Nuclear disarmament: Over to you, Pyongyang
By Ralph A Cossa
Hats off to US assistant secretary of state Christopher Hill. It's not exactly
clear what he told (or promised) North Korean officials during his surprise
visit to Pyongyang last week - or if the mere continuation of the
long-sought-after one-on-one direct dialogue was sufficient - but North Korea
has finally agreed to honor its commitment to begin the denuclearization
process.
As spelled out in the February 13 six-nation "action for action" agreement,
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials
are returning to North Korea to begin the process of shutting down and sealing
the country's nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.
True, the North Korean still had to be bribed to honor their promises - to the
tune of US$25 million - but in a refreshing twist, this time they were bribed
with their own money, tainted though it may have been, via the release of
frozen assets from Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macau. For this, US and South
Korean taxpayers should be thankful.
Hill, ever the optimist, is hopeful that the first phase of the February
agreement - the IAEA-monitored shutdown of all nuclear facilities at Yongbyon
in return for an initial shipment of "emergency energy assistance" equivalent
to 50,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil - can be accomplished "probably within three
weeks" and that the second phase - which includes the declaration and
dismantlement of all nuclear facilities in return for an additional 950,000
tonnes of fuel oil or equivalent in aid - will still be realized by the end of
the year.
Phase 1 was supposed to have been completed within 30 days, but the action plan
had been sidetracked because of the failure of the US administration to honor
an apparent side agreement - not contained anywhere in the February 13
declaration - to allow Pyongyang to recover its alleged ill-gotten gains from
BDA. Overcoming the "technical issues" created by its own financial
restrictions proved more difficult (and time-consuming) than anyone in
Washington had anticipated.
As (should have been) anticipated, however, Pyongyang refused to proceed until
the money was in its hands. Thanks to assistance from Dalkombank of Russia, the
money has reportedly been successfully transferred to the Foreign Trade Bank of
North Korea, for the intended (but unverifiable) purpose of "improving the
standard of people's living and humanitarian purposes" in the country.
While this action appears sufficient to allow Pyongyang to proceed with its
Phase 1 commitments, it is doubtful we have heard the last of this "financial
sanctions" issue, since overall US warnings against doing business with
Pyongyang reportedly remain in place.
One North Korean interlocutor announced at an international conference
recently, "Lifting financial sanctions is not simply a technical issue of
withdrawing some amounts." Permitting full access to the international banking
system, North Korean officials have long insisted, "serves as a yardstick
showing whether the US is willing to drop its hostile policy" toward the
country.
The "proof" sought by North Korea that this policy has been eliminated has
included demands for an end to US military exercises in the South, the
provision of light-water reactors, a peace treaty, acknowledgment of North
Korea's status as a nuclear-weapons state on a par with the US, and full
diplomatic recognition.
Without such a demonstrated commitment by Washington to "peaceful
co-existence", Pyongyang maintains, "The Korean Peninsula will hold no prospect
for denuclearization for an indefinite period." Getting past the "hostile
policy" hurdle is likely to take longer than the end of this year (and likely
to cost considerably more than the promised million tonnes of fuel oil or
equivalent of total aid).
This is not to demean the significance of this long-awaited first step, but
only to warn, as Hill himself has noted, that the US remains "burdened by the
realization of the fact that we are going to have to spend a great deal of
time, a great deal of effort and a lot of work in achieving" America's full
objectives, that is, complete denuclearization.
It is important to note also that, while the February 13 agreement is touted as
a denuclearization pact, there is no reference to North Korea's presumed
stockpile of actual weapons. It is not clear, at least from Pyongyang's
perspective, that this ultimate bargaining chip has yet been placed on the
table.
While some have criticized both the release of the funds and Hill's trip to
Pyongyang as "rewarding bad behavior", they appear a small price to pay for
shutting down the Yongbyon facilities and getting the ball rolling once again.
But while the US State Department has been playing down the significance of
Hill's visit, describing it as part of "a full range of face-to-face
consultations" in the region, similar to consultations with other members of
the six-party talks, Pyongyang needs to recognize it as the bold move that it
was, especially given that it has not yet begun the process of shutting down
its nuclear facilities.
Hill's visit should be viewed as a clear demonstration of the US
administration's sincerity and determination to move the process forward. It is
now up to Pyongyang to reciprocate. All too often, conciliatory gestures are
seen by Pyongyang as a sign of weakness or as an opportunity to make still more
demands.
This would be a huge mistake. As State Department spokesman Sean McCormack
rightly noted, the US is now at "an important moment in the six-party talks
because we are testing the proposition that North Korea has made that strategic
decision to abandon its nuclear-weapons programs and to abandon its nuclear
programs".
Further stalling and brinkmanship by Pyongyang is almost inevitable at some
point as the process proceeds toward its ultimate goal of complete
denuclearization, but a failure to proceed at this point with completion of
Phase 1 could undermine Hill's credibility - both in Washington and among his
partners at the talks, which also included China, Japan, South Korea and Russia
besides the US and North Korea - and bring the whole process to a grinding
halt.
My guess is that the "shutdown and sealing" of the Yongbyon facilities will
take place within the next few weeks. Pyongyang has little to lose here
because, at any point, it could once again expel the IAEA and restart the
reactor and reprocessing facility; abandonment or dismemberment of the
facilities is still many months (and many tonnes of aid) away. More problematic
is the "list of all its nuclear programs" that North Korea is committed to
"discuss" during Phase 1 (but apparently not actually required to provide until
Phase 2). The emphasis here is on "all".
Washington had previously made it clear that any declaration must include some
admission of the existence of a not-so-secret (but to date denied) North Korean
uranium-enrichment program. However, Hill was somewhat circumspect on this
point upon his return from Pyongyang, noting only that "we discussed the need
to have a complete list of all nuclear-weapons programs, and I would just say
that all means all". Defining "all" is likely to become the next major
stumbling block, although it remains unclear whether this crisis will occur
before or after the first phase is otherwise deemed to have been completed.
Plans are now reportedly under way for a new round of six-party talks in
Beijing, some time next month, assuming that the IAEA inspectors are back in
place by then and Yongbyon is shut down. Then there is the promised
ministerial-level six-way meeting involving US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice and her North and South Korean, Chinese, Japanese and Russian
counterparts, most likely on the sidelines of the August 2 ASEAN (Association
of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum ministerial meeting in Manila.
Rice would be ill-advised to proceed with such a meeting, however, unless all
Pyongyang's nuclear-related programs have been fully identified and discussed
by that time.
Ralph A Cossa (PacForum@hawaii.rr.com) is president of the Pacific
Forum CSIS.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
