SPEAKING
FREELY South Korea must choose
sides By Corey Richardson
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
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Rumors of
a substantial drawdown or complete withdrawal of US
Forces Korea (USFK) have been around for decades.
After years of a South Korean administration
generally hostile to US regional
objectives and priorities,
perhaps the rumors are finally becoming a reality.
That would be a tragedy for both sides.
If
the US were to leave Korea, how would US influence
in the region be altered? How would Korea's
relationships with China and Japan change? What
about the strengthening US-Japan alliance? What if
North Korea collapsed? These questions have
largely escaped critical consideration in the
current debate.
Despite President Roh
Moo-hyun's stunning obliviousness to political and
security realities, South Korea would be
particularly vulnerable without USFK, or even with
a token force left in place. For its part, the US
cannot realistically expect to maintain or improve
its ability to exert regional influence by leaving
Korea.
Like US Forces Japan (USFJ),
America's Korean contingent helps prevent conflict
by acting as a strong deterrent for any nation
that might consider military actions or threats,
at the same time moderating the responses of the
host nation in tense situations.
Obviously, the original purpose of the
US-South Korea alliance was to counter the North
Korean threat. However, as that threat has waned,
a more important, diplomatically incorrect mission
has evolved in addition to deterring North Korea:
ensuring stability among China, Japan and
Korea.
The North Korean threat is
nonetheless the reason for the majority of South
Korea's defenses, even if Seoul won't say so in
defense white papers. No conventional military
calculus suggests the possibility of a North
Korean victory in a second Korean War, but a
weaker South Korean military could cause Pyongyang
to miscalculate. South Korea's defenses must
remain strong.
Regional tensions, but
stability Even with USFK in Korea, issues
from the region's long and often confrontational
history cause tensions to flare.
Chinese claims that Koguryo, an ancient
ethnically Korean kingdom whose territories extended
into present-day China, was in fact a Chinese kingdom
have raised Korean hackles on several occasions.
The move is viewed as the possible groundwork for
justifying a Chinese invasion of the northern half
of the peninsula, perhaps to "help" a North Korea
on the verge of implosion, or after collapse.
China's plans to register Mount Baekdu
(Changbai in Chinese) as a Chinese historical
site with the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
World Geopark list was also viewed as a possible
prelude to claiming North Korean territory. The
mountain, sacred to both sides, straddles the
border. A 1962 agreement between the two countries
split ownership of the mountain.
This view
is bolstered by the fact that China prefers to
retain border buffer zones and would not relish
having a reunified Korea, potentially with US
forces just across the Yalu River. South Korea
could not prevent China from sending troops into
North Korea, and the US likely would not risk war
with China over North Korea.
Japan's colonial
domination of Korea from 1910 to 1945 has
left a deep and bitter resentment in both Koreas
that is apt to provoke emotional and drastic
responses.
One high-profile manifestation
of this is the decades-long dispute over the
ownership of some relatively insignificant islets
in the waters between the peninsula and the
archipelago, the Liancourt Rocks. Known as Dokdo
in Korea and Takeshima in Japan, South Korea has
stationed a Coast Guard contingent on the island
since 1954 to enforce its claim. Both nations
claim the area as a part of their exclusive
economic zones (EEZs).
In 2005 South Korea
scrambled fighters to intercept a civilian
Japanese Cessna aircraft nearing Dokdo airspace.
When Japan announced plans to conduct a
hydrographic survey of the area, South Korea made
vague threats alluding to possible military action
against the research vessels. Japan backed down.
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi's numerous visits to the Yasukuni Shrine,
dedicated to Japan's war dead including some
convicted war criminals, have raised diplomatic
tensions with both South Korea and China on
several occasions, including a temporary recall of
South Korea's ambassador in Japan.
Ripe
for an arms race South Korea wants to be
the "hub" of something in East Asia, and it may
finally have its chance, thanks to the Roh
administration.
The current US-South Korea
situation is a case of "be careful of what you ask
for because you might get it". Even so, the
psychological impact on South Korea of a
significant USFK departure likely would not be
immediate but should not be underestimated. A
massive reduction of US troop levels and
capabilities could have the same effect as a
complete withdrawal on Seoul's planning processes.
It might begin with regretful concern, but could
quickly become panic.
At this point it
should be noted that even if the USFK withdraws
from Korea, some sort of collaborative security
agreement will remain in place. However, South
Korea's perception of America's commitment to
security on the peninsula is the decisive factor
in how it will react to real and perceived
threats. What are now relatively minor
disagreements with Japan and China would take on a
more serious dimension.
Without USFK, South
Korea would need to vastly increase its defense
budget to make up for functions long taken
for granted. With American forces on its soil as a
safety net, South Korea didn't have to be overly
concerned with being attacked or invaded. Many
Koreans would perceive that era over.
