North Korea deserves applause: it has
helped to accomplish in 10 days what US officials
had failed to accomplish in almost four years of
diplomacy: a unanimous United Nations Security
Council resolution that not only condemns its
missile launches this month and demands that
Pyongyang "suspend all activities related to its
ballistic missile programs", but that also
deplores North Korea's nuclear-weapons
aspirations.
Much has been made in media
coverage of UNSC 1695 about the fact that it does
not cite Chapter VII of the UN Charter (which
makes measures enforceable by armed action, if
necessary).
But this was no watered-down
resolution. If one compares the initial "hardline"
Japanese draft with the considerably toned-down
initial Chinese/Russian
proposal for a "presidential statement", the final
product is no middle-ground compromise; it is
surprisingly tough and comprehensive.
While we may never know the details of the
Chinese diplomatic mission to North Korea that
preceded the resolution's passage, one could
safely guess that Pyongyang was as defiant and
disagreeable in private as it has been in public
about its sovereign right to conduct "military
exercises for self-defense".
The 15
Security Council members clearly thought
otherwise. In addition to demanding an end to all
ballistic-missile activities, the resolution
"requires" all member states to prevent
missile-related goods and technology from being
transferred to North Korea and also "requires" all
member states to "prevent the procurement" of such
goods from that country, while banning the
"transfer of any financial resources in relation
to DPRK's [North Korea's] missile or WMD [weapons
of mass destruction] program".
While the
terms "embargo" or "sanctions" are not used, the
intent is crystal-clear: no sales of missiles or
missile-related technology to North Korea and no
purchases of such weapons from them as well.
While the missile launches provided the
catalyst for Resolution 1695, its reach is more
comprehensive. It specifically addresses North
Korea's nuclear-weapons ambitions, "deploring ...
its stated pursuit of nuclear weapons in spite of
its Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
[NPT] and International Atomic Energy Agency
[IAEA] safeguard obligations". It also reaffirms
the May 2004 UNSC Resolution 1540, which obligates
all member states, under Chapter VII, to prevent
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and associated delivery systems.
The
resolution also expresses the Security Council's
"grave concern about DPRK's indication of possible
additional launches" and "underlines, in
particular to the DPRK, the need to show restraint
and refrain from any action that would aggravate
tension". For its part, Pyongyang "strongly
denounces and fully condemns the UNSC resolution",
calling the action "completely unreasonable and
brigandish behavior". An official Foreign Ministry
statement says North Korea "will not be bound to
[UNSC 1695] in the least".
It remains to
be seen whether Pyongyang will make good on its
threat to conduct more tests or if this surprising
display of unity and resolve by the Security
Council will have a sobering effect on the Hermit
Kingdom. For its part, the resolution notes that
the council "decides to remain seized of the
matter", suggesting that even stronger action
could be forthcoming in the face of future acts of
provocation by North Korea.
For the moment
at least, the Security Council appears willing to
take a firm, unified stand on a serious
proliferation issue, sending a message not only to
Pyongyang but perhaps to Tehran as well.
The resolution also calls for the
resumption of the six-party talks on the North
Korean nuclear issue and "strongly urges"
Pyongyang to return to the talks "without
preconditions". There has been talk in diplomatic
circles about the convening of an "informal"
session of the talks to address the latest crisis,
with the understanding that North Korea's much
sought-after direct discussions with the United
States could take place along the sidelines of
such a meeting.
If China and the other
members of the six-party process, South Korea,
Japan, Russia and the US as well as North Korea,
are serious about using this incident to
kick-start the broader denuclearization process,
then Beijing should set a date for an informal
six-party session and the others should commit to
coming, regardless of whether Pyongyang agrees to
attend. It would then be up to North Korea to
decide whether it wants to participate in the
solution or simply remain the problem.
Ralph A Cossa
(pacforum@hawaii.rr.com) is president of the
Pacific Forum CSIS.
