Kim Jong-il's mollifying remarks to a
visiting Chinese envoy create the misimpression
that North Korea has reversed its policy and
stepped back from a confrontation over its
nuclear-weapons program. Pyongyang's diplomatic
outreach will undermine US efforts to secure
Chinese, Russian and South Korean agreement to
implement United Nations Resolution 1718
forcefully. North Korea may temporarily defer
additional escalatory actions to allow its message
to take hold, although possible preparations for a
second nuclear test have
already been observed.
Pyongyang's
conflicting messages regarding a second nuclear
test over the past few days reflect classic
North Korean negotiating tactics to gain leverage
over the United States. Kim told Chinese State
Councilor Tang Jiaxuan on Friday that North Korea
had no plans for conducting additional nuclear
tests. Other North Korean officials, however, have
threatened a test.
Li Gun, deputy head of
the North Korean delegation to the six-party talks
on Pyongyang's nuclear program that also involved
China, Japan, the US, Russia and South Korea,
commented that a second test "shouldn't be a
surprise", while North Korean generals told
Chinese counterparts that Pyongyang had planned a
"series of nuclear events". US, South Korean and
Japanese officials announced that satellite
imagery revealed activity at three underground
facilities similar to that observed prior to the
first nuclear test.
Kim is offering to
return to the six-party talks, stalled for more
than a year, but on conditions that are well known
to be unacceptable to the US. He may presume that
the nuclear test provided him additional leverage
and the US will be forced to acquiesce.
Alternatively, he hopes, with Chinese assistance,
to make the US appear to be the unreasonable
party. Kim's pledge that North Korea was willing
to return to the talks was predicated on
Pyongyang's long-standing precondition that the US
must first remove economic sanctions. As such, it
does not reflect a change in the North Korean
position nor presage an immediate resumption of
nuclear negotiations.
Kim's message is
intended to deflect attention and criticism to the
US administration's hardline policy. He will thus
feel rewarded for his escalatory behavior,
increasing the potential for additional steps in
the future if he concludes that he has not
attained his objectives, especially a removal or
dilution of economic sanctions. He may,
however, postpone additional provocations and hold
a second nuclear test in abeyance to determine the
effectiveness of his strategy. The US will not be
deterred from its policy of isolating and
pressuring North Korea, nor will it lift the
sanctions as a precondition to resuming six-party
talks. Moreover, US officials have emphasized that
even an unconditional North Korean return to the
nuclear negotiations would not induce Washington
to remove the sanctions, since they are a
law-enforcement rather than a diplomatic issue.
Pyongyang's two-track strategy will
complicate US attempts to gain Chinese, Russian
and South Korean support for abiding by
restrictions against North Korea's WMD (weapons of
mass destruction) programs contained in Resolution
1718.
North Korea's seeming reasonableness
will encourage Beijing and Seoul to resist tough
enforcement of the trade sanctions, let alone US
demands for additional sanctions beyond those
mandated by the UN. The US will be unable to
persuade South Korea to engage in any meaningful
punishment against the North.
South Korea
will reluctantly adopt stronger diplomatic and
economic measures. But it will also likely
implement only the minimum response necessary to
placate the US and satisfy domestic groups. While
Seoul will publicly declare that its engagement
policy is contingent on Pyongyang returning to
nuclear negotiations, the administration of
President Roh Moo-hyun will continue to see it as
the most viable option to prevent a crisis.
Seoul has rebuffed US requests to cancel
the Gaesong development zone and Kumgangsan
tourist project and distanced itself from initial
pledges to increase involvement in the
Proliferation Security Initiative. Domestic
approval for South Korea's policy of providing
asymmetric benefits to Pyongyang will decline, but
that does not mean there will be increased support
for US efforts to isolate and pressure North
Korea. Any belief that Washington is instigating a
military confrontation risks the renewal of
anti-American action.
China has taken
steps to punish North Korea for its provocative
behavior, including reducing bank transactions,
restricting border crossings and constructing
fences along their common border. But Beijing will
continue to resist US efforts to radically
increase pressure on North Korea.
The
strong but narrowly focused UN resolution against
North Korean WMD programs postpones an immediate
confrontation with Pyongyang, but does not resolve
the nuclear impasse. Although a more tenuous and
tense status quo has been established, both the US
and North Korea will continue their brinkmanship
tactics. North Korea's deteriorating economy will
pressure Kim to undertake additional escalatory
steps, including a potential second nuclear test.
The US would respond by demanding even more
punitive follow-on UN resolutions.
Although Resolution 1718 will do little to
constrain North Korea's WMD programs, the ban on
missile exports eliminates another critical source
of revenue for the beleaguered regime. North
Korea's nuclear program is predominantly
indigenous and has already developed a working,
albeit flawed, nuclear weapon. Pyongyang can
continually acquire plutonium for additional
weapons from its existing Yongbyon reactor.
Although North Korean missile sales have declined
in recent years, eliminating exports will further
challenge Pyongyang's ability to reverse the
declining viability of its economy. US-led
restrictions against illicit North Korean
activities, such as counterfeiting and
money-laundering, have already significantly
reduced the willingness of foreign banks and
companies to engage with Pyongyang on even
legitimate business transactions.
North
Korea's options are dwindling and its inability to
achieve its diplomatic objectives will force it
eventually to engage in more high-risk
confrontational measures, even as it appeals for
negotiations with the US. Kim will be emboldened
by perceptions that Washington does not have a
military option, because of the proximity of Seoul
to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the deteriorating
Iraqi security situation and the potential
face-off with Iran.
The US administration
will continue to eschew the six-party talks,
seeing its ability to gain approval of the UN
resolution as vindicating its policy to isolate
and pressure North Korea. Washington assesses that
Pyongyang won't risk a confrontation that could
lead to regime collapse. In such a situation of an
irresistible force meeting an immovable object
with neither willing to yield, there is the danger
of miscalculating the other side's intentions and
responses.
Kim's range of potential
escalatory actions include: additional nuclear and
missile tests; resumed construction of two larger
nuclear reactors to provide additional
weapons-grade plutonium; provocative actions along
the DMZ or maritime demarcation line; shadowing or
intercepting US reconnaissance aircraft;
initiating division or corps-level military
exercises outside of normal training cycles; and
announcing wartime preparations by the military
and populace.
Pyongyang may conduct such
actions in conjunction with diplomatic entreaties
to gain Chinese and South Korean support,
including promises to return to the six-party
talks, expand bilateral business ventures, and
implement new economic reforms. Least likely would
be acquiescence to US demands to return to the
nuclear negotiations without Washington lifting
its current economic restrictions. Pyongyang would
prepare the populace for such a policy reversal by
first altering its propaganda message to portray
the shift as a victory.
Bruce
Klingner is the Korea analyst for Eurasia
Group, the world's largest political-risk
consultancy. He can be reached at
klingner@eurasiagroup.net.
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