North Korea: When the talking ends
... By Bruce Klingner
The fourth round of six-party talks
represents a critical juncture for a diplomatic
resolution to the North Korean nuclear impasse. A
failure to achieve measurable progress would
embolden US hawks who argue Pyongyang is
negotiating merely to gain time for developing
additional nuclear weapons and to undermine US
plans for increasing pressure on North Korea.
Although the stalemate has been largely
blamed on Bush administration intransigence, the
single-most critical determinant to reaching an
agreement remains North Korean willingness to give
up its nuclear weapons programs.
The chief
US negotiator, Assistant Secretary of State
Christopher Hill, expressed public optimism that
an accord would be reached by October, but US
diplomats privately remain agnostic on whether
Pyongyang has made the strategic decision to
abandon its nuclear ambitions. Despite indications
of greater US and North
Korean flexibility, the
widely divergent positions of the participants and
the complexity of issues make a successful
comprehensive resolution improbable by yearend.
US flexibility reflects new
pragmatism Nonetheless, the Bush
administration appears to have overcome its
previous refusal to negotiate with Pyongyang due
to a realization that its North Korean policy had
failed and that a lingering Korean nuclear
stalemate is no longer politically advantageous.
Washington likely was driven to a reassessment of
its policy by a "perfect storm" comprising the
deteriorating Iraqi security situation, a looming
confrontation over Iran's nuclear program and,
more recently, growing public criticism and a
further overextension of military forces resulting
from Hurricane Katrina.
In addition,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has parlayed
her strong relationship with President George W
Bush into a greater control over foreign policy
than Colin Powell was able to exercise. She has
adopted a less ideologically driven approach than
was initially expected when she became secretary.
Though her self-described practical realism is
ultimately a diluted version of Powell's strategy,
Rice's approach enjoys a greater degree of
presidential support and protection. Similarly,
Hill has been given greater autonomy than his
predecessor and has been allowed to engage in
direct bilateral meetings with North Korean
counterparts.
There are, however, limits
to how far Rice and Hill can go in negotiations
before neo-conservatives led by Vice President
Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld begin to undermine their efforts.
Although the US will likely display greater
willingness to use all diplomatic tools available
during the six-party talks, it will not compromise
on key points such as North Korea's uranium-based
nuclear program and verification requirements. But
if real breakthroughs occur, the Bush
administration would attempt to protect its flanks
against conservative attacks by having South Korea
and China provide early benefits to North Korea
and defer any US concessions until after Pyongyang
had made significant progress on eliminating its
nuclear weapons programs.
Pakistan
assistance complicates the issue Still, a
resolution has been complicated by revelations
from Pakistan about earlier assistance provided to
North Korea. President General Pervez Musharraf
confirmed on August 26 that Pakistani nuclear
scientist A Q Khan had provided centrifuges and
uranium hexafluoride (UF-6) to North Korea for the
production of nuclear weapons.
Centrifuges
and UF-6 provide the means and material to enhance
raw uranium into feedstock for nuclear fuel or
weapons-grade material. Musharraf's disclosure
will bolster US assertions that North Korea is
pursuing a parallel uranium enrichment program and
reinforce Washington's resolve to secure an
admission of such activities from North Korea. The
US delegation presented undisclosed evidence of a
North Korean uranium weapons program during the
six-party talks to counter repeated denials by
Pyongyang and Hill affirmed that North Korea must
satisfactorily address US concerns as a condition
for resolving the nuclear impasse.
Painting itself into a
corner The Bush administration will also be
constrained by previous criticism of former
president Bill Clinton's policy toward North
Korea. The Agreed Framework was criticized by
conservatives as appeasement that naively allowed
Pyongyang to defer its nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) obligations and retain an estimated
one to two nuclear weapons. As a result, it will
be politically necessary for the Bush
administration to insist on verification
provisions that are more expansive and intrusive
than existed under the Agreed Framework, demands
that North Korea is unlikely to accept.
North Korean charm
offensive North Korea's recent activities
also leave little room for hope of a resolution.
Pyongyang used the first phase of the fourth round
primarily to sound out any potential changes to
the US position and determine support for
Washington's hardline policy. North Korean
delegations historically have had little
negotiating leeway at the table and are expected
to closely hew to their talking points.
Alterations to North Korean policy are usually
made only after lengthy deliberations in
Pyongyang.
During the negotiating recess,
North Korea attempted to undermine the US position
by blaming Washington for the stalemate and
portraying itself as the more reasonable
negotiating partner. Vice Foreign Minister Kim
Gye-kwan intimated a more flexible North Korean
negotiating position on two issues that had defied
resolution during the fourth round of six-party
talks.
Although he reiterated North Korean
denials that it possessed a uranium-based nuclear
weapons program, he opened the door to potential
inspections. He enigmatically pledged Pyongyang
would provide proof that it was not pursuing such
a program and was "fully prepared" to address any
future US evidence. Kim's remarks were reminiscent
of statements prior to Pyongyang's agreement to
allow inspections in the late 1990s of the
Kumchang-ni suspect nuclear site. Kim also
suggested that North Korea would agree to strict
international supervision of its peaceful nuclear
energy facilities.
