Page 2 of 2 Pyongyang shuffles its
military, not policies By Yoel Sano
Kwang (O's successor as defense
minister) and Ri Ul-sol (the commander of the
General Security Bureau), with relatively younger
figures such as Jo Myong-rok and Kim Yong-chun.
However, as the revolutionary generation
passed away from old age or retired, Kim Jong-il
consolidated his control over the military using
its General Political Department - a body
monitoring the behavior of all KPA personnel,
especially senior officers. The
department is headed by Jo
Myong-rok, but he has two powerful deputies, Hyon
Chol-hae (in charge of administration) and Pak
Jae-kyong (in charge of propaganda) who balance
each other.
Meanwhile, Vice Marshal Kim
Il-chol, who has served as defense minister since
1998, has balanced both Jo and Kim Yong-chun. The
latter arrangement also maintains a balance among
the navy, air force and ground forces, in which
these officers serve, respectively. Furthermore,
Kim Jong-il can bypass the chief of the General
Staff entirely by issuing orders to its director
of operations, General Ri Myong-su, another figure
who is often at Kim Jong-il's side.
Kim
Jong-il also keeps a close eye on senior officers
through a variety of channels, most notably
through the General Security Bureau and the
Security Command. In the event of a coup attempt
by one of the army corps, he can rely on these two
security agencies and Pyongyang Defense Command.
Thus these competing structures make it very
difficult for a coup to come to fruition.
As if to make the message clear, the
General Security Bureau and Pyongyang Defense
Command staged a major military exercise in the
capital on January 12, apparently aimed at
simulating a move against a potential coup. The
exercise was extremely rare, underscoring the
increasing importance with which the regime views
security.
Generation shift won't mean
softer line With the majority of North
Korea's top generals now in their late 60s, 70s
and even 80s, a generational shift in command is
inevitable. Indeed, Kim Jong-il reportedly
reshuffled army corps commanders in 2003, bringing
in younger officers. Furthermore, of the 586
generals he has promoted in rank since taking
power in 1994, 436 were colonels being promoted to
major-general. In other words, he is bringing new
blood into the KPA.
This means that for
the first time, the military will be led by
officers who have no combat experience. Jo
Myong-rok and Kim Il-chol may be among the last
senior figures to have fought in the Korean War
(1950-53).
In theory, this should mean
that bitter war memories and anti-US and
anti-South Korean sentiment should fade, allowing
for improved relations. However, in practice, this
will not necessarily be the case. The younger
generals have undergone the same indoctrination as
their predecessors and will also feel the need to
demonstrate their hardline credentials. Indeed,
the younger officers, having barely any
recollection of a world without the Kim regime,
may be even more nationalistic than the older
generation.
Consequently, the military is
likely to pressure Kim Jong-il not to take North
Korea down the road of nuclear disarmament - not
that Kim needs too much persuasion anyway. Both
Kim Jong-il and the military know full well that
nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent to a
possible invasion or bombing campaign by the US.
Although North Korea has more than 10,000
artillery pieces, as well as chemical and
biological weapons, and missiles that could be
used to attack South Korea or Japan in the event
of a US attack, the nuclear card raises the stakes
considerably. Indeed, after North Korea's nuclear
test last October 9, reports emerged in the South
that this had been conducted as a result of
military pressure.
Thus Pyongyang is
likely to keep stalling in its implementation of
the February 13, 2007, denuclearization agreement.
It is also questionable whether Kim
Jong-il and the military really want a substantial
reduction in tensions with the US, South Korea and
Japan. An official peace treaty - which Pyongyang
has demanded to replace the existing 1953
armistice - would lead civilian authorities in
North Korea to demand more resources for the
civilian economy (at present, defense spending
accounts for about 16% of the national budget).
True peace would mean that the KPA would
lose its privileged status within North Korea. In
addition, it would probably require demobilizing a
significant proportion of the 1.1-million-strong
military. Yet with the economy running well below
capacity, because of a lack of energy and
investment, the retrenched soldiers could end up
joining the unemployed, or perhaps drift into
organized crime.
Although some observers
hope that North Korea's generals eventually will
emulate their Southern counterparts in the 1960s
and 1970s by setting their country on the path to
economic development, the prospects thus far are
not bright. Many generals already serve as heads
of "trading houses" that export weapons, metals
and minerals overseas. There is no evidence that
they are calling for radical reform.
Therefore, despite progress, the February
13 denuclearization deal rests on shaky ground.
Yoel Sano has worked for
publishing houses in London, providing political
and economic analysis, and has been following
Northeast Asia for many years.
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