N Korea's missile tests send message
to Iran By Ehsan Ahrari
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il defied the
US and fired as many as 10 missiles, including at
least one long-range Taepodong-2, on July 4, the
United States' Independence Day. Even though the
longer-range missile launch was a failure, the
symbolism of those developments was not lost on
anyone.
Since Iran and North Korea are
watching each other's behavior, especially in
terms of dealing with the United States, the best
lesson for Iran is to avoid emulating North Korea
by defying the US.
The Taepodong-2, which
is North Korea's most advanced missile, was
reported to have flown for about 40 seconds before
crashing into the Sea of Japan, or East Sea as
Koreans prefer to call that
body
of water. Estimates vary wildly as to the
missile's projected range, but it was believed to
be potentially able to reach the western
extremities of the United States.
The
other missiles, between six and nine according to
reports, were shorter-range rockets, and they fell
into the Sea of Japan. One of those was a Scud
type (short-range, which could be used to target
South Korea during a military conflict), and one
or two were Rodong, with a range of 1,000
kilometers, which could be used to target Japan.
The countries most disconcerted by the missile
launches are the US and Japan, though for
different reasons.
The US is upset because
North Korea has violated the moratorium on missile
tests it imposed on itself in 2002. Since the
conflict over nuclear-weapons development between
that hermit nation and the lone superpower has not
yet been resolved, the firing of ballistic and
Scud missiles further complicates the diplomatic
front.
Much has been made of the
supposition that the Taepodong-2 missile was
capable of reaching parts of the US. However,
given the extremely wide asymmetry between the
power quotient of the US and North Korea, the
firing of those missiles posed no threat
whatsoever. In fact, the Pentagon made a point of
saying just that.
Japan is upset for
security reasons. Tokyo has been encouraged by the
administration of US President George W Bush to
become more like a "normal" country in the realm
of military preparedness and to engage its forces
in US-led conflicts such as that in Iraq. So North
Korea's firing of missiles is likely to strengthen
the arguments of the hardliners in Japan who are
already pushing for that "normalcy".
As
expected, there was a flurry of diplomatic
activity from the US, Japan and South Korea. The
brunt of this activity is to create international
pressure to force North Korea to return to the
negotiating table on the nuclear issue and for it
to renew its moratorium on missile tests.
There are some murmurings in Washington
that, since Beijing has been attempting to calm
tensions between Washington and Pyongyang, the
firing of these missiles might have embarrassed
the Chinese. However, that suggestion is based on
the faulty premise that China really wishes to see
that conflict resolved.
Given the
complicated state of affairs between Washington
and Beijing, it is hard for anyone to draw even a
reasonably certain conclusion that the latter
takes its role as a mediator in the US-North Korea
conflict seriously. In fact, a persuasive argument
can be made that China can be as serious or as
disingenuous about resolving this conflict as the
United States has been about issues that are of
equal significance to China (Taiwan, for
instance). So it is possible that China would like
to see the conflict between its neighbor and the
US resolved, but it is not exactly on top of
China's global strategic priorities.
What
lessons should Iran draw from North Korea's
decision to defy the United States, Japan and
South Korea by going ahead with the missile tests?
There are, to be sure, several similarities
between the Korea conflict and the one involving
Iran and the US.
First, both involve
nuclear technology, even though Pyongyang says it
already possesses nuclear weapons, while Iran
insists it does not have nuclear weapons or,
indeed, any intention of developing them.
Second, both governments are wary of
becoming victims of Bush's declared doctrine of
regime change. But here again, there is an
important distinction between North Korea and
Iran. In the case of Pyongyang, the Bush
administration insists that it has no intention of
taking military action; however, regarding Iran,
it repeats the same mantra regularly: "All options
are on the table."
Third, both countries
have opted to resolve their respective conflicts
through the use of multilateral forums, even
though both prefer to deal directly with the US to
extract ironclad security guarantees and gain
access to cutting-edge technologies that their
respective economies sorely need.
However,
there is one major difference that Iran has to
keep in mind. Unlike the general understanding
that North Korea possesses four to 10 atomic
bombs, Iran does not own any nuclear weapons. More
to the point, its nuclear know-how has not yet
reached the state where there could be ample
uncertainties that it might already possess such
weapons.
Iran has to understand how
significant such uncertainties were in maintaining
the "balance of terror" between the United States
and the Soviet Union, and how important the same
type of uncertainty is playing in deterring the US
from taking military action against North Korea.
On the contrary, US intelligence is quite
confident that Iran has not yet developed nuclear
weapons. That very reality is enabling the Bush
administration to maintain the swagger in its
iteration, "all options are on the table".
Under these circumstances, Iran's best bet
is to keep insisting that it wants to deal
directly with the US. It can also - and it has
every right to - be adamant that it must have
ironclad security guarantees in a multilateral
context, with the European Union, China and Russia
being the signatories, along with the US, to any
guarantee.
Iran may also persist in
demanding that it should be allowed to continue a
small research program on uranium enrichment with
ample transparency. In fact, there are reports
that the Bush administration might be amenable to
such a suggestion under proper guarantees.
However, Iran's best bet is not to ignore
Washington and continue with its
uranium-enrichment program. Pushing the Bush
administration into a corner is an option that
Iran cannot afford to exercise.
Ehsan Ahrari is the CEO of
Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria, Virginia-based
defense consultancy. He can be reached at
eahrari@cox.net or stratparadigms@yahoo.com. His
columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online. His
website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
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