Appeal to
Seoul North Korea also continued its quest
to further pull Seoul away from the US and Japan.
For example, Pyongyang used the August 15
Liberation Day celebrations to proselytize in
Seoul by emphasizing that the main impediment to
Korean reunification was the continued presence of
US military forces in Korea and joint exercises
with South Korean troops. North Korea reinforced
this point by blaming the annual Ulchi Focus Len
exercise for the delayed resumption of nuclear
negotiations. Pyongyang sought to undermine
support for Tokyo's demands for resolution of the
Japanese abductee issue by appealing to shared
Korean nationalist themes of their mutual struggle
against Japan's brutal colonial occupation and
wartime aggression.
Pyongyang's overtures
will undoubtedly gain traction with a South Korean
government desperate to show results from its
engagement policy. Unification Minister Chung
Dong-young, Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, and
President Roh Moo-hyun have all advocated North
Korea's right to civilian nuclear program under
the NPT, reversing Seoul's previous demand that
Pyongyang must give up all nuclear energy
initiatives in return for a proffered 2 million
kilowatts of electricity. Chung even publicly
highlighted that Seoul "thinks differently from
the US" on the issue, undercutting alliance
solidarity in the midst of negotiations.
Subsequent statements by China and Russia
expressing support for Pyongyang's position show
the extent to which the US has been isolated.
Rising cost of engagement The
South Korean National Assembly and public may
balk, however, once the costs of South Korea's
initiatives become widely known. Seoul's
electricity proposal was initially justified as a
cost-neutral initiative since it would utilize
funding originally earmarked for constructing the
US$4.5 billion light water reactors called for
under the Agreed Framework. Seoul's acquiescence
to the North's demand that it retain a peaceful
nuclear program could entail funding both
initiatives. The provision of 2 million kilowatts
could cost $1.65 billion to build the necessary
infrastructure as well as an additional $1.2
billion in annual operating costs, according to
Korea Electric Power Corporation estimates.
Unification Minister Chung told a Uri Party policy
committee meeting that it may be necessary to
devote 1% of South Korea's general budget for
inter-Korean cooperation.
Backing into
an agreement Participants in the six-party
talks could increase the potential for a
successful resolution by adopting a narrowly
defined agenda and deferring contentious issues.
Hill suggested during the recess that the US may
be amenable to postponing settlement of some
issues by relegating them to other negotiating
venues He stated that, while North Korea's human
rights record, previous abductions of Japanese
citizens and a formal peace treaty ending the
Korean War must all eventually be addressed, the
six-party talks might not be the appropriate
forum. He also implied a softer US stance toward
North Korean retention of a civilian nuclear
energy program, characterizing the issue as
neither a "major stumbling block" nor a
"showstopper" since it was a "theoretical,
downstream" issue.
The 'seventh
party' But such a strategy runs counter to
previously stated Bush administration positions
and would face fierce opposition from the
Republican-controlled US Congress that would play
a significant role after a six-party agreement was
reached. If the agreement were a formal treaty, it
would require the "advice and consent" of
two-thirds of the Senate. If the accord were a
presidential agreement, such as the 1994 Agreed
Framework, congressional support would still be
necessary to fund any US programs for North Korea.
Existing US law precludes the transfer of
any nuclear technology without congressional
approval, and the North Korea Human Rights Act of
2004 predicates any provision of "significant
increases" in US humanitarian assistance upon
"substantial improvements in transparency,
monitoring and access to vulnerable populations".
Congressional budgetary authority would also be
required for the provision of energy supplies,
such as heavy fuel oil included in the Agreed
Framework.
Implications of failed
talks Successfully achieving a diplomatic
resolution to the nuclear impasse will require a
fundamental shift in North Korean strategy, but
this is unlikely. Pyongyang would be loathe to
give up the strategic benefits that nuclear
weapons provide, namely regime survival,
deterrence against US military attacks, enhanced
prestige for the regime and negotiating leverage.
A collapse of the talks would lead Bush
administration hawks to call for increased
pressure against North Korea, including UN
resolutions, enhanced measures to prevent nuclear
proliferation, increased sanctions and blockade.
Strident US rhetoric would generate
regional concern and media speculation that
Washington and Pyongyang were on a slippery slope
to military confrontation similar to the 1994
nuclear crisis. Yet, the US would ultimately be
hampered by strong South Korean, Chinese and
Russian resistance, and all three countries have
vowed they will not allow the issue to be brought
to the UN Security Council.
Moreover, none
would agree to escalatory actions absent
provocative North Korean behavior, such as a
nuclear weapons test or proliferation of nuclear
materials. Washington would then be faced with a
choice of ratcheting up pressure with limited
international support, a policy that it would be
increasingly reluctant to pursue given competing
crises in Iraq, Iran and the southern United
States.
Bruce Klingner is the
Korea analyst for Eurasia Group, the world's
largest political risk consultancy firm. His areas
of expertise are national security, political and
military affairs in Korea, China and Japan. He can
be reached at klingner@eurasiagroup.net
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