Pyongyang, forcing it to discard its nuclear programs. Rather than offering the DPRK anything of substance in return for what was termed complete, verifiable, irreversible, dismantlement (CVID) of its nuclear programs, Washington made vague offers of security guarantees and the provision of food and power. These ill-defined commitments would be available only after CVID was established.
The absence of diplomacy inherent to Washington's non-negotiable posture was furthered by the Bush administration's refusal to hold direct bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang. Bilateral negotiations would reduce or eliminate international pressure on the DPRK - pressure crucial to Washington's plan of diplomatically isolating Pyongyang. Naturally, Pyongyang balked at the Bush administration's obstinateness. The first two rounds of the six-party talks, held in August 2003 and February 2004, ended acrimoniously with Pyongyang and Washington hurling insults at one another.

In the third round of six-party talks, held in June 2004, Washington, under pressure from Moscow, Beijing and Seoul, unveiled a new proposal to Pyongyang. This proposal required the DPRK to completely disclose its plutonium producing and uranium enrichment capabilities as well as an inventory of all nuclear materials, weapons and production equipment. After verification of the disclosure, the destruction of all these items was to start within three months.

Pyongyang would begin to receive shipments of heavy fuel oil following its agreement to Washington's proposal. After verification of its nuclear disclosure, multilateral security assurances would be provided as would a study of the DPRK's energy needs. Discussions on normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang would also begin once the dismantlement of the DPRK's nuclear programs began.

Interestingly, the Bush administration's proposal offered nothing directly from the US except "discussions" on bilateral relations. Both fuel oil and security guarantees were to be provided by other countries involved in the six-party talks. The third round of six-party talks ended as acrimoniously as the prior two rounds with Pyongyang insisting that Washington provide incentives for CVID prior to the beginning of the process. The Bush administration retorted that it would offer no rewards to the DPRK prior to the beginning of CVID.

As in the first two rounds, Washington made little diplomatic effort in the third round of six-party talks. Rather than offering its new proposal as a starting point for negotiations, the Bush administration presented this proposal as a fait accompli for Pyongyang. Unsurprisingly, officials in the DPRK never formally responded to the US proposal. Following a 13-month hiatus, which included childish name-calling on the part of President George W Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Pyongyang was cajoled back to the six-party talks by the goodwill of government officials in Seoul.

Fourth round no different from before
The fourth round of six-party talks, which lasted for an unprecedented 13 days, promised to be a diplomatic departure from the prior three rounds for Washington. Former US ambassador to the ROK and current Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill was appointed as Washington's head envoy. In addition to more experience in Korean affairs than his predecessor, James Kelly, Hill was given exceedingly more leeway to engage DPRK officials and the media.

In a major concession to other countries involved in the talks, including the DPRK, Hill held numerous bilateral meetings with DPRK officials in what resembled bilateral negotiations. Hill also conducted nightly news conferences. Hill artfully used these news conferences to mold media coverage of the six-party talks, forcefully portraying the US as flexible and willing to go great lengths to produce results.

In contrast to the media image he created for Washington, Hill repeatedly suggested that inflexibility among the delegation from the DPRK was holding up a joint statement, the principal reason why talks extended for 13 days. During several news conferences Hill depicted the DPRK as being on one page and all other parties in the talks, including the US, being on another.

As the fourth round of six-party talks dragged on into early August, the prospect of a joint statement on principals for future negotiations, the key goal of the round, became increasingly remote. Such a statement was meant to provide a diplomatic framework for settling the Korean nuclear issue. When the fourth round adjourned on August 7 the gap between Washington and Pyongyang was as wide as ever.

Washington's isolation apparent
One issue that received much attention was the DPRK's demand to continue operating a civilian nuclear power program. Hill stressed ad nauseam in interviews that the US as well as the ROK, China, Russia and Japan were not willing to cede this demand because of Pyongyang's previous deceit over its civilian nuclear power program.

However, in the past three weeks Russia, China and the ROK have all endorsed Pyongyang's right to a civilian nuclear power program. Only the US and Japan remain unwilling to allow such a program to exist in the DPRK. Apart from the civilian nuclear power issue, there remains numerous obstacles to the resolution of the Korean nuclear issue. These obstacles make a diplomatic breakthrough extremely unlikely when the six-party talks resume, particularly since Washington is the isolated party rather than Pyongyang.

The DPRK's civilian nuclear power program is a minor issue compared to the other stumbling blocks to diplomatically solving the Korean nuclear issue. With proper safeguards and international monitoring, it would be extremely difficult for the DPRK to utilize militarily any aspect of a light water nuclear reactor system, the type of civilian power system Pyongyang is demanding. This is why Russia, China and the ROK are amenable to this demand.

The underlying issue in Washington is the Bush administration's desire to control what countries are, and are not, in the nuclear club. Like the DPRK, the Bush administration does not want Iran in the nuclear club. However, the opposite is true regarding India, which recently won the support of the Bush administration for its civilian nuclear power program. The bottom line appears to be that nuclear power is okay for democratic countries or those resembling democracies, like Pakistan, but not okay for countries with authoritarian governments such as Iran and the DPRK.

