NORTH KOREA'S DANGEROUS
GAME There's method in the missile
madness
By Bruce Klingner
North Korea appears to be in the final stages of preparations for the test of
an intercontinental ballistic missile, although Pyongyang could still stop
short of an actual launch. Media leaks of increasingly detailed intelligence
information and warnings by senior US, South Korean and Japanese government
officials since mid-June have indicated far greater concern than previous false
warnings of missile and nuclear test preparations.
Washington and Tokyo are expected to respond firmly to a launch but will be
constrained in available options. South Korea will likely postpone short-term
economic benefits to Pyongyang but retain
its engagement policy.
Intelligence leaks indicate
increasing activity at the Musudan-ri launch
facility, including conflicting reports of fueling
operations.
The loading of
highly corrosive liquid fuel, which is difficult to remove, is perceived as an
irreversible last step prior to a missile launch. North Korean official media
alerted the populace for a significant announcement this past Sunday, but the
time passed without event.
Pyongyang has denied it will conduct a missile test, but official media
emphasized over the weekend how the 1998 launch of a Taepodong I had
"powerfully" demonstrated North Korean military might and the "wise guidance"
of leader Kim Jong-il.
Pyongyang has also augmented its propaganda offensives against South Korea and
the United States in the past week, threatening military action against naval
intrusions and aerial reconnaissance, respectively. Although the tone is
consistent with previous rhetoric, a North Korean decision to shadow allied
military ships or planes raises the potential for miscalculation and
inadvertent tactical confrontation.
A
missile launch appears more likely than initial
indications earlier this month and could occur
this week after dissipation of severe weather in
the area. North Korea could, however, still decide
not to launch, having determined it has
accomplished its political objectives of regaining
international attention to increase its bargaining
leverage. Pyongyang would be unlikely to initiate
additional escalatory steps except in response to US action.
Aware of Washington's recent overture to Iran, Kim Jong-il may believe that
provocative actions will induce the US to offer better negotiating terms to
North Korea. Regardless of whether a test occurs, Pyongyang has accomplished
its objective of regaining international attention.
The test preparation has compelled the participants in the six-party talks to address
the North Korean nuclear issue, which has languished since the joint statement
last September. The activity at the Musudan-ri launch facility - whether
preparatory to a launch or not - and more forceful North Korean diplomatic
tactics in the past month are likely part of an effort to wrest additional
concessions from South Korea and gain advantage in the six-party talks, whose
participants are the two Koreas, Japan, China, Russia and the US.
Pyongyang may be heightening concerns over its missile capabilities to
resurrect the potential for a deal with the US by highlighting the viability of
North Korean sales of long-range missiles. Last year Kim told Chung Dong-young,
who was then the South's minister of unification, "We are willing to forgo
missile options if we form diplomatic ties and alliance with the United
States."
North Korea's September 1, 1999, unilateral missile moratorium was followed
several days later by a US pledge to remove some economic sanctions. The two
countries were discussing a larger potential deal in 2000 when time ran out on
the administration of US president Bill Clinton. North Korea had demanded
annual recompense of US$1 billion to forgo missile exports.
But North Korea will be careful not to overplay its hand. The current US
administration would see a launch of a Taepodong 2 missile as vindication of
its hardline policy and press Beijing and Seoul for stronger measures against
Pyongyang. Washington has already reduced Pyongyang's legal and illicit
economic transactions by targeting North Korean firms and foreign banks, but
could seek to freeze Kim's personal assets in overseas accounts.
Although the US will increase reconnaissance activity and may deploy additional
military assets to the region, a military response is off the table. Washington
could use increased fears of missile proliferation to press China and South
Korea to join the Proliferation Security Initiative.
Japan would respond to a missile over-flight by imposing additional economic
restrictions on North Korea. The Japanese parliament has approved legislation
that gives the cabinet unilateral authority to levy economic measures against
North Korea. The North Korean Human Rights Act will provide additional means
for Tokyo to impose sanctions, including for lack of progress in resolving the
abductee issue.
Tokyo will likely take its cue from Washington as to which economic
restrictions to impose. These measures could include prohibiting North Korean
ships from entering Japanese ports or blocking economic remittances from
Japanese citizens to North Korea; at an extreme, there could be interdiction of
North Korean ships to prevent any bilateral trade.
Kim Jong-il likely understands the irreversible consequences of conducting a
test. Although less inflammatory than a nuclear test, a missile launch would
undermine Pyongyang's strategy of blaming the US for the impasse in the nuclear
negotiations. More important, a launch would endanger South Korean President
Roh Moo-hyun's ability to continue Seoul's engagement policy, which has been a
major source of economic assistance to the North.
The North recently obtained South Korean agreement for $80 million in new aid
and stands to gain additional benefits if it agrees to a summit with Roh.
Although Seoul would play down a missile launch, as it did North Korea's
February 2005 admission of possessing nuclear weapons, recent polls show a
growing demand by the Southern populace for reciprocal concessions from
Pyongyang.
A launch would also provide additional leverage for the US to gain Chinese
agreement to increasing pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear-weapons
programs. Although Pyongyang has exhibited little interest in continuing
negotiations, its recent invitation for US assistant secretary of state Chris
Hill to travel to Pyongyang suggests it has not yet fully rejected the
six-party talks.
Seoul has risked its relationship with Washington by providing North Korea with
significant economic benefits with few accompanying preconditions. Roh is
increasingly desperate for tangible signs of success for his engagement policy,
but his flexibility to offer inducements has been curtailed by Pyongyang's
abrupt cancellation of plans for resuming inter-Korean rail links and
heavy-handed demands for redrawing the maritime border.
Roh's engagement strategy even faces growing criticism from the ruling party,
which is distancing itself from the beleaguered president after disastrous
local elections on May 31. A missile launch would cause the National Assembly
to reduce funding for inter-Korean initiatives during upcoming budget
deliberations.
Seoul would feel forced to curtail additional shipments of food and fertilizer
during the next few months, postpone discussion of additional programs and
cancel former president Kim Dae-jung's scheduled visit next Tuesday to
Pyongyang. The Roh administration would, however, not cease its involvement in
the Gaesong industrial zone in North Korea.
In the long run, Seoul will continue to push the United States to moderate its
hardline policy toward North Korea and will serve as an intermediary with
Pyongyang. A missile launch would roil already jittery South Korean markets
but, in the absence of subsequent escalatory action by North Korea or the US,
this would likely be of short duration.
Bruce Klingner is the Korea analyst for Eurasia Group, the world's
largest political-risk consultancy. The views expressed herein are his own. His
areas of expertise are national security, political, military and economic
affairs in Korea, China and Japan. He can be reached at klingner@eurasiagroup.net.
The loading of
highly corrosive liquid fuel, which is difficult to remove, is perceived as an
irreversible last step prior to a missile launch. North Korean official media
alerted the populace for a significant announcement this past Sunday, but the
time passed without event.
