Some might say that North Korea's decision
to resurrect its stalled public food distribution
system (PDS) is a return to the good old days.
Others might say it is only a return to the old
days.
It is unclear whether the
isolationist state can successfully bring back the
once-popular food program. Still, it's a given
that all attempts to make the PDS work will be
undertaken as it is not just a matter of food, but
also of government control.
In recent days
officials across North Korea have been busy
preparing for re-implementation of the PDS, which
in fact never really died but rather mostly
slipped into disuse. In 1994-95, the PDS stopped
functioning in the countryside, and by 1996 it was
pretty
much the same story in the major cities. It was
not officially cancelled since ration coupons
continued to be issued. However, there was either
no food or only a fraction of the required
rations.
About 2000, the PDS was partially
re-started in major urban centers, but it never
delivered the full rations as it once had. In 2002
when the government introduced an economic reform
package, it was widely assumed that the PDS would
be cancelled, but still this did not happen. Over
the past two years there were reports that some
food was occasionally being distributed via the
PDS, usually in Pyongyang, but the amount was
small.
Now, reports suggest that the North
Korean authorities decided to re-introduce the
public distribution system. According to these
reports, from October private trade in grain will
be banned - as it was from 1958 until the
mid-1990s when the PDS collapsed under the
pressure of famine. It appears the entire system
will not be reintroduced, but at least its key
component - the distribution of cereals, the
staple food of North Koreans.
It will take
time to see whether North Korean authorities are
actually able to re-start the PDS. There are few
doubts that they are confident about their ability
to do so, though their confidence is not necessary
based on a realistic appraisal of the situation.
Still, it seems that a relatively good harvest and
constant influx of foreign aid indeed make this
plan realistic. North Korean merchants definitely
think that way: market prices went down with so
many vendors selling their stockpiled grain.
Let's assume that in the next few months
we indeed see the revival of the PDS, at least in
regard to the distribution of rice and other
cereals. What does it mean for North Korea's
future?
To start, the ordinary North
Korean is certain to be happy. The PDS, when it
works properly, can provide everybody with a
sufficient amount of calories. It is not clear how
much the grain will cost with the PDS, but it's
pretty certain the price will be well below the
current market prices. It seems that over the past
decade most people have learned how to get food
without the PDS. But for many just staying alive
requires enormous effort.
Many - perhaps
most - North Koreans see the decades prior to the
death of Kim Il-sung (father of current leader Kim
Jong-il) not as the time when political repression
reached heights with few parallels in world
history but rather a time of stability. The
average citizen's chances of disappearing in a
prison might have been higher than they are today
but his chances of starving to death were pretty
close to zero.
So for the average citizen,
the return of the PDS would mean a return of that
past stability, which they welcome. But what does
it mean in a longer run?
For nearly a
decade, South Korea's approach to the North has
been based on the so-called "Sunshine Policy" of
unilateral concessions and engagement. Within the
framework of this policy, Seoul provides the North
with large amounts of direct and indirect aid,
does not exercise much political pressure, avoids
confrontation whenever possible and tries not to
do anything to annoy Pyongyang's leaders.
To some extent, this policy is aimed at
preventing the collapse of the North, which would
likely lead to an immediate German-style
unification. Such a unification, once a
long-cherished dream of Seoul, is seen as a
nightmare: the South is afraid - probably, with
good reason - that absorption of destitute
northern provinces would bring great economic
hardships for South Koreans and might even wipe
out the fruits of its hard-won "economic miracle".
But in a long run, the major intended goal
of the "Sunshine Policy is to encourage Pyongyang
to start slowly reforming itself, presumably more
or less along the same lines as China or Vietnam.
It is assumed that such reforms would eventually
make North Korea more prosperous. The diminishing
gap between the two Koreas would make unification
less costly and less socially disruptive. The
feeling is the later unification occurs, the
better for South Korea.
Meantime, Seoul
argues that unilateral concessions and generous
aid will help North Korean leaders get over their
supposedly apparently "paranoiac" fear of reforms,
and they will start emulating China in a drive to
change the country.
However, the North
Korean leaders are not paranoiac. They are
perfectly normal and very rational. In all
probability, the top North Korean leadership does
not harbor many illusions about their economic
system. In that sense, they are reasonable people,
and they realize that the system does not work.
But they also realize that their situation
is very different from that of China. They have to
co-exist with politically free and economically
affluent South Korea where the per capita income
is at least 15 times higher than in the North.
