North Korea plays politics with
food aid By Jeffrey
Robertson
North Korean Deputy Foreign
Minister Choe Su-hon, in a veiled reference to the
US Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea,
recently accused the United States of politicizing
food aid. Yet, speaking with irony so thick it
could be sliced, he demonstrated North Korea's
complete mastery of food-aid politics. Choe,
who made the US accusation September 22 in a news
conference after his United Nations address,
confirmed that his government would ask all
humanitarian aid agencies to cease operations by
the end of this year. Instead, North Korea is
requesting developmental aid. He accused other
countries, especially the US, of attempting to
"politicize humanitarian assistance, linking it to
the human rights issue". He maintained
that
constituted interference in his country's affairs.
Washington denied it was mixing politics with
relief work.
Humanitarian aid
transactions, as with any interaction between two
players in the international environment, is a
game of power politics. The recipient in accepting
aid submits to the will of the donor. The donor in
turn imposes conditions upon the recipient. In
simple terms, accepting a donor's conditions could
be considered a form of punishment for a
government that has proven incapable of its most
basic task - to care and provide for its people in
times of emergency or prolonged adversity.
The United Nations effectively removes
politics from food aid by placing itself, an
intergovernmental body, between donor and
recipient. Donor states cannot place excessive
political conditions on humanitarian aid that will
effect a change in societal or political status
quo. In fact, the only conditions put in place by
the United Nations are designed to ensure that the
objectives of the specific project can be met. In
the case of the current World Food Program (WFP)
in North Korea, these conditions aim to ensure aid
is distributed to specific targets.
Since
1995 the WFP has been working to alleviate
widespread food shortages in North Korea. The
isolated communist state has notoriously difficult
agricultural conditions for a country with state
ideology of juche, or self-sufficiency. To
begin with, arable land is scarce, with more than
70% of the country being too mountainous for
crops. It suffers from difficult climatic
conditions including typhoons, flooding and
drought. This is exacerbated by poor agricultural
management, deforestation and a lack of
agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, machinery
and fuel.
In fact, floods in 1995 and
1996, followed by drought in 1997 and 2001, as
well as declining inputs of pesticides, fertilizer
and machinery are estimated to have caused up to
3.5 million deaths. Today, of a population of 22.5
million, it is estimated that 37% remain
malnourished.
Despite this, in what seems
like the ultimate irony, North Korea places strict
conditions on international aid agencies when they
seek to help its people. These conditions include
the screening of agency personnel - Korean
speakers or those with prior knowledge of Korea
are particularly disliked - restrictions on the
use of VHF mobile stations, VHF repeater towers
and handsets, and the prohibition of satellite
phone communication.
Conditions are also
placed on the monitoring of food distribution. In
late 2004 North Korea placed new constraints on
humanitarian aid workers, forcing the WFP to
reduce staff levels to 10 from 15 in 2005. Strict
limits are placed on normally routine visits to
distribution monitoring points, which must also be
arranged in advance. Further, 42 counties of 203
remain off-limits to all humanitarian agencies,
leaving humanitarian aid out of reach to about 15%
of the civilian population.
But with the
WFP having provided 3.6 million tons of food, at a
value of more than US$1.5 billion since 1995, does
the North really want the aid agencies gone
altogether?
A simplistic explanation to
the North's decision to show the WFP and its
associated partners the door has been trumpeted
across the international media. As reported by the
BBC, "China and South Korea provide huge food
shipments to North Korea without overseeing where
it ends up." Indeed, there are few conditions
placed on Chinese and South Korean aid to the
North. South Korea and China give generously and
ask for little in return. South Korea is scheduled
to deliver 500,000 tons of grain this year,
matching WFP commitments. Monitoring is virtually
non-existent once the grain is delivered.
In comparison, the WFP insists on the
monitoring of food distribution at all points.
From unloading to final distribution among the
targeted groups - orphanages, pregnant/nursing
women, nursery, kindergarten and primary school
children, children in hospitals as well as elderly
and low-income groups. In 2004, the WFP carried
out more than 4,800 inspections of the
distribution system - South Korea carried out 10.
It makes sense to North Korea to seek an
end to the irritating interference of the WFP.
Indeed, it would be much better if China and South
Korea were to redirect the substantial funding
they give to the WFP. In 2003, South Korea
provided 20% of food contributions to the WFP, in
2004 it supplied 27%. North Korea would definitely
prefer that 27% travel a more direct,
less-monitored, route.
But here would be
the North's biggest mistake. In totally removing
the WFP middle man, political interference from
South Korea or China would have substantially more
impact.
The North is more than aware that
China knows how to play politics with aid and/or
trade when it controls the monopoly. China
provides about 70-80% of North Korea's fuel
supplies. In early 2003 this supply was halted,
reportedly due to a pipeline error. This occurred
prior to the visit of a high-level Chinese
delegation to the North and the subsequent North
Korean agreement to attend the April 2003
trilateral talks with the United States and China.
However, nobody could ever accuse the
North of being either inept or naive in
international politics. The country would never
leave itself open to being overly reliant upon
Chinese and South Korean aid.
Here lies
the rationale behind the North's request for
humanitarian aid to be changed into developmental
aid. The North will not totally remove the United
Nations lifeline. Rather, it will just scale it
back enough to renegotiate the removal of a large
swathe of the unpalatable conditions that so annoy
the regime. After the opening salvo of
declarations that all humanitarian aid must cease,
a later and much quieter, back-down will allow the
continuation of certain programs under new,
more-lenient conditions. Other programs will be
reclassified as developmental aid, and follow a
similar path of renegotiation to more lenient
conditions.
And should South Korea or
China ever seek to place more onerous conditions
upon their generous supplies, the United Nations
will be more than welcomed back. Now, who is
playing food-aid politics?
Jeffrey
Robertson is a political affairs analyst
focusing on Northeast Asia, currently based in
Seoul.
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