Distrust characterizes talks
Beltway logic dictates that authoritarian regimes are more likely proliferators than democratic governments, excepting Pakistan - once the world's most active proliferator of nuclear materials - of course. The Bush administration simply does not trust authoritarian regimes, and the DPRK is no exception. However, trust is essential to diplomacy in general and to resolution of the Korean nuclear issue specifically. Without trust there can be no negotiations as demonstrated during the fourth round of six-party talks.

The same is true in Pyongyang. Exceedingly justifiable distrust of Washington's intentions on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia drove the DPRK to develop nuclear weapons. Though officials in Washington have repeatedly stated that the US is not interested in promoting "regime change" in the DPRK, officials in Pyongyang don't buy it - witness Iraq.

Mutual distrust is an enormous stumbling block that has manifested in several ways, including in Pyongyang's demand that Washington eliminate its military threat to the DPRK, which ostensibly includes 30,000 US troops stationed in the ROK and another 50,000 in Japan. In addition, Pyongyang would like Washington to scale back its vast amount of military hardware from these countries, including nuclear weapons, and halt activities related to US plans for a regional nuclear umbrella. Officials in Washington have indicated that there is no possibility of negotiations on regional US military installations.

Several other significant issues stand in the way of a diplomatic breakthrough on the DPRK's nuclear programs. These include the timing of Pyongyang's nuclear dismantlement, the existence of a highly enriched uranium program, the DPRK's long-range missile program and human rights issues - a clever moniker for democratization.

The timing of economic and energy assistance, and security guarantees - rewards for Pyongyang in return for nuclear dismantlement - is another issue of mutual trust or distrust. Pyongyang wants its rewards up front while Washington insists that rewards will only come after the dismantlement process has begun. The issue of timing could be overcome by simultaneity of action by the US and the DPRK, an idea supported by the ROK, Russia and China.

The Bush administration believes that in addition to a plutonium-based nuclear weapons program that the DPRK also has a highly enriched uranium weapons program. Pyongyang denies the existence of such a program. Neither Russia nor China believes such a program exists in the DPRK. In addition to its nuclear weapons program, the Bush administration is demanding that Pyongyang scrap its formidable long-range missile program. Without at least a partial reduction of US military capabilities in the ROK and Japan, Pyongyang is unlikely to scrap its missile program.

Finally, Washington would like to see a vast improvement in human rights in the DPRK. Such an improvement is unlikely under the current regime. Improved human rights is a thinly disguised push for regime change, which is how both the ROK and the DPRK view Washington's push for improved human rights. The ROK does not want regime change in the DPRK as such a change implies a flood of refugees into the ROK and economic disaster.

Like the ROK, both Russia and China border the DPRK and are strongly resistant to regime change in Pyongyang. Neither country wants US military forces any closer and both countries would like to see US military capabilities in the region dramatically scaled back. Both Moscow and Beijing presumably support Pyongyang's long-range missile program, having helped create it. Washington's growing diplomatic isolation in the six-party talks makes it very unlikely that the talks will succeed in their goal of forcing the DPRK to dismantle its civilian and military nuclear programs. This may be what Washington wants.

Washington wants nuclear test
Rather than isolating the DPRK, Washington's still heavy-handed approach to the six-party talks has isolated the US. In fact, it seems that only Tokyo supports Washington's efforts to isolate Pyongyang in the six-party talks. This support could also bolt depending on the outcome of Japan's Lower House elections scheduled for September 11.

The media manipulation inherent to the fourth round of six-party talks is strongly reminiscent of the Bush administration's pre-Iraq war media manipulation. By creating the appearance of inflexibility in Pyongyang, Washington can justify to the American public that stronger action against the DPRK must be taken.

Rather than a diplomatic push for reconciliation and mutual understanding, the Bush administration is using the six-party talks as a bully pulpit for foisting its non-negotiable position on the DPRK and the other participating countries. This effort has very little chance of success in vanquishing Pyongyang's nuclear programs, particularly since Washington's demands are not supported in Seoul, Moscow or Beijing.

Washington must be plainly aware that its approach to nuclear dismantlement in the DPRK has little hope for success. From this position it seems obvious that the Bush administration does not want to negotiate a settlement. Rather, it intends to use the six-party talks and the inevitable failure of these talks to rally American support for stronger action against the DPRK.

Stronger action against the DPRK, whether militarily or through UN censure, would almost certainly provoke Pyongyang to conduct a nuclear test in order to demonstrate its deterrent capability. The Bush administration may be purposefully pushing the DPRK to conduct a nuclear test to drum up international support for isolating Pyongyang - support that Washington sorely lacks. Unfortunately, escalation of the nuclear standoff between Washington and Pyongyang is likely. This escalation carries strong negative global economic implications.

Jephraim P Gundzik is president of Condor Advisers, Inc. Condor Advisers provides emerging markets investment risk analysis to individuals and institutions globally. Please visit www.condoradvisers.com for further information.

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