COMMENT Talk to Pyongyang,
not at it By Ian Williams
Knowing North Korea's penchant for
symbolism, one cannot help wondering whether the
timing of its apparent nuclear test was meant to
rain on Ban Ki-moon's party as the United Nations
secretary general-designate. As it was, the
business of selecting a South Korean as the
world's secular pope was rushed through with
almost unseemly brusqueness by the UN Security
Council so it could discuss Kim Jong-il's
diversion.
The General Assembly will
probably confirm Ban's appointment, predictably
with no dissent, on Friday. It is probably too
late now
for
his Sunshine Policy of engagement with North Korea
to be held against him.
But it has been
noticed that John Bolton, the US ambassador to the
UN, expressed complete and almost proprietary
satisfaction with Ban's appointment. It is almost
reassuring to note that the US envoy's soulmates
in the conservative Heritage Foundation had
expressed doubts about Ban's suitability, citing
Seoul's reluctance "to confront North Korea on
human rights or its belligerence and nuclear
ambitions" and alleging that "Ban has said little
about UN reform, and there are questions about his
commitment to it. The current government in South
Korea campaigned in 2004 with strong anti-United
States rhetoric." [1]
Even so, the
Security Council agreed a unanimous statement
condemning North Korea's action, and even more
predictably showed signs of deadlock as the
various parties put forward their widely differing
tactics for resolving the issue.
Last
week, Bolton had said the UN was not the "alpha
and omega" of such disputes. As one of the
cartographers of the "axis of evil" that lumped
Iraq, Iran and North Korea together, he should
know. It is indeed axiomatic that virtually no one
is happy about Pyongyang's test, but it is
entirely legal, and one of the reasons for that is
the United States' and Bolton's diehard fight
against improving the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) regime.
North Korea finally
opted out of the NPT in 2002, which it was
perfectly entitled to do, but would not have been
if the treaty had been strengthened, as most
delegates wanted. Bolton, who does not believe in
international treaties that bind the US, or for
that matter Israel, frustrated any attempts to
strengthen the NPT regime. The administration of
US President George W Bush has been trying for
years to inch toward renewed nuclear testing,
regardless of the NPT agreement to reduce and run
down existing nuclear-weapons stocks.
Nonetheless, for once - perhaps it is the
stopped-clock syndrome - Bush is entirely correct.
Although there are more than a few degrees of
hypocrisy involved in existing and new nuclear
powers who have never signed the NPT, the entire
world community, committed as most nations are to
the non-proliferation regime, is upset at Monday's
explosion.
And as the International Court
ruled over Libyan sanctions, Security Council
decisions override any existing international law,
so in the unlikely event of a strong resolution
emerging, North Korea is in deep trouble.
The comrades in Pyongyang are certainly
not the most cosmopolitan types, so one could
almost forgive them for misreading signals. Israel
has 200-plus nuclear warheads, and gets billions
of dollars of free money, with the diplomatic
equivalent of a Monopoly game "get out of jail
free" card. Pakistan gets lots of support, even as
its prime nuclear scientist is proved to have been
disseminating bomb kits in the Muslim world. India
explodes a bomb, and Washington subsequently
rewards it with an offer of civilian nuclear
technology. What conclusion is Kim supposed to
reach from this?
For once, Bolton's
unilateralist supporters who traditionally argue
that the UN should not put obstacles in the way of
US diplomacy are right, at least in the cases of
North Korea and Iran. This is not really the UN's
business. Both regimes are trying to get the US to
talk to them, and the UN, the six-party talks and
similar devices are simply fig leaves to cover up
the United States' refusal to engage in diplomacy.
It cannot bring itself to say publicly that it has
no intention of making war on them.
One
could admire the principles, if they were
consistently applied. However, welcoming President
Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan as a visiting
anti-terrorist hero, while maintaining relations
with Uzbekistan, suggests that there is more than
a little wiggle room in the Bush administration's
principles.
Former US ambassador to China
James Lilly has a constructive suggestion that
would appease the arcane sensibilities on both
sides. He suggests that Washington should send an
envoy to Pyongyang to persuade them to restart the
six-party talks.
I can cap it with my own
modest proposal. Washington should send Oliver
North of Contra-scandal fame to Iran and North
Korea, with or without a Bible and key-shaped
cake, and talk seriously to them about matters of
mutual interest, such as making sure that weapons
go to US-licensed freedom fighters. The Israelis
can provide airlift and service agreements as they
did for Irangate, and that will hush any objectors
in the US Congress.
If this seems a little
far-fetched, one has to consider the alternatives.
Perhaps the only thing worse than an overtly
nuclear North Korea is the consequences of letting
the Bush administration provoke Pyongyang with a
naval blockade or other attacks on sovereignty.
It is in everyone's interest to let the
North Korean regime have a soft landing rather
than take actions to confirm its paranoia. In any
contest between the approach of Bush and Vice
President Dick Cheney and the Ban-China approach,
the latter wins hands down.
