TOKYO - Will they or
won't they? That seems to be the big question
dominating the news. Will the North Koreans launch
a Taepodong 2 missile, either as an ICBM
(intercontinental ballistic missile) test or in an
attempt to launch a satellite (as they claimed
during their last launch in 1998)?
No one
knows. And trying to predict Pyongyang's behavior
is a fool's task. But I, for one, hope they do
conduct a test, for a number of reasons.
Before explaining, it is worth pointing
out an unpleasant fact that most critics seem to
be ignoring: North Korea, like the US or
China, or even Kazakhstan
(which launched its first communications satellite
this month with little or no fanfare) has a right
to conduct missile tests or satellite launches.
There are certain international protocols that
should be followed - notice to mariners, airspace
closures, prior notifications, etc - but a missile
launch per se is not an illegal or necessarily a
hostile act.
Keep in mind also that North
Korea's current moratorium is self-imposed; it was
initiated in 1999 and was to run as long as
missile talks between Washington and Pyongyang
continued - which they have not.
True, in
the 2002 "Pyongyang Declaration" signed by
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and
North Korean "Dear Leader" Kim Jong-il, both men
pledged they "would not commit conducts
threatening the security of the other side" and
"confirmed the necessity of resolving security
problems including nuclear and missile issues by
promoting dialogues among countries concerned".
This hardly sounds like a binding
agreement and, again, little dialogue is currently
taking place (although both Washington and Tokyo
have expressed willingness to enter into bilateral
talks with Pyongyang, within the context of the
six-party talks - it is only North Korea that
refuses to come back to the talks).
For
what it is worth, while it does reaffirm the 2002
Pyongyang Declaration, there is really absolutely
nothing in the September 2005 six-party-talks
joint statement regarding missile tests.
Nonetheless, US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice has claimed that a missile test puts that
agreement in jeopardy since the moratorium "is
clearly a part of the framework agreement that was
signed in September of this past year between the
six parties".
Having said all that, there
is no question that a missile launch, even if
designed to put a satellite in orbit, would be
seen as saber-rattling at a particularly sensitive
time, and at least three members of the six-way
talks - the US, Japan and South Korea - have
firmly stated that a test would be a threat to
regional stability and undermine the spirit of
cooperation embodied in the September 2005 joint
statement, and would thus have "severe
consequences".
On Tuesday, China also told
North Korea to refrain from testing the missile,
telling it there were "a lot of concerns", said
China's ambassador to the United Nations, Wang
Guangya.
So if a test, while legal, would
be so provocative, why am I for it? Primarily
because it would, perhaps for the first time in
several years, bring Washington, Tokyo and Seoul
back into agreement on dealing more firmly with
North Korea.
It has already compelled
Seoul to cancel the planned trip of former
president Kim Dae-jung to North Korea, a trip that
would only have added to the illusion of (false)
progress in North-South relations, where little is
being accomplished beyond increased handouts and
non-reciprocated gestures.
One presumes
that even Beijing may also finally see the wisdom
in taking a harder line against Pyongyang in the
wake of a missile launch, something Washington has
been requesting for months (if not years), to no
avail.
Until and unless Beijing and Seoul
are prepared to join Washington and Tokyo in
taking a firm stance against Pyongyang's
foot-dragging and saber-rattling, there is little
incentive for North Korea to change its behavior.
(Apologies to Moscow; Russian support is also
useful, but not nearly as critical.)
Finally, there is the question (at least
in this author's mind) as to whether or not
Pyongyang is even capable of successfully firing a
multi-stage missile. Recall that the 1998 test
failed. A missile launch would be a windfall to
the US intelligence community, which continues
only to guess at the Taepodong's capabilities.
Even if no missile is fired, a "test" is
already being conducted. The presence (if reports
are true) of an ICBM on a launch pad in a country
with a declared nuclear (and presumed chemical and
biological) weapons capability and a declared
hostile policy toward the US and Japan constitutes
a test of the US doctrine of preemption, which
calls for US military forces to respond if an
attack by a weapon of mass destruction appears
imminent.
I am neither predicting nor
advocating a preemptive attack - such an action
would be counterproductive - but merely noting
that, unlike in Iraq, Washington's criterion is
being met in this instance, something Pyongyang
likely factored into its actions.
While
the Bush administration has not directly
threatened a preemptive strike, it has indicated
that its missile defense system has been activated
and is on alert for what could be its first
real-life test; if one questions North Korea's
ability to launch a missile, questions equally
abound about America's ability to shoot one down.
So to Pyongyang I say, "Fire away." Who
knows, it may actually give the other members of
the six-party talks the backbone required (and
currently conspicuously absent) finally to get
tough with Pyongyang and move the stalled
denuclearization process forward.
Ralph A Cossa
(pacforum@hawaii.rr.com) is president of the
Pacific Forum CSIS.
