Controlling North Korea and Iran By Jephraim P Gundzik
Shallow diplomacy inherent in nuclear negotiations orchestrated by the US
and the European Union presuppose the evil intentions of North Korea and Iran.
This presupposition implies that the US and EU must subjugate North Korea and
Iran in order to control nuclearization in these countries. The diplomatic
ineptitude fostering subjugation has accelerated Pyongyang's and Tehran's
nuclear programs. Unless Washington and Brussels recognize the sovereign rights
of North Korea and Iran, nuclearization in these countries will continue to
accelerate, greatly amplifying security risks in Asia and the
Middle East - risk that will increasingly weigh on global economic growth.
Negotiations with both North Korea and Iran are currently in limbo. North
Korea, despite last week signing a joint statement with other six-party
nations, is posturing over conditions for elimination of its nuclear programs.
Further talks are scheduled for November. Meantime, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA - the United Nations nuclear watchdog) on the weekend found
Iran in "non-compliance" with its obligations under the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which could lead to Iran being referred to the
United Nations Security Council.
The Bush administration's efforts to subjugate North Korea began in 2002 when
President Bush stated that Pyongyang was part of an infamous "axis of evil".
Though Washington appeared to engage Pyongyang in the ensuing six-party talks,
which began in August 2003, diplomacy was sorely lacking. With unwavering
demands on North Korea and inveterate name calling of the country's leader,
Washington tried to force Pyongyang into submission.
Rather than reversing nuclearization in North Korea, the six-party talks
accelerated Pyongyang's military nuclear program. In December 2002, North Korea
restarted operations at its nuclear facility in Yongbyon, 60 miles north of the
capital. Operations at this facility had been frozen and sealed by the IAEA
since 1994 under the Agreed Framework negotiated by the Clinton Administration.
In January 2003, Pyongyang withdrew from the NPT.
By June 2003, North Korean scientists had harvested an estimated 30 kilograms
of plutonium from 8,000 spent fuel rods used at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor.
Pyongyang also conducted numerous long- and short-range missile tests
concurrent with the restart of the Yongbyon reactor and the harvesting of spent
fuel rods. The most noteworthy of these tests occurred in October 2003 when
North Korea successfully fired engines for the Taepodong 2 intercontinental
ballistic missile, which is estimated to have a range of nearly 4,000 miles.
In February, Pyongyang announced that it had joined the plutonium extracted
from Yongbyon with its missiles, producing nuclear weapons. Experts now
estimate that North Korea has between six and 12 nuclear weapons. These weapons
were created in response to the Bush administration's failed attempt to
subjugate North Korea under the auspices of the six-party talks.
Fourth round hallow not heroic
The fourth round of six-party talks, which concluded on September 19, seemed to
depart from the previous three rounds in both substance and outcome. Washington
engaged Pyongyang during negotiations, producing an unprecedented joint
statement at the conclusion of the fourth round. Headlines around the world
heralded the joint statement as Pyongyang's agreement to abandon both its
civilian and military nuclear programs.
While the joint statement vaguely outlined what North Korea would receive in
return for denuclearization, it said nothing about the timing of
denuclearization efforts relative to rewards. It also failed to address the
issue of verification. Less than 24 hours after the joint statement was
released Pyongyang began to assert its sovereign right to a civilian nuclear
program demanding that light-water reactors be provided before denuclearization
begins. Within 48 hours North Korea's media described the six-party talks as an
effort by the US "to disarm and crush us to death with nuclear weapons".
The Bush administration responded by stating that light-water reactors for
North Korea were "out of the question" until nuclear dismantlement was
complete. Later, the US envoy to the six-party talks, Christopher Hill, stated
that the US wanted North Korea to fully disclose the details of its
uranium-enrichment program, of which Pyongyang denies the existence. These same
timing and verification issues prevented progress in earlier rounds of the
six-party talks. Ultimately they will unravel the next round of six-party
talks, if these talks are ever reconvened.
EU mirrors US in negotiations with Iran
The EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) have replicated Washington's diplomatic
ineptitude in its negotiations with Tehran over Iran' civilian nuclear program.
As with the six-party talks, negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran, over the
fate of Tehran's civilian nuclear program, have been an exceedingly drawn-out
process. These negotiations, which began in October 2003, cajoled Iran into
suspending uranium-conversion activity until a final agreement on Iran's
civilian nuclear program was reached.
The EU-3 has also embraced the Bush administration's view that Iran is using
its civilian nuclear program to conceal a military nuclear program intent upon
developing nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the EU-3 has come to believe that
Iran, like North Korea, is evil and must be subjugated. This subjugation
precludes Iran's sovereign right to civilian nuclear power.
In August, Tehran announced that it was restarting uranium conversion at its
nuclear facility in Isfahan in reaction to what it described as the EU's
failure to present an acceptable plan for Iran's future ability to develop
nuclear power. This plan, which was released by the EU in early September,
required complete cessation of all uranium-conversion activity and enrichment
research by Iran. In return, the EU would provide Iran with fuel for its
nuclear reactors. The EU plan subjugates Tehran to Brussels by forcing Iran to
rely on Europe for nuclear fuel.
The EU-3's immediate response to the restarting of uranium conversion in Iran
was to suspend negotiations with Tehran. In mid-September, the EU-3, threatened
Tehran with IAEA referral to the UN Security Council for possible economic
sanctions unless Iran again suspended uranium-conversion activity. The EU-3's
IAEA action, which is being orchestrated with the US, has foundered due to the
lack of support from other IAEA member countries, notably Russia and China, for
referring Iran to the UN Security Council.
Nonetheless, Iran has hardened its position. Tehran has suggested that it would
withdraw from the NPT and begin to enrich uranium, a process that can create
fuel for both nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons, should the EU-3 press the
IAEA for UN Security Council action.
Recognizing sovereignty
Rather than trying to subjugate them, the US and EU must recognize the
sovereign right of North Korea and Iran to civilian nuclear programs. In the
case of North Korea, Washington must give Pyongyang light-water reactors in
order to encourage nuclear disarmament. In the case of Iran, the EU and the US
must allow Tehran to master the nuclear fuel cycle in order to produce fuel for
its nuclear reactors.
Better inspection mechanisms by the IAEA could easily prevent military
application of civilian nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran. But rather
than reform the IAEA to improve its ability to control nuclearization, the US
and EU want to directly control nuclearization through subjugation - an
approach that is proving unworkable and is accelerating nuclearization.
The continued acceleration of nuclearization in North Korea and Iran is
inevitable unless the US and EU recognize the sovereignty of North Korea and
Iran. A nuclear test by North Korea and Iran's withdrawal from the NPT are
increasingly probable. These events will greatly amplify the security risk in
Asia and the Middle East. Higher security risk will fan higher global inflation
and slower global economic growth in the months and years ahead.
Jephraim P Gundzik is president of Condor Advisers, Inc. Condor Advisers
provides emerging markets investment risk analysis to individuals and
institutions globally. Please visit www.condoradvisers.com for further
information.
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