at
klingner@eurasiagroup.net
(Copyright 2005
Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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