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At odds over
Pyongyang
By Bruce Klingner
The dichotomy between the positions of the
United States and South Korea in their perceptions
following the recent summit of presidents Roh
Moo-hyun and George W Bush is so broad that Seoul
and the populace may well feel betrayed once it
becomes apparent that the US has not altered its
intention to increase pressure on Pyongyang over
its nuclear program.
Such a realization
will aggravate already tense relations and further
impair Washington's ability to achieve policy
consensus on bringing Pyongyang back to the
six-party negotiations.
And South Korean
pre-summit efforts to redress contentious
bilateral issues were insufficient to bridge the
philosophical chasm that continues to separate
Seoul and Washington.
Veneer of
harmony
Although both countries were eager
to portray the solidarity of their alliance,
neither president was willing to compromise on
their diametrically opposed convictions regarding
the nature of the North Korean regime and the most
viable policy to alter its behavior. As a result,
each president will continue to pursue his own
policy, self-assured in its righteousness but
risking misfortune due to an unwillingness or
inability to accommodate the other.
At the
summit, the presidents stressed their common goal
of a denuclearized North Korea while downplaying
their vastly different approaches, as well as
several other bilateral issues that have caused US
anger and suspicion toward its ally. Roh
downplayed reports of major rifts in the alliance,
characterizing them instead as merely "one or two
minor issues [which] I don't think will become a
major problem".
Foreign Minister Ban
Ki-moon dismissed questions as to whether
potential escalatory steps were discussed, stating
that such discussion would not be "helping to
create a favorable atmosphere for a resumption of
six-party talks". Kim Sook, director general for
US affairs at the Foreign Ministry, stated that
the two sides did not discuss any plans such as
referring the nuclear issue to the UN Security
Council once diplomacy failed. The Foreign
Ministry even sought to prevent future perceptions
of a disparity of views by urging North Korea to
ignore any hardline US comments that were at odds
with Bush's views expressed at the summit.
From the US viewpoint, however, immutable
issues such as Roh's proposed "balancing role" for
South Korea, Seoul's initial rejection of US
requests for a Concept of Operations Plan (Conplan
5029), and criticism of Washington's "strategic
flexibility" policy are not so easily laid to
rest. The two presidents relegated the issues to
be discussed by "working-level officials".
Divergent perceptions
US media
reporting was generally dismissive of the
presidential summit statements as bromides
designed merely to reduce short-term tensions
between the two allies and were not reflective of
a change in Washington's policy objectives. US
perceptions of "papering over differences" were
common.
Conversely, South Korean media
were universally praiseworthy in their coverage of
the summit, characterizing it as having attained
US agreement to Roh's advocacy of diplomacy and
putting sanctions against North Korea in abeyance.
The press acclaimed the summit as a success that
had "calmed fears that there is friction" in the
alliance or that there were differences in
approach to North Korea. Even the opposition Grand
National Party, which usually never passes up an
opportunity to criticize Roh, was laudatory, with
party chairwoman Park Geun-hye telling Roh that
the summit had eased her concerns over the state
of the alliance.
The South Korean
government and media clearly assimilated the
portion of the US message pledging to seek a
diplomatic resolution, but were dismissive or in
denial of the remainder of Washington's intent of
the eventual need to resort to "other measures"
once, not if, negotiations failed. As a result,
Seoul will continue to pursue its engagement
policy, having declared that the summit achieved
"breathing room" for continued diplomatic
overtures, apparently unaware that the US is not
fully on board with the South Korean approach. The
summit meeting did not delineate a deadline for
moving beyond diplomacy, nor articulate a common
strategy for escalatory measures.
Next
steps
North Korean Vice Foreign Minister
Kim Gye-gwan's announcement on the eve of the
US-South Korean summit that Pyongyang was building
more nuclear weapons undercut Roh's efforts by
dispelling international euphoria generated
earlier by indications that Pyongyang might return
to negotiations. That said, Seoul has shown an
inexhaustible ability to absorb North Korean
affronts as it pursues its engagement policy.
Seoul will attempt to press Pyongyang on
the nuclear issue during the June 21-24
inter-Korean Ministerial meetings, but is unlikely
to achieve anything other than agreeing to provide
an additional largesse of 300,000 tons of
fertilizer. Seoul has recently dangled an
unspecified "important proposal" to entice North
Korea, but only after Pyongyang returns to
multilateral negotiations.
Assistant
Secretary of State Chris Hill acknowledged before
a congressional committee on Wednesday that it
would be difficult for the US to impose economic
or political sanctions on North Korea without
South Korean and Chinese support. As such, the
summit may have served to postpone the rumored
June deadline for Washington to begin stronger
actions against Pyongyang.
The onus
remains on Pyongyang to respond, despite neither
Washington nor Seoul having proffered any new
incentives. Bush made clear during the summit that
Washington was unwilling to move beyond its June
2004 proposal that would provide assurances only
in return for North Korea first beginning to
resume compliance with its international
obligations. Pyongyang rejected that US proposal
and continues to demand additional concessions
from Washington.
In the absence of
movement by either the US or North Korea, the
six-party talks will continue to have only a
remote potential for resolving the current
impasse. The lack of contingency planning at the
summit and Ban Ki-moon's assertion that such
discussions could occur only when all "relevant
nations agree that diplomatic efforts have been
completely exhausted" portend contentious
bilateral discussions in the future.
Bruce Klingner is the Korea
analyst for Eurasia Group, the world's largest
political risk consultancy firm. His areas of
expertise are national security, political and
military affairs in Korea, China and Japan. He can
be reached at klingner@eurasiagroup.net
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