BOOK
REVIEW East Asia's black
sheep North Korea: The
Politics of Regime Survival by Young
Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim (eds)
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
Despite rampant speculation of imminent
collapse, North Korea has muddled through economic
hardship and diplomatic pressures for 11 years
under Kim Jong-il. While there is little doubt
that North Korea's domestic politics and foreign relations
are
in a devastated condition, the longevity of Kim's
regime has proved many soothsayers wrong.
North Korea: The Politics of Regime
Survival contains commentaries by
internationally renowned scholars who specialize
in the study of the anachronistic Hermit Kingdom,
which never fails to befuddle. Impartially making
sense of a black sheep in a rapidly progressing
East Asia is no mean task, but this book ably
places North Korea's endurance game in the
regional framework.
Co-editor Young Whan Kihl's
introductory essay characterizes North Korea as a
"failing state" that is politically repressive and
economically reliant on humanitarian assistance to
overcome chronic starvation. The limited
"marketization" measures introduced by Kim with
hesitancy in 2002 create more losers than winners
and increase the possibility of greater social
unrest. Agricultural commodity price reform will
not improve efficiency because of North Korea's
small proportion of farm population. Inferior
export competitiveness places limits on
large-scale trade
expansion. The new
industrial policy is unbalanced, with excessive
spending on armaments and ammunition factories.
The special economic zones are plagued by
mismanagement, poor infrastructure, geographic
isolation and onerous rules.
Kim's power
is based on tight control of the Korean People's
Army (KPA) and songun-chongchi
(military-first) ideology. Having abolished the
office of president, he governs in the capacity of
chairman of the National Defense Commission.
Improvising on his father's ideology of
juche (self-reliance), Kim organizes the
citizens on a "revolutionary course" under the
guidance of the suryong (leader), who is
glorified as "brain of the body politic". (p 9)
His "mini-max" foreign-policy style is tough and
rarely deviates from pre-established strategic
plans such as forcing US troop withdrawal from
South Korea. His strong sense of national pride,
self-righteousness and distrust toward outsiders
are reflected in nuclear brinkmanship and the
unalloyed desire to reunify Korea on the North's
terms. In Kihl's perception, "the evolving balance
of power in the region will ultimately shape the
form of Korea's reunification." (p 27)
Alexandre Mansourov's essay posits an
ongoing structural transformation of North Korea
that is affecting the elite, bureaucracy and the
masses. Kim's succession in 1994 ushered in
"political neo-authoritarianism" that loosened the
Korean Workers Party's (KWP's) grip and replaced
it with military penetration of all civil affairs.
The KPA is "the general backbone of society" and
the principal veto player, with the conservative
state security apparatus purged and relegated to
nominal status. Kim is modeling himself after
General Park Chung-hee's military reign in South
Korea. The race for his successor mantle "has
already begun" among the third generation within
the Kim family clan along the lines of "estate
fights". (p 50) As regional rivalries heat up, the
suryong is maintaining an even balance at
the center between leaders hailing from the
Hamgyong (northern) provinces and those from the
Pyongan (southern) provinces.
Economy-wise, North Korea is going through
"neo-corporatism" that rewards traders, landlords,
apparatchiks and those with access to foreign
currency. The worst impacted are the elderly, the
disabled, women and children, budgetary employees,
hinterland dwellers, intellectuals and scientists.
The regime is also emphasizing "cultural
neo-traditionalism", authentic Korean values and
revival of religion in the countryside. Mansourov
feels Kim will not halt the process of change
"even if his absolute power is eroded", as long as
his dynastic rule is assured of continuation. (p
55)
Ilpyong Kim's essay interprets the
suryong's military-first politics
formalized in the 1998 constitutional amendment
that licensed the army to rule the party. The
collapse of communist parties worldwide in 1991
and the deteriorating North Korean economy led Kim
to advocate songun-chongchi. Another reason
is Kim's suspicions of senior KWP cadres of his
father's generation, who are less responsive to
his command than younger KPA officers. He knows
from history that Kim Il-sung took one decade of
KWP factional struggles to reach the summit. The
unified and loyal military is seen by the
suryong as a quicker conduit to power and
as a fixer of the moribund economy.
Kenneth Quinones' essay argues that North
Korea's nuclear program is less about economic
woes and more to do with security concerns.