Another factor is the closer US-Japan
security partnership, which causes both China and
South Korea concern. Some in the South Korean
defense sector are undoubtedly jealous of the
relationship Japan enjoys with the US.
Japan would also need to take into
consideration a South Korea without the moderating
influence of USFK, although the role of USFJ in
Japan would reduce much concern.
In such
an environment it's not unthinkable that a few
minor skirmishes could occur, between South Korean
and Japanese navel vessels in the vicinity of
Dokdo, for example. This would be the slow start
of a regional arms race, with Korea and Japan
joining China's ongoing buildup.
A
reunified Korea could go nuclear North
Korea is the wildcard. If in the next few years
reunification were to occur - through a North
Korean collapse, the death of Kim Jong-il, or a
possible but unlikely mutual agreement - South
Korea would suddenly find itself straddled with
the enormous cost of integrating North Korea.
These costs would dwarf the already
massive increase South Korea would have been
undertaking in defense spending, something it
would clearly be unprepared and unable to
accomplish while maintaining its defense
investment.
A Korea faced with an economic
dilemma of such magnitude would find maintaining
its conventional military forces at current levels
impossible. At the same time, it would feel more
vulnerable than ever, even with US security
assurances.
For a nation paranoid about
the possibility of outside influence or military
intervention, strapped for cash, and obsessed
about its position in the international hierarchy,
the obvious route might be to either incorporate
North Korean nuclear devices (if they actually
exist), or build their own, something South Korean
technicians could easily accomplish. North Korea,
after all, has set the example for economically
challenged nations looking for the ultimate in
deterrence.
One might argue that clear and
firm US security guarantees for a reunified Korea
would be able to dissuade any government from
choosing the nuclear option. If making decisions
based purely on logic the answer would be probably
yes.
Unfortunately, the recent Korean
leadership has established a record of being
motivated more by emotional and nationalistic
factors than logical or realistic ones. Antics
over Dokdo and the Yasukuni Shrine and alienating
the US serve as examples. But the continuation of
the "Sunshine Policy" tops those.
Instead of admitting they've been sold a dead horse,
the Roh administration continued riding the
rotting and bloated beast known as the Sunshine
Policy, until all that are left today are a pile of bones, a
bit of dried skin, and a few tufts of dirty hair.
Roh, however, is still in the saddle, if not as
firmly after North Korea's recent missile tests.
Japan must then consider its options in
countering an openly nuclear, reunified Korea
without USFK. Already building momentum to change
its constitution to clarify its military, it's not
inconceivable that Japan would ultimately consider
going nuclear to deter Korea. As in South Korea,
there is no technological barrier preventing Japan
from building nuclear weapons.
While the
details of the race and escalation of tensions can
vary in any number of ways and are not inevitable,
that an arms race would occur is probable. Only
the perception of threat and vulnerability need be
present for this to occur.
East Asia could
become a nuclear powder keg ready to explode over
something as childish as the Dokdo/Takeshima
dispute between Korea and Japan, a Diaoyu/Senkakus
dispute between China and Japan, or the Koguryo
dispute between Korea and China.
The
arms race need not occur One could argue
that the US would be able to step in and moderate
things before such an escalation could occur.
Considering the recent US record on influencing
either North or South Korea, it is perhaps unwise
to count on it being able to do so at some crucial
point in the future.
One could also argue
that the US need not be involved in a future East
Asian war. Like assuming there is no need for USFK
since North Korea is considered less of a threat
to Seoul, that is wishful thinking. The US has too
many political and diplomatic ties, aside from
alliance obligations, to ignore such a war.
For American policymakers, the notion
that a withdrawal is a deserved payback for the
rampant anti-Americanism in South Korea, or that
the few billion we spend on defense there is a
catastrophic waste, need to be discarded. The
potential cost of a war would be far greater in
both American lives and in dollars, the benefits
of continued peace immeasurable.
Vastly
reducing or withdrawing USFK can only harm US
security, it cannot help it. USFK has helped
maintain peace and allowed the US to project
influence in the region for the past six decades;
removing that presence would be foolish and
difficult to replicate once done. It is also
important to keep in mind that the next
presidential election will likely result in a less
anti-American administration.
South
Korean policymakers and citizens alike need to come to
terms with the fact that Korea will probably never
be a powerful nation, but because of its location
it will always be important in the geopolitical
sense. Because of this, Korea can never take the
middle ground or play a "balancing" role; Korea
must choose sides.
Finally, the
reality that both American and South Korean policymakers
need to come to terms with is that USFK deterring
a second North Korean invasion has become a
secondary mission to maintaining regional
stability, even in a reunified Korea.
Corey Richardson is a
Washington-based analyst who covered East Asian
security issues as a presidential management
fellow with the US Department of Defense, and is a
co-founder of The Korea Liberator
(korealiberator.org), a weblog focused on North
Korea. The opinions expressed are his own. He can
be reached atrichardson@korealiberator.org.
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Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