This raises the question: if ordinary North
Koreans become aware about prosperity of their
brethren merely a few hundred miles away, why
would they follow the orders of a regime that has
produced so much suffering?
What will stop
the North Koreans from emulating the East Germans
if reforms destroy the network of police
surveillance and undermine the self-imposed
information blockade? And if the government is
overthrown, what will happen to its leaders and
top cadres? Unlike their colleagues in the former
USSR and Eastern Europe, they will stand few
chances to become successful capitalists - all
leading positions in the new economy are far more
likely to be taken by the people from the South.
The North Korean elite has nothing to gain and
everything to loose, and they understand this
perfectly well - perhaps far better than the Seoul
enthusiasts of "Sunshine Policy". They are riding
a tiger, and they probably know it.
Reforms are dangerous because they will
invite internal instability. If the ordinary
people will learn how desperate the country's
situation is, they will probably decide that by
getting rid of the current regime and unifying
with the South they will reach the current South
Korean prosperity in a matter of years. This is
unlikely to be a realistic expectation, but it is
bound to be a powerful motivator if things get out
of control.
In such a situation, what is
the best policy for the North Korean leaders? In a
nutshell, this is the continuation of the strategy
they and their predecessors have used for decades:
the aid-maximizing strategy that allowed them to
extract some resources from outside donors through
diplomatic efforts. Such aid made possible the
survival of an economic structure that otherwise
would be unviable. For a long time, the role of
the overseas donor belonged to the USSR and China,
then it was China and South Korea (and some
foreign aid agencies), and nowadays it seems that
this role has been enthusiastically assumed by
Seoul. The overseas aid is probably not sufficient
to kick-start economic development, but it is
sufficient to keep the economy afloat, prevent a
major famine and also allow for a reasonably
luxurious life for the country's few elite - the
few dozen families around Kim Jong-il.
If
reports of attempts to re-start the PDS are
correct, it seems the dreams of Pyongyang leaders
are coming true: the North will indeed return to
the old-style command economy, with distribution
of essential food going through an elaborate
government rationing system.
If the
government has enough food at its disposal, it can
resume its old responsibility for providing the
entire population with a minimum of calories,
sufficient for physical survival. This is likely
to increase domestic stability. However, this is
also likely to diminish the incentive for reforms.
This might even lead to crackdowns on the market
activity and other forms of the neo-capitalist
economy that have been instrumental in keeping
alive the population, or at least part of it, when
the government could not deliver the goods it was
supposed to deliver.
If there is enough
food to provide every adult with 500-700 grams of
grain ration, why should the government worry
about social and economic reforms that are certain
to be dangerous and might lead to its own
overthrow? It would be better to continue with the
old policy. There is a great temptation to
continue with the old system while milking the
outside world for aid. Of course, this means that
hoped-for "Vietnamization" of North Korean
society, the dream of the Seoul politicians, will
be postponed, and we'll see a partially restored
version of Stalinism, this time bankrolled by
Seoul's, not Moscow's coffers.
It is
difficult to believe that efforts to reverse the
tremendous social changes of the past decade would
be completely successful. However, for more than a
decade North Korea has seen the slow-motion slide
toward demise of government control over society
and economy, and now this slide is likely to be
halted or even reversed for a while. It seems that
the generous aid, delivered as a part of "Sunshine
Policy" programs has produced results that are
opposite to what its designers initially intended.
Of course, the situation cannot be frozen
forever, whatever the dreams and hopes of the
Pyongyang leaders are. Information about the
outside world is flowing into the country (and in
this regard the "Sunshine Policy" also plays an
important role). Low-level bureaucrats are losing
their zeal and are less and less likely to enforce
official regulations.
Still, we have a
paradox: the relatively generous aid was intended
to speed up the transformation of Pyongyang, but
it is actually slowing it down. For a while,
Pyongyang's leaders will try to use their
new-found stability, once again bankrolled by the
foreign donors, to freeze the situation. However,
this does not mean that the government will be
able to turn the clock back to Kim Il-sung's era,
even if it is what the key people in Pyongyang
probably want. To keep aid coming, they need to
develop contacts with the outside world, and these
contacts in a long run will bring changes - in the
very long run, perhaps. But who knows?
Dr Andrei Lankov is a lecturer
in the faculty of Asian Studies, China and Korea
Center, Australian National University. He
graduated from Leningrad State University with a
PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with
emphasis on Korea, and his thesis focused on
factionalism in the Yi Dynasty. He has published
books and articles on Korea and North Asia. He is
currently on leave, teaching at Kookmin
University, Seoul.
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