Countering the US conventional and nuclear threat
to regime survival drives Pyongyang's atomic
ambitions. South Korea's admission in 2004 of
secret nuclear experiments intensifies Kim's
anxiety that they are being "conducted at the
instruction of the United States". (p 79) Folding
of the Soviet nuclear umbrella in 1991 and the
awesome display of US weapons technology in the
first Gulf War stunned Pyongyang and laid the
foundations for a "self-reliant" deterrence
capability. Kim does not believe that the US would
desist from invading if he unilaterally dismantled
his weapons of mass destruction. He is also not
confident that his generals will agree to total
disarmament. Quinones takes the long-term view
that North Korea must end songun-chongchi
and provide a safer environment for foreign
investors to avoid demise.
Larry Niksch
presents the evidence on North Korea's weapons of
mass destruction from sensory detection, Russian
intelligence documents and "confessions" of
Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Kim
directed North Korea's nuclear program since at
least the late 1980s, accelerating it after his
father's death. The project has managed to produce
metallic plutonium, but the amount is uncertain.
It has successfully tested triggering devices, but
a nebula pervades the crucial question of whether
North Korea has developed warhead-class bombs
capable of being mounted on ballistic missiles.
Kim's enriched-uranium adventure is
afforded by "cash payments that South Korea's
Hyundai Group made" between 1999 and 2002. (p 105)
North Korea's "real fear of US attack" is receding
as the US juggernaut gets bogged down in Iraq.
Niksch maintains that proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction to other governments or
terrorists is a bigger threat from cash-strapped
North Korea than a land invasion of the South.
Dick Nanto takes stock of North Korea's
dismal economic conditions. About 40% of the
population still suffers from malnutrition.
Underweight children, physically stunted youth and
factories running at about 30% of their capacity
are morbid signs. Scarce consumer necessities are
being used to reward regime loyalists classified
according to ideological orientation. The military
and bureaucratic elites who enjoy privileges far
above the reach of the average person "have a
strong vested interest in maintaining the current
economic system". (p 121) They are stifling the
first round of capitalistic enclaves. To pay for
imports, North Korea dabbles in illicit drugs,
weapons-trading and currency counterfeiting.
Ethnic Koreans living in Japan are boosting
Pyongyang's money-laundering operations.
Robert Scalapino's essay on US-North Korea
relations expresses doubts whether the North
Korean military is indeed divided on foreign
policy toward Washington. The broad thrust within
the KPA is of toughness, matching that of the
Pentagon. Kim's advisers regard a nuclear
deterrent as a necessary substitute to the
country's obsolescent and expensive conventional
arsenal. Talks over the nuclear program are
stalemated over the sequence of reciprocity, since
Pyongyang deciphers from readjustment of US forces
in South Korea that a preemptive strike may be in
the offing. Scalapino's projection for US-North
Korea ties is for "partial moves, subject to
retreats". (p 158)
Co-editor Hong Nack
Kim's article on Japan-North Korea relations goes
into Tokyo's objective of competing effectively
with China and Russia in the Korean Peninsula.
Preventing a "hard landing" of North Korea is
necessary for Japan also to stanch influxes of
refugees. Kim Jong-il needs Japanese economic aid
and goodwill that can be leveraged with the US.
Although prickly issues such as abduction of
Japanese nationals, reparations for colonial
wrongdoings, launch of missiles and spy ships keep
pegging back the Tokyo-Pyongyang saga, Kim's
nuclear program is the ultimate bone of
contention.
Japan has joined the US-led
Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict
shipments to and from North Korea, stepped up
customs and safety inspections of North Korean
cargoes, investigated finances of pro-Pyongyang
organizations and mulled economic sanctions on
Kim's regime. It has launched spy satellites to
monitor North Korean missile tests and plans to
deploy a costly anti-missile defense system by
2007. Despite Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's
reconciliatory intent, conservatives in Japan
disparage easy concessions to Pyongyang without
securing gains in nuclear dismantlement.
Samuel Kim's analysis of the "special
relationship" between China and North Korea lists
Beijing's goals as staving off collapse of the Kim
Jong-il regime, halting refugee inflows and
preventing the rise of ethno-nationalism among
Chinese-Koreans. China is "more committed to
maintaining stability than to nuclear
disarmament". (p 186) Aggressive US military
action on the peninsula worries China more than
North Korea's proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Beijing rejects the US claim that
Pyongyang has an enriched-uranium project. Every
year, in the face of US sanctions, China provides
more aid in a wider variety of forms to North
Korea, accounting for nearly 100% of the latter's
energy imports. However, there are limits to
China's embrace of Kim, as shown in 2001, when
president Jiang Zemin refused to acquiesce to an
anti-US declaration during a visit to Pyongyang.
Peggy Meyer's piece on Russia-North Korea
relations describes Moscow's overarching goal for
acceptance as an influential power on the Korean
Peninsula. President Vladimir Putin is also
promoting economic ventures such as electricity
transmission, natural-gas pipelines, port
renovation, and railroads linking Russia with both
Koreas. North Korean labor working to develop
Russia's Far East is another concern, along with
avoidance of nuclear radiation or refugees pouring
over the border.
Putin strongly condemns
Kim's nuclear gimmicks and lends his spooks to the
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for joint
monitoring efforts of Pyongyang's weapons of mass
destruction. He has tried to walk the middle
ground by disagreeing with the Bush
administration's "language of ultimatums and
strict demands". (p 213) Time and again, he
stresses the importance of giving Kim "security
guarantees" and "step by step" disarmament
options. Russia also refuses to put North Korea's
"civilian nuclear research" on the table at the
six-party talks. Since Beijing, Seoul and, to a
lesser extent, Tokyo also oppose Washington's
hardball negotiation tactics, Moscow has succeeded
in limiting spill-over damage to the US-Russia
equation.
Seongji Woo's essay on North and
South Korean relations portrays weapons of mass
destruction as "the safety valve for the North
Korean regime's survival". (p 225) President Roh
Moo-hyun's "peace and prosperity" policy with the
North is opening the door to a schism in alliance
politics with the US. With Washington and
Pyongyang at loggerheads, Seoul's wish for
inter-Korean reconciliation and integration is
"once again on hold". (p 231) Kim, on his part,
takes advantage of the ideological divisions
within the South by playing one side against the
other and attempts to widen the gap between
Washington and Seoul.
Seongji's view is
that the future of inter-Korean economic
cooperation hinges on success or failure of the
Gaesong industrial park initiative. The flow of
Southern investment into the North is also
contingent upon resolution of the nuclear
imbroglio. Seongji concurs with the rest of the
writers that "only by reforming its economy and
opening to the outside world can North Korea's
regime security be achieved". (p 238)
Kihl's second contribution is on the
"bi-multilateral approach" (2+4 formula) for
defusing the nuclear crisis. China is
interestingly an intermediary or third party by
virtue of hosting the six-party talks. Beijing is
allegedly employing strong-arm tactics toward
North Korea to improve its own relations with the
US. President George W Bush has rejected calls for
bilateral US-North Korea dealing "because it would
remove China, a powerful influence on its
communist neighbor". (p 256) Beijing has been
unusually critical of Kim's threats to withdraw
from the six-party talks last February, but the
other side of the coin is its reported
undercutting of Washington's strategy of sanctions
on North Korea. Kihl recommends that the US "must
go beyond treating Korea policy as an appendage to
larger causes in Asia such as rising China or
rearming Japan". (p 261) He also moots conversion
of the six-party talks into a regional security
forum for East Asia.
Nicholas Eberstadt's
final essay brings the lens back on the factors
that abet state survival in North Korea. Kim
Jong-il averted economic collapse in the late
1990s through a huge upsurge in merchandise
imports financed by illicit trading, South Korean,
Japanese, US and European Union aid injections.
"Appeasement-motivated" Western aid has been the
lifeline for Kim. North Korea's dysfunctional and
stagnant trade regimen, far from being irrational,
has "a deeply embedded regime logic". (p 284)
Economic exchanges with the "capitalist world" are
resisted by Kim because of his paranoia against
"ideological and cultural infiltration". Terming
aid-seeking a highly tenuous mode of state
finance, Eberstadt calls for a more secure path
such as Chinese or Vietnamese outward-oriented
growth in North Korea. Reallocation of resources
from the hypertrophied military to civilian
sectors is necessary to harvest productivity in
Kim's tin-pot empire.
How the "Dear
Leader" can juggle the antinomies brought out in
this book and yet remain in the saddle is the big
question. East Asia will rest easier when the
answer is found.
North Korea: The
Politics of Regime Survival by Young Whan Kihl
and Hong Nack Kim (eds). M E Sharpe, New York,
2006. ISBN: 0-7656-1638-6. Price US$78.95, 322
pages.
(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for
information on sales, syndication and republishing
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expansion. The new
industrial policy is unbalanced, with excessive
spending on armaments and ammunition factories.
The special economic zones are plagued by
mismanagement, poor infrastructure, geographic
isolation and onerous rules